Barbara Lee's Bill:
Ms. LEE (for herself, Ms. WOOLSEY, Mr. KUCINICH, Mr. CONYERS, and Ms. WATERS)
HR 770 IH

110th CONGRESS 1st Session

H. R. 770

To prohibit the use of funds to carry out any covert action for the purpose of causing regime change in Iran or to carry out any military action against Iran in the absence of an imminent threat, in accordance with international law and constitutional and statutory requirements for congressional authorization.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

January 31, 2007

Ms. LEE (for herself, Ms. WOOLSEY, Mr. KUCINICH, Mr. CONYERS, and Ms. WATERS) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Armed Services and Select Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

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A BILL

To prohibit the use of funds to carry out any covert action for the purpose of causing regime change in Iran or to carry out any military action against Iran in the absence of an imminent threat, in accordance with international law and constitutional and statutory requirements for congressional authorization.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

This Act may be cited as the 'Iran Nuclear Nonproliferation Act'

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:

(1) Numerous bi-partisan commissions and study groups, including the Iraq Study Group co-chaired by James A. Baker III and Lee H. Hamilton, a 2004 working group established under the Council on Foreign Relations and co-chaired by Robert Gates and Zbigniew Brzezinski, and a 2001 Atlantic Council of the United States Working Group, co-chaired by Lee H. Hamilton, James Schlesinger, and Brent Scowcroft have called for various forms of dialogue and engagement with Iran in order to achieve United States strategic interests in the Middle East region.

(2) Implementing effective strategies to deflect or deter Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, or pursuing the development of nuclear weapons capabilities, is an important United States strategic interest.

(3) Establishing a diplomatic dialogue with the Government of Iran and deepening relationships with the Iranian people would help foster greater understanding between the people of Iran and the people of the United States and would enhance the stability and security of the Persian Gulf region, including by reducing the threat of the proliferation or use of nuclear weapons in the region, while advancing other United States foreign policy objectives in that region.

(4) The Iraq Study Group Report states `Iran's interests would not be served by a failure of U.S. policy that led to chaos and the territorial disintegration of the Iraqi state', and therefore, the Government of the United States should build upon this mutual interest to develop a diplomatic dialogue with the Government of Iran concerning deteriorating conditions in Iraq, which can become a basis of broader future United States-Iranian engagement.

(5) Given the dispersal of Iran's nuclear program at sites throughout the country and their proximity to urban centers, the use of military force against Iran would be extraordinarily difficult and probably ineffective, the immediate consequences and loss of life would be drastic, and the long-term instability generated would be against long-term United States interests in the region.

(6) Any military action designed to eliminate Iran's capacity to produce nuclear weapons would run the significant risk of reinforcing and accelerating the desire of the Government of Iran to acquire a nuclear deterrent and compounding nationalist passions in defense of that very course, and would most likely also generate hostile Iranian initiatives in Iraq and Afghanistan.

(7) Together, the ongoing efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) along with corresponding multilateral sanctions recently adopted by the United Nations Security Council offer a viable path for steering Iran's nuclear efforts along peaceful lines, provided that there is close multilateral coordination and steadfastness in the adherence to the sanctions and firm United States leadership in support of the multilateral effort.



(8) According to the most definitive United States intelligence reports, Iran is likely a decade away from acquiring the know-how and material to have an option to build a nuclear weapon, and even the most pessimistic analysis by outside experts puts the timeline at least three years away, assuming Iran suffers no setbacks during development, which would be unprecedented.<>

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that--

(1) full diplomatic, political, and economic relations between the United States and Iran cannot be normalized unless and until enforceable safeguards are put in place to prevent weaponization of Iran's nuclear program and the Government of Iran ends its support for international terrorist groups, but the attainment of these policy objectives should not constitute preconditions for any diplomatic dialogue; and

(2) no congressional authorization for the use of military force in any Act of Congress enacted before the date of the enactment of this Act constitutes, either implicitly or explicitly, an authorization for the use of military force against Iran or its nuclear program. 

It is the policy of the United States not ot enter into a preemptive war against Iran in the absence of an imminent threat, and then only in accordance with international law and constitutional and statutory requirements for congressional authorization.

SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

It is the policy of the United States not ot enter into a preemptive war against Iran in the absence of an imminent threat, and then only in accordance with international law and constitutional and statutory requirements for congressional authorization.

SEC. 5. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS.

No funds appropriated or otherwise made available to the Department of Defense or any other department or agency of the Government of the United States may be used to carry out any covert action for the purpose of causing regime change in Iran or to carry out any military action against Iran in the absence of an imminent threat, in accordance with international law and constitutional and statutory requirements for congressional authorization.

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Rep. Jones Bill:  HJ 14 IH

Concerning the use of military force by the United States against Iran. (Introduced in House)

110th CONGRESS 1st Session

H. J. RES. 14

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

January 12, 2007

Mr. JONES of North Carolina introduced the following joint resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

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JOINT RESOLUTION

Concerning the use of military force by the United States against Iran.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. REQUIREMENTS CONCERNING THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST IRAN.

(a) Rule of Construction- No provision of law enacted before the date of the enactment of this joint resolution shall be construed to authorize the use of military force by the United States against Iran.

(b) Requirements- Absent a national emergency created by attack by Iran, or a demonstrably imminent attack by Iran, upon the United States, its territories or possessions or its armed forces, the President shall consult with Congress, and receive specific authorization pursuant to law from Congress, prior to initiating any use of military force against Iran.

