Antifederalist No. 11

UNRESTRICTED POWER OVER COMMERCE SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN THE NATIONAL 
GOVERNMENT 



Scholars regard James Winthrop of Cambridge, Mass. to be the 
"Agrippa" who contributed the series to The Massachusetts Gazette 
from November 23, 1787 to February 5, 1788.  This is a 
compilation of excerpts from "Agrippa's" letters of December 14, 
18, 25, and 28, 1787, taken from Ford, Essays, pp. 70-73, 76-77, 
79-81. 


    It has been proved, by indisputable evidence, that power is 
not the grand principle of union among the parts of a very 
extensive empire; and that when this principle is pushed beyond 
the degree necessary for rendering justice between man and man, 
it debases the character of individuals, and renders them less 
secure in their persons and property.  Civil liberty consists in 
the consciousness of that security, and is best guarded by 
political liberty, which is the share that every citizen has in 
the government. Accordingly all our accounts agree, that in those 
empires which are commonly called despotic, and which comprehend 
by far the greatest part of the world, the government is most 
fluctuating, and property least secure.  In those countries 
insults are borne by the sovereign, which, if offered to one of 
our governors, would fill us with horror, and we should think the 
government dissolving. 
      The common conclusion from this reasoning is an exceedingly 
unfair one, that we must then separate, and form distinct 
confederacies.  This would be true if there was no principle to 
substitute in the room of power. Fortunately there is one.  This 
is commerce.  All the states have local advantages, and in a 
considerable degree separate interests.  They are, therefore, in 
a situation to supply each other's wants.  Carolina, for 
instance, is inhabited by planters, while Massachusetts is more 
engaged in commerce and manufactures.  Congress has the power of 
deciding their differences.  The most friendly intercourse may 
therefore be established between them.  A diversity of produce, 
wants and interests, produces commerce; and commerce, where there 
is a common, equal and moderate authority to preside, produces 
friendship. 
     The same principles apply to the connection with the new 
settlers in the west.  Many supplies they want, for which they 
must look to the older settlements, and the greatness of their 
crops enables them to make payments.  Here, then, we have a bond 
of -union which applies to all parts of the empire, and would 
continue to operate if the empire comprehended all America. 
     We are now, in the strictest sense of the terms, a federal 
republic.  Each part has within its own limits the sovereignty 
over its citizens, while some of the general concerns are 
committed to Congress.  The complaints of the deficiency of the 
Congressional powers are confined to two articles.  They are not 
able to raise a revenue by taxation, and they have not a complete 
regulation of the intercourse between us and foreigners. For each 
of these complaints there is some foundation, but not enough to 
justify the clamor which has been raised. . . . 
     The second article of complaint against the present 
confederation . . . is that Congress has not the sole power to 
regulate the intercourse between us and foreigners.  Such a power 
extends not only to war and peace, but to trade and 
naturalization.  This last article ought never to be given them; 
for though most of the states may be willing for certain reasons 
to receive foreigners as citizens, yet reasons of equal weight 
may induce other states, differently circumstanced, to keep their 
blood pure.  Pennsylvania has chosen to receive all that would 
come there.  Let any indifferent person judge whether that state 
in point of morals, education, [or] energy, is equal to any of 
the eastern states; the small state of Rhode Island only 
excepted.  Pennsylvania in the course of a century has acquired 
her present extent and population at the expense of religion and 
good morals.  The eastern states have, by keeping separate from 
the foreign mixtures, acquired their present greatness in the 
course of a century and an half, and have preserved their 
religion and morals.  They have also preserved that manly virtue 
which is equally fitted for rendering them respectable in war, 
and industrious in peace. 
     The remaining power for peace and trade might perhaps be 
safely lodged with Congress under some limitations.  Three 
restrictions appear to me to be essentially necessary to preserve 
that equality of rights to the states, which it is the object of 
the state governments to secure to each citizen.  1st.  It ought 
not to be in the power of Congress, either by treaty or 
otherwise, to alienate part of any state without the consent of 
the legislature. 2nd.  They ought not to be able, by treaty or 
other law, to give any legal preference to one part above 
another. 3rd.  They ought to be restrained from creating any 
monopolies.... 
     The idea of consolidation is further kept up in the right 
given to regulate trade.  Though this power under certain 
limitations would be a proper one for the department of Congress, 
it is in this system carried much too far, and much farther than 
is necessary.  This is, without exception, the most commercial 
state upon the continent.  Our extensive coasts, cold climate, 
small estates, and equality of rights, with a variety of 
subordinate and concurring circumstances, place us in this 
respect at the head of the Union.  We must, therefore, be 
indulged if a point which so nearly relates to our welfare be 
rigidly examined.  The new constitution not only prohibits 
vessels, bound from one state to another, from paying any duties, 
but even from entering and clearing.  The only use of such a 
regulation is, to keep each state in complete ignorance of its 
own resources.  It certainly is no hardship to enter and clear at 
the custom house, and the expense is too small to be an object. 
     The unlimited right to regulate trade, includes the right of 
granting exclusive charters.  This, in all old countries, is 
considered as one principal branch of prerogative.  We find 
hardly a country in Europe which has not felt the ill effects of 
such a power.  Holland has carried the exercise of it farther 
than any other state, and the reason why that country has felt 
less evil from it is, that the territory is very small, and they 
have drawn large revenues from their colonies in the East and 
West Indies.  In this respect, the whole country is to be 
considered as a trading company, having exclusive privileges.  
The colonies are large in proportion to the parent state; so 
that, upon the whole, the latter may gain by such a system.  We 
are also to take into consideration the industry which the genius 
of a free government inspires. But in the British islands all 
these circumstances together have not prevented them from being 
injured by the monopolies created there.  Individuals have been 
enriched, but the country at large has been hurt.  Some valuable 
branches of trade being granted to companies, who transact their 
business in London, that city is, perhaps, the place of the 
greatest trade in the world.  But Ireland, under such influence, 
suffers exceedingly, and is impoverished; and Scotland is a mere 
by-word.  Bristol, the second city in England, ranks not much 
above this town [Boston] in population.  These things must be 
accounted for by the incorporation of trading companies; and if 
they are felt so severely in countries of small extent, they will 
operate with tenfold severity upon us, who inhabit an immense 
tract; and living towards one extreme of