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Robert Byrd's Bill:  SRES 39 IS

Expressing the sense of the Senate on the need for approval by the Congress before any offensive military action by the United States against another nation. (Introduced in Senate)
SRES 39 IS

110th CONGRESS 1st Session

S. RES. 39

Expressing the sense of the Senate on the need for approval by the Congress before any offensive military action by the United States against another nation.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

January 24, 2007

Mr. BYRD submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

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RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the Senate on the need for approval by the Congress before any offensive military action by the United States against another nation.

Whereas the United States has the best trained, most effective military in the world;

Whereas the United States military is made up of dedicated, patriotic men and women;

Whereas the men and women in the United States military reflect the highest values and the spirit of our Nation;

Whereas the United States Government has the responsibility to ensure that the men and women of the United States military are provided for to the fullest extent;

Whereas the United States Government has the responsibility to make certain that the lives of the men and women of the United States military are never put at risk without the utmost consideration;

Whereas military action by the United States must not be undertaken without the most careful preparation;

Whereas the Constitution of the United States is designed to meet the needs of the Nation in peace and in war and to meet any common danger to the Nation;

Whereas, in time of war and periods of emergency, in particular, the constitutional principles of separation of powers and checks and balances are most critical; and

Whereas offensive military action by the United States must not be undertaken without full and thorough debate in the Congress: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate--

(1) that, under the Constitution of the United States, it is the Congress that has the power to take the country from a state of peace to a state of war against another nation;

(2) that the framers of the Constitution understood that the President, in an emergency, may act to defend the country and repel sudden attack, but reserved the matter of offensive war to the Congress as the representatives of the people;

(3) that the Senate affirms the requirement under the Constitution that the President seek approval of the Congress before the United States undertakes offensive military action against another nation;

(4) that consultation by the President with the Congress on any United States undertaking of offensive military action against another nation must allow sufficient time for the Congress to fully debate the matter and shape national policy; and

(5) that any offensive military action by the United States against another country shall occur only after the Congress has authorized such action.

110th CONGRESS 1st Session

S. 759

To prohibit the use of funds for military operations in Iran .

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

March 5, 2007

Mr. WEBB introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

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A BILL

To prohibit the use of funds for military operations in Iran .

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS IN IRAN .

(a) Prohibition- Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no funds appropriated or otherwise made available by any Act, including any Act enacted after the date ofthe enactment of this Act, may be obligated or expended formilitaryoperations or activities within or above the territory ofIran , or within the territorial waters ofIran , except pursuant to a specific authorization of Congress enacted in a statute enacted after the date ofthe enactment of this Act.

(b) Exceptions- The prohibition in subsection (a) shall not apply with respect tomilitaryoperations or activities as follows:

(1) Militaryoperations or activities to directly repel an attack launched from within the territory ofIran .

(2) Militaryoperations or activities to directly thwart an imminent attack to be launched from within the territory ofIran .

(3) Militaryoperations or activities in hot pursuit of forces engaged outside the territory ofIran who thereafter enter into Iran .

(4) Militaryoperations or activities connected with the intelligence or intelligence-related activities ofthe United States Government.

(c) Report- Not later than 24 hours after determining to utilize funds referred toin subsection (a) for purposes of a military operation described in subsection (b), the President shall submit tothe appropriate committees of Congress a report on the determination, including a justification forthe determination.

(d) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined- In this section, the term `appropriate committees of Congress' means--

(1) the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence ofthe Senate; and

(2) the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence ofthe House of Representatives.

Expressing the sense of Congress that the President should not initiate military action against Iran without first obtaining authorization from Congress. (Introduced in Senate)

110th CONGRESS 1st Session

S. CON. RES. 13

Expressing the sense of Congress that the President should not initiate military action against Iran without first obtaining authorization from Congress.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

February 15, 2007

Mr. SANDERS submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

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CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of Congress that the President should not initiate military action against Iran without first obtaining authorization from Congress.

Whereas article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution grants Congress the power to `declare war', to `lay and collect taxes', to `provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States', to `raise and support armies', to `provide and maintain a navy', to `make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces', to `provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions', to `provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia', and to `make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof';

Whereas the Constitution also grants Congress exclusive power over the purse, stating, `No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law . . .'; 

Whereas the sole war power granted to the executive branch through the President can be found in article II, section 2, which states, `The President shall be the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States . ..'; 

Whereas President George W. Bush and his Administration have argued that this `Commander in Chief' clause grants the President wide latitude to engage United States military forces abroad without prior authorization from Congress;

Whereas the President further argues that previous unilateral actions by Presidents of both political parties add credence to this interpretation of the Constitution;

Whereas, in reality, nothing in the history of the `Commander in Chief' clause suggests that the authors of the provision intended it to grant the executive branch the authority to engage United States forces in military action without any prior authorization from Congress, except to allow the President to repel sudden attacks and immediate threats;

Whereas in the Federalist Paper Number 69, while comparing the lesser war-making power of the President of the United States with the war-making power of the King of Great Britain, Alexander Hamilton wrote, `The President is to be commander in chief of the army and navy of the United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the same with that of the king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first general and admiral of the confederacy; while that of the British king extends to the declaring of war, and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies; all which, by the constitution under consideration, would appertain to the legislature.';

Whereas James Madison declared that it is necessary to adhere to the `fundamental doctrine of the Constitution that the power to declare war is fully and exclusively vested in the legislature';

Whereas, in 1793, President George Washington, when considering how to protect inhabitants of the frontier of the United States, instructed his Administration that `no offensive expedition of importance can be undertaken until after [Congress] have deliberated upon the subject, and authorized such a measure';

Whereas, in 1801, when Thomas Jefferson sent a small squadron of frigates to the Mediterranean to protect against possible attacks by the Barbary powers, he told Congress that he was `unauthorized by the Constitution, without the sanction of Congress, to go beyond the line of defense', and further noted that it was up to Congress to authorize `measures of offense also';

Whereas, according to the most definitive United States intelligence report, Iran is several years away from developing a nuclear weapon, and even the most pessimistic analysis by outside experts predicts that Iran is at least 3 years away from developing a nuclear weapon, assuming Iran suffers no setbacks during development, which would be unprecedented;

Whereas diplomatic efforts involving Iran , the United States, the European Union, Russia, the People's Republic of China, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the United Nations Security Council continue; and

Whereas, despite these diplomatic efforts and statements by President Bush and other members of his Administration that diplomacy is the preferred route, there are an increasing number of reports that preparations for war are underway: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That Congress--

(1) strongly affirms that initiating military action against Iran without congressional approval does not fall within the President's `Commander in Chief' powers under the Constitution;

(2) rejects any suggestion that the Authorization forUseofMilitary Force (Public Law 107-40; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note), approved in response tothe terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, explicitly or implicitly extends to authorizing military action against Iran , including over its nuclear program;

(3) rejects any suggestion that the Authorization forUseofMilitary Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107-243; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note) explicitly or implicitly extends to authorizing military action against Iran , including over its nuclear program; and

(4) strongly and unequivocally affirms that seeking congressional authority prior to taking military action against Iran is not discretionary, but is a legal and constitutional requirement.

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(against escalation)

Senator Kennedy  (&--- ): S. 233

110th CONGRESS 1st Session

S. 233

To prohibit the use of funds for an escalation of United States military forces in Iraq above the numbers existing as of January 9, 2007.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

January 9, 2007   

~O~

To prohibit the use of funds for an escalation of United States military forces in Iraq above the numbers existing as of January 9, 2007. (Placed on Calendar in Senate)

S 287 PCS

Calendar No. 7 110th CONGRESS 1st Session

S. 287

To prohibit the use of funds for an escalation of United States military forces in Iraq above the numbers existing as of January 9, 2007.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

January 12, 2007

Mr. KENNEDY (for himself, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. SANDERS, Mrs. BOXER, Mr. KERRY, Mr. HARKIN, Mr. MENENDEZ, and Mr. BROWN) introduced for the first time the following bill; which was read

January 16, 2007

Read the second time and placed on the calendar

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A BILL

To prohibit the use of funds for an escalation of United States military forces in Iraq above the numbers existing as of January 9, 2007.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR ESCALATION OF UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCES IN IRAQ.

(a) Findings- Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Congress, the representatives ofthe American people, should vote before any additional United States military forces are sent to Iraq.

(2) The Authorization forUseofMilitary Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107-243) authorized a war against the regime of Saddam Hussein because he was believed to have weapons of mass destruction and to have an operational relationship with Al Qaeda and because he was in defiance of United Nations Security Council Resolutions.

(3) The mission ofthe Armed Forces ofthe United States today in Iraq no longer bears any resemblance tothe mission ofthe Armed Forces authorized by Congress inthe Authorization forUseofMilitary Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002.

(4) Iraq has descended into civil war, and sectarian violence continues to escalate.

(5) On March 5, 2006, General Nash said `[w]e're in a civil war now; it's just that not everybody's joined in' .

(6) On December 3, 2006, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan said `[w]hen we had the strife in Lebanon and other places, we called that a civil war--this is much worse'.

(7) On December 17, 2006, former Secretary of State Colin Powell said `I am not persuaded that another surge of troops into Baghdad forthe purposes of suppressing this communitarian violence, this civil war, will work'.

(8) A political solution is required in Iraq, not a military solution.

(9) The open-ended commitment ofthe Armed Forces continues to enable the Iraqis to avoid taking responsibility for their own future. Tens of thousands of additional United States troops will only serve to make the Iraqis more dependent on the United States, not less.

(10) On November 15, 2006, General Abizaid was unequivocal that increasing our troop commitment is not the answer in Iraq, saying `I've met with every divisional commander. General Casey, the corps commander, General Dempsey--we all talked together. And I said, `In your professional opinion, if we were to bring in more American troops now, does it add considerably to our ability to achieve success in Iraq?' And they all said no'.

(11) On December 29, 2006, General Casey said `[t]he longer we inthe United States forces continue to bear the main burden of Iraq's security, it lengthens the time that the government of Iraq has to make the hard decisions about reconciliation and dealing with the militias... They can continue to blame us for all of Iraq's problems, which are at base their problems'.

(12) More than 3,000 United States troops have died in Iraq, and more than 22,000 have been wounded.

(13) President George W. Bush should not be permitted to increase the number of United States troops in harm's way inthe civil war in Iraq without a new authorization from Congress that reflects the reality ofthe changed circumstances on the ground in Iraq.

(b) Prohibition- Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no Federal funds may be obligated or expended by the United States Government to increase the number of United States military forces in Iraq above the number for such forces which existed as of January 9, 2007, without a specific authorization of Congress by law for such an increase.

Calendar No. 7

110th CONGRESS 1st Session

S. 287

A BILL

To prohibit the use of funds for an escalation of United States military in Iraq above the numbers existing as of January 9, 2007. forces

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January 16, 2007

Read the second time and placed on the calendar


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Senator Feinstein: SJ 3 IS

To specify an expiration date for the authorization of use of military force under the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 and to authorize the continuing... (Introduced in Senate)

SJ 3 IS 110th CONGRESS 1st Session

S. J. RES. 3

To specify an expiration date for the authorization of use of military force under the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 and to authorize the continuing presence of United States forces in Iraq after that date for certain military operations and activities.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

February 17, 2007

Mrs. FEINSTEIN introduced the following joint resolution; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

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JOINT RESOLUTION

To specify an expiration date for the authorization of use of military force under the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 and to authorize the continuing presence of United States forces in Iraq after that date for certain military operations and activities.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. EXPIRATION OF AUTHORIZATION FOR USEOF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST IRAQ.

The authority conveyed by the Authorization forUseofMilitary Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107-243) shall expire on December 31, 2007, unless otherwise provided in a Joint Resolution (other than Public Law 107-243) enacted by Congress.

SEC. 2. ALLOWANCE FOR CERTAIN MILITARYOPERATIONS AND ACTIVITIES.

Section 1 shall not be construed as prohibiting or limiting the presence of personnel or units ofthe Armed Forces ofthe United States in Iraq after December 31, 2007, forthe following purposes:

(1) Training, equipping, and advising Iraqi security and police forces.

(2) Force protection and security for United States Armed Forces and civilian personnel.

(3) Support of Iraqi security forces for border security and protection, to be carried out with the minimum forces required for that purpose.

(4) Targeted counter-terrorism operations against al Qaeda and foreign fighters within Iraq.

(5) Logistical support in connection with activities under paragraphs (1) through (4).

To provide for the redeployment of United States forces from Iraq. (Introduced in Senate)

S 121 IS

110th CONGRESS 1st Session

S. 121

To provide for the redeployment of United States forces from Iraq.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

January 4, 2007

Mr. FEINGOLD (for himself and Mrs. BOXER) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

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A BILL

To provide for the redeployment of United States forces from Iraq.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. REDEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES FORCES FROM IRAQ.

(a) Statement of Policy- It is the policy ofthe United States to redeploy United States forces from Iraq by not later than 180 days after the date ofthe enactment of this Act, while maintaining thereafter in Iraq theof United States forces sufficient to engage directly inin minimal level targeted counterterrorism activities, train Iraq security forces, and protect United States infrastructure and personnel Iraq.

(b) Report-

(1) REPORT ON STRATEGY FOR REDEPLOYMENT- Not later than 60 days after the date ofthe enactment of this Act, theof Defense and the Secretary of State shall jointly submit to Congress a report setting forth the strategy ofthe United States forthe redeployment of United States forces from Iraq by not later than the date that is 180 days after the date ofthe enactment of this Act (in this section referred to as the `redeployment date'), inthe policy stated in Secretary accordance with subsection (a).

(2) ELEMENTS OF STRATEGY- The strategy set forth inthe report under this subsection shall include the following:

(A) A flexible schedule for redeploying United States forces from Iraq by the redeployment date, in accordance with thein subsection (a). policy stated

(B) An estimate ofthe number, size, and character of United States military units needed in Iraq after the redeployment date, for purposes of counterterrorism activities, training Iraq security forces, or protecting United States infrastructure and personnel in Iraq.

(C) A strategy for managing the regional implications oftheof United States forces from Iraq in accordance with the policy stated in subsection (a), including a description of proposed efforts to ensure a coordinated diplomatic, political, and development strategy to accompany such redeployment of United States forces. redeployment

(D) A strategy for ensuring the safety and security of United States forces in Iraq during the redeployment under the policy stated in subsection (a), and a contingency plan forin security conditions that may require a specified number of additional United States forces to remain in Iraq after the redeployment date. addressing dramatic changes

(E) A strategy for repairing and strengthening United States forces to effectively engage and defeat global terrorist networks that threaten the United States.

FEINGOLD INTRODUCES

IRAQ REDEPLOYMENT ACT OF 2007

110th CONGRESS 1st Session

S. 448

To prohibit the use of funds to continue deployment of the United States Armed Forces in Iraq beyond six months after the date of the enactment of this Act .

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

January 31, 2007

Mr. FEINGOLD (for himself, Mrs. BOXER, and Mr. LEAHY) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

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A BILL

To prohibit the use of funds to continue deployment of the United States Armed Forces in Iraq beyond six months after the date of the enactment of this Act .

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the `Iraq Redeployment Actof 2007 '.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS TO MAINTAIN ARMED FORCES IN IRAQ .

(a) Prohibition- Notwithstanding the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraqof 2002 (Public Law 107-243) and except as provided in subsection (b), no funds appropriated or otherwise made available under any provision of law may be obligated or expended to continue the deployment in Iraqof members of the United States Armed Forces after 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act . Resolution

(b) Exceptions- The prohibition under subsection (a) shall not apply to the use of funds--

(1) to conduct targeted counterterrorism operations in Iraq ;

(2) to provide security for United States infrastructure and civilian personnel;

(3) to allow a limited number of members of the Armed Forces to conduct specific training for Iraqi security services;

(4) to protect members of the Armed Forces who are performing the functions described in paragraphs (1) through (3); or

(5) to provide for the carrying out by any department or agency of the United States Government of political, economic, or general reconstruction activities in Iraq .

(c) Report-

(1) IN GENERAL- Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act , the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State shall jointly submit to Congress a report describing a strategy for the redeploymentof members of the Armed Forces from Iraq not later than 180 days after such date of enactment.

(2) CONTENT- The report required under paragraph (1) shall include--

(A) an estimate of the number of members of the Armed Forces needed to perform the activities described in paragraphs (1) through (3) of subsection (b);

(B) a strategy for managing the regional implications of the redeploymentofof the Armed Forces from Iraq and a description of the efforts that have been or will be made to ensure a coordinated diplomatic, political, and development strategy to accompany the redeployment ; members

(C) a strategy for ensuring the safety and security of members of the Armed Forces during such redeployment ; and

(D) a strategy for repairing and strengthening the Armed Forces to effectively engage and defeat global terrorist networks that threaten the United States.

***FACT SHEET: IRAQ REDEPLOYMENT ACT OF 2007

“…Congress can, and has, used the power of the purse to restrict presidential war power. If members of Congress are worried about American troops fighting for their lives in a futile war, those lives are not protected by voting for continued funding. The proper and responsible action is to terminate appropriations and bring the troops home.”

-Louis Fisher, Specialist in Constitutional Law, Law Library of Congress, in his book “Presidential War Power.”

Feingold’s legislation:

Prohibits the use of funds for continued deployment of U.S. Armed Forces to the Republic of Iraq after six months of enactment. In other words, the President would have to redeploy troops safely by that date.
Requires the Administration to report to Congress, within 60 days of enactment, a strategy for safely redeploying U.S. forces from Iraq within the six months prior to the fund termination date.
Provides specific exceptions to the prohibition for:
Conducting targeted counter-terrorism operations in Iraq.
Allowing a limited number of U.S. forces to conduct specific training for Iraqi security services.
Providing security for U.S. infrastructure and civilian personnel.
Does not prohibit funds for any department or agency of the Government of the United States to carry out political, economic, or general reconstruction activities in Iraq.
Does not prevent any U.S. troops from receiving salaries, equipment, training and other resources.

On numerous occasions, Congress has exercised its constitutional authority to end military engagements. Here are just a few examples:

Cambodia – In late December 1970, Congress passes the Supplemental Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act prohibiting the use of funds to finance the introduction of United States ground combat troops into Cambodia or to provide U.S. advisors to or for Cambodian military forces in Cambodia.
Vietnam – In late June 1973, Congress passes the second Supplemental Appropriations Act for FY1973. This legislation contains language cutting off funds for combat activities in Vietnam after August 15, 1973.
Somalia – In November 1993, the Department of Defense Appropriations Act includes a provision that prohibits funding after March 31, 1994 for military operations in Somalia, except for a limited number of military personnel to protect American diplomatic personnel and American citizens, unless further authorized by Congress.
Bosnia – In 1998, Congress passes the Defense Authorization Bill, with a provision that prohibits funding for Bosnia after June 30, 1998, unless the President makes certain assurances.

Nadler's Bill: H.R. 455 IH

HR 455 IH 110th CONGRESS 1st Session

H. R. 455

To provide for the protection of members of the United States Armed Forces and for their withdrawal from Iraq by December 31, 2007.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

January 12, 2007

Mr. NADLER (for himself and Mr. HINCHEY) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services

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A BILL

To provide for the protection of members of the United States Armed Forces and for their withdrawal from Iraq by December 31, 2007.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the `Protect the Troops and Bring Them Home Act of 2007'.

SEC. 2. WITHDRAWAL OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES FROM IRAQ.

(a) Limitations on Use of Funds-

(1) USE OF FUNDS FOR SAFE AND ORDERLY WITHDRAWAL- Funds appropriated or otherwise made available to the Department of Defense under any provision of law may be obligated or expended within the Republic of Iraq only for the purpose of providing for--

(A) the continued protection of members of the Armed Forces who are in Iraq pending their withdrawal pursuant to the schedule required by subparagraph (B); and

(B) the safe and orderly withdrawal of the United States Armed Forces from Iraq pursuant to a schedule that provides for commencement of the withdrawal not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and completion of the withdrawal not later than December 31, 2007.

(2) NO INTERRUPTION OF WITHDRAWAL- Funds appropriated or otherwise made available to the Department of Defense under any provision of law may not be obligated or expended to increase the number of members of the Armed Forces serving in Iraq at any time.

(b) Continued Provision of Certain Assistance to Iraq- Subsection (a) shall not apply to the obligation or expenditure of funds to ensure the security of Iraq and its transition to democratic rule by--

(1) carrying out consultations with the Government of Iraq, other foreign governments, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United Nations, and other international organizations;

(2) providing financial assistance or equipment to Iraqi security forces and international forces in Iraq; or

(3) providing economic or reconstruction assistance.

(c) Rule of Construction Regarding Other Federal Agency Assistance- Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit or otherwise restrict the use of funds available to any department or agency of the United States to carry out social and economic reconstruction activities in Iraq.

(d) Definition- In this section, the term `Armed Forces' has the meaning given the term in section 101(a)(4) of title 10, United States Code.

To prohibit an escalation in United States military forces in Iraq without prior authorization by Congress. (Introduced in Senate)

110th CONGRESS 1st Session

S. 308 IS

To prohibit an escalation in United States military forces in Iraq without prior authorization by Congress.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

January 16, 2007

Mr. DODD introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

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A BILL

To prohibit an escalation in United States military forces in Iraq without prior authorization by Congress.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) On October 10, 2002, Congress adopted House Joint Resolution 114 (107th Congress), the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, at the request of the President. 

(2) On October 16, 2002, House Joint Resolution 114 (107th Congress) was signed into law by President George W. Bush as Public Law 107-243.

(3) On March 19, 2003, United States forces entered Iraq to carry out Operation Iraqi Freedom.

(4) Congress honors the valor and sacrifice of United States forces in Iraq and will always endeavor to ensure that there are sufficient resources made available to support them while they are there.

(5) On March 22, 2003, President George W. Bush stated in a radio address that the objective of Operation Iraqi Freedom was `toof mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein's support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people'.  disarm Iraq of weapons

(6) On April 19, 2003, the government of Saddam Hussein in Iraq was deposed.

(7) On December 15, 2005, Iraq held democratic elections to select a new government pursuant to a constitution endorsed in a referendum conducted on October 15, 2005. 

(8) On February 22, 2006, insurgents attacked the Askariya Shrine in Samarra, Iraq, an event that ignited a wave of sectarian violence that has escalated over the ensuing months and resulted in the deaths of more than 16,000 Iraqis during 2006. 

(9) On May 21, 2006, the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki took office in Iraq.

(10) Efforts by Iraqi and United States forces in the summer and autumn of 2006, Operation Together Forward and Operation Together Forward II, have failed to halt sectarian conflict in the Iraq.  Bagdhad area of

(11) On October 5, 2006, Senator John Warner, a coauthor ofin my judgment was drawn up at a time when none of us, from the President on down, could ever envision theof this situation now, in terms ofthe possibility ofto me Congress should focus on a dramatic change if our troops are to be employed in that type of combat.  We would have toto do anything further to support the the House Joint Resolution 114 (107th Congress), stated that resolution (H.J. Res. 114) sectarian violence, and--and I underline--just a civil war.'. He further stated that `therefore it seems go back and focus on what we have done and determine whether or not we would have seriousness <> President'.

(12) On December 6, 2006, the Iraq Study Group made 79 recommendations to address the ongoing conflict in Iraq. Among the most important ofthe recommendations is a call for `new and enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and the region, and a change inthe primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq that will enable the United States to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly'.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON ESCALATION OF UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCES IN IRAQ WITHOUT PRIOR AUTHORIZATION BY CONGRESS.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the levels of United States military forces in Iraq may not exceed the levels of such forces in Iraq as of January 16, 2007, without specific authority in statute enacted by Congress after the date ofthe enactment of this Act.

  

To provide a comprehensive strategy for stabilizing Iraq and redeploying United States troops from Iraq within one year. (Introduced in Senate)

110th CONGRESS 1st Session

S. 679

To provide a comprehensive strategy for stabilizing Iraq and redeploying United States troops from Iraq within one year.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

February 17, 2007

Mr. KERRY introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

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A BILL

To provide a comprehensive strategy for stabilizing Iraq and redeploying United States troops from Iraq within one year.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. REDEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES FORCES FROM IRAQ.

(a) Redeployment of United States Forces From Iraq- The President shall complete the redeployment of United States forces from Iraq within one year of the date o fthe enactment of this Act, in accordance with a schedule negotiated with the Government of Iraq, leaving thereafter inof United States forces that are critical to -- Iraq only minimal number the

(1) completing the mission of standing up Iraqi security forces;

(2) conducting targeted and specialized counter-terrorism operations ; and

(3) protecting United States facilities and personnel.

(b) Change of Priorities to Training Iraqi Security Forces- The President shall--

(1) immediately change United States military priorities in Iraq by giving the highest priority to the training, equipping, advising, and support of Iraqi security forces; and

(2) accelerate the redeployment of United States forces within Iraq to rear-guard, garrisoned status for security back-up, border security, training, and emergency response.

(c) Enforcement of Benchmarks- The President shall enforce benchmarks tied to specific dates for progress, as agreed upon by the Government of Iraq, in meeting key objectives on national reconciliation, security, and governance in Iraq, by conditioning United States political, military , and economic assistance to Iraq on meeting such benchmarks. 

(d) Maintenance of Over-the -Horizon Troop Presence- The President shall maintain an over-the -horizon troop presence in the Middle East region to prosecute the war on terror and protect regional security interests.

(e) Statement of No Permanent United States Military Bases in Iraq- The  President shall state publicly that the United States does not seek to establish or maintain military bases in Iraq.

SEC. 2. DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES ON IRAQ.

(a) Summits-

(1) IN GENERAL- The President shall work with the leaders  of Iraq, and engage in the diplomacy necessary, to summits for theof reaching a sustainable agreement on Iraq that engenders the support of Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds by-- Government convene, as soon as possible, a summit, or series purpose

(A) ensuring the equitable distribution ofthe oil revenues of Iraq;

(B) disbanding militias in Iraq;

(C) strengthening internal security and deterring foreign interference in Iraq;

(D) reviving reconstruction efforts in Iraq and fulfilling related international economic aid commitments with respect to Iraq;

(E) securing the borders of Iraq;

(F) supporting the national reconciliation commission of Iraq;

(G) reintegrating former Ba'athists into Iraqi society;

(H) resolving the final status of Kirkuk; and

(I) providing for a sustainable federalist structure in Iraq.

(2) PARTICIPANTS- Participants in the summit or summits under this subsection should include the following:

(A) Leaders of the governments of each country bordering Iraq, including Turkey, Iran , and Syria.

(B) Representatives of the Arab League.

(C) The Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

(D) Representatives of the European Union.

(E) Leaders of the governments of each permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.

(b) Establishment of International Support Group for Iraq-

(1) IN GENERAL- The President shall organize, as soon as possible, an international support group working collectively for Iraq for the purpose of bringing stability to Iraq. 

(2) PARTICIPANTS- The international support group under this subsection should consist of the following:

(A) Each country bordering Iraq, including Turkey, Iran , and Syria.

(B) Representative countries from the Arab League.

(C) The Secretary General ofthe North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

(D) Representatives countries from the European Union.

(E) Each permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.

(c) Establishment of Regional Security Alliance- The President shall create a new regional security alliance that strengthens the security in the Middle East region through a phased process that includes enhanced security assistance programs, joint exercises, and coordinated diplomatic initiatives. 

SEC. 3. RECONSTRUCTION INITIATIVES IN IRAQ.

(a) Senior Advisor for Economic Reconstruction in Iraq-

(1) APPOINTMENT- The President shall appoint a senior advisor to oversee the coordination of reconstruction efforts in Iraq among United States agencies, Iraq agencies, and international partners (including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and international humanitarian agencies) in order to foster greater United States interagency cooperation on Iraq and avoid duplicative programs and activities in the reconstruction of Iraq.

(2) REPORT TO PRESIDENT- The senior advisor appointed under paragraph (1) shall report directly to the President with respect to  the senior advisor under that paragraph. activities undertaken by

(b) Expedited Disbursement of Reconstruction Funds - The President shall provide the Chief of Mission in Iraq authority as follows:

(1) Authority to spend significant funds through a program having a structure similar to  the structure of the Commander's Emergency Response Program.

(2) Authority to rescind United States funds from projects in which the Government of Iraq is not demonstrating an effective partnership with the United States.

(c) Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Militias-

(1) IN GENERAL- The President shall work to create security conditions in Iraq in which reconstruction efforts can succeed by providing financial and technical support to a program to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate militia members in Iraq.

(2) ASSISTANCE- In carrying out paragraph (1), the President shall establish in Iraq an office to coordinate assistance and support of the neutral international experts as advisors to Iraq on the processes of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of militias. 

SEC. 4. REAUTHORIZATION OF USE OF MILITARY FORCE IN IRAQ BY CONGRESS.

(a) Fulfillment of Original Authorization- Congress declares that the reasons for which the authorization for use of military force in Iraq were granted to the President by Congress pursuant to the Authorization for of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107-243), namely (1) to defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq, and (2) to Use enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq, have been achieved. purposes

(b) New Authorization- Effective as of the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall be authorized to use military force in Iraq solely for the implementing of the strategy set forth in sections 1, 2, and 3. purpose

SEC. 5. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.

(a) Plan for Implementation of Strategy-

(1) PLAN REQUIRED- Not later than 60 days after the date oftheofthe Secretary of Defense shall, inthe Secretary of State, submit to Congress a report that sets forth a plan for implementing the strategy set forth in enactment consultation with sections 1, 2, and 3. this Act,

(2) ELEMENTS- The plan required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) The schedule for redeploying United States forces from Iraq within one year ofthe date ofthe enactment of this Act, as developed pursuant to section 1(a).

(B) A strategy for ensuring the safety and security of United States forces in Iraq during and after such redeployment.

(C) The number, size, and character of United States militaryin Iraq after such redeployment for purposes oftheof standing up Iraqi security forces, conducting targeted and specialized counter-terrorism operations , and protecting United States facilities and personnel. units needed completing mission

(D) A strategy for addressing the regional implications ofinto ensure a coordinated diplomatic, political, and development strategy to accompany such redeployment. redeploying United States forces from Iraq accordance with section 1(a), including efforts that will be made

(E) Contingency plans for using over-the -horizon forces deployed inthe Middle East region pursuant to section 1(d) totothe United States that may arise in Iraq and throughout the address threats region.

(F) A strategy for redeploying United States forces tothe effectively engage and defeat global terrorist networks that threaten United States.

(G) A schedule for completing the diplomatic initiatives set forth in section 2.

(H) A schedule for completing the reconstruction initiatives set forth in section 3.

(b) Reports on Implementation of Strategy- Not later than 60 days after the date ofthe submittal ofthe report required by subsection (a), and every 60 days thereafter, the Secretary of Defense shall, in consultation with the Secretary of State, submit to Congress a report on the actions taken to implement the strategy set forth in sections 1, 2, and 3.

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SCON 2 IS

110th CONGRESS 1st Session

S. CON. RES. 2

Expressing the bipartisan resolution on Iraq.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

January 17, 2007

Mr. BIDEN (for himself, Mr. HAGEL, Mr. LEVIN, and Ms. SNOWE) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

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CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Expressing the bipartisan resolution on Iraq.

Whereas the United States strategy and presence on the ground in Iraq can only be sustained with the support of the American people and bipartisan support from Congress;

Whereas maximizing chances of success in Iraq should be our goal, and theofin current strategy; best chance success requires a change

Whereas the situation in Iraq is damaging the standing, influence, and interests of the United States in Iraq, the Middle East, and around the world;

Whereas more than 137,000 United States military personnel are bravely and honorably serving in Iraq and deserve the support of all Americans;

Whereas more than 3,000 United States military personnel have already lost their lives in Iraq, and more than 22,500 have been wounded in Iraq;

Whereas on January 10, 2007, President George W. Bush announced his plan to deepen the United States military involvement in Iraq by deploying approximately 21,000 additional United States combat forces to Iraq;

Whereas Iraq is witnessing widening sectarian and intra-sectarian violence;

Whereas Iraqis must reach a political settlement if there is going to be a reconciliation in Iraq, and the failure of the Iraqis to achieve such a settlement has led to the increase in violence in Iraq;

Whereas Iraq Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki stated on November 27, 2006, that `[t]he crisis is political, and the ones who can stop the cycle of aggravation and bloodletting of innocents are the politicians.';

Whereas an open-ended commitment of United States forces in Iraq is unsustainable and a deterrent to the Iraqis making the political compromises and providing the personnel and resources that are needed for violence to end and for stability and security to be achieved in Iraq;

Whereas the responsibility for internal security and halting sectarian violence inthe Government of Iraq and Iraqi security forces; Iraq must rest primarily with

Whereas there have been repeated promises by the Government of Iraq tooftothe Iraq constitution, enact laws to reconcile sectarian differences, and improve theof life for the Iraqi people, but those promises have not been kept; assume a greater share security responsibilities, disband militias, consider amendments quality

Whereas a successful strategy in Iraq is dependent upon the Iraqi leaders fulfilling their promises;

Whereas the commander of the United States Central Command, General John Abizaid, testified to Congress on November 15, 2006, that `[i]t's easy forthe Iraqis to rely upon us to do this work. I believe that more American forces prevent the Iraqis from taking more responsibility for their own future';

Whereas the Iraq Study Group suggested a comprehensive strategy to `enable the United States to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly' based on `new and enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and the region';

Whereas the United States Army and Marine Corps, including their Reserves and the Army National Guard, their personnel, and their families, are under enormous strain from multiple, extended deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan;

Whereas the majority of nondeployed Army and Marine Corps units are no longer combat ready due to a lack of equipment and insufficient time to train; and

Whereas the United States strategy in Iraq must not compromise the ability ofthe United States to address other vital national security priorities, inofof mass destruction, regional stability in the Middle East, the nuclear program of Iran , the nuclear weapons ofin Afghanistan: Now, therefore, be it North Korea, and stability and security particular global terror networks, proliferation weapons

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring),theof That it is sense Congress that--

(1) it is not inthe national interest ofthe United States to deepen its military involvement in Iraq, particularly by escalating the United States military force presence in Iraq;

(2) the primary objective of United States strategy in Iraq should be to have the Iraqi political leaders make the political compromises necessary to end the violence in Iraq;

(3) greater concerted regional, and international support would assist the Iraqis in achieving a political solution and national reconciliation;

(4) main elements ofthe mission of United States forces in Iraq should transition to helping ensure the territorial integrity of Iraq, conduct counterterrorism activities, reduce regional interference inthe internal affairs of Iraq, and accelerate training of Iraqi troops;

(5) the United States should transfer, under an appropriately expedited timeline, responsibility for internal security and halting sectarian violence in Iraq tothe Government of Iraq and Iraqi security forces; and

(6) the United States should engage nations inthe Middle East to for Iraq.

develop a regional, internationally-sponsored peace and reconciliation process

Calendar No. 12

110th CONGRESS 1st Session

S. CON. RES. 2

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Expressing the bipartisan resolution on Iraq.

Senator Reid:  S 574 PCS

To express the sense of Congress on Iraq. (Placed on Calendar in Senate)

Calendar No. 25 110th CONGRESS 1st Session

S. 574

To express the sense of Congress on Iraq.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

February 13, 2007

Mr. REID introduced the following bill; which was read the first time

February 14, 2007

Read the second time and placed on the calendar

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A BILL

To express the sense of Congress on Iraq.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON IRAQ.

It is the sense of Congress that--

(1) Congress and the American people will continue to support and protect the members ofthe United States Armed Forces who are serving or who have served bravely and honorably in Iraq; and

(2) Congress disapproves ofthe decision of President George W. Bush announced on January 10, 2007, to deploy more than 20,000 additional United States combat troops to Iraq.

SEC. 2. FREQUENCY OF REPORTS ON CERTAIN ASPECTS OF POLICY AND OPERATIONS .

The United States Policy in Iraq Act (section 1227 of Public Law 109-163; 119 Stat. 3465; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

`(d) Frequency of Reports on Certain Aspects of United States Policy and MilitaryOperationsin Iraq- Not later than 30 days after the date oftheof this subsection, and every 30 days thereafter until all United States combat brigades have redeployed from Iraq, the President shall submit to Congress a report on the matters set forth in paragraphs (1)(A), (1)(B), and (2) of subsection (c). Tothe maximum extent practicable each report shall be unclassified, with a classified annex if necessary.'. enactment

Calendar No. 25

110th CONGRESS 1st Session

S. 574

A BILL

To express the sense of Congress on Iraq.

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February 14, 2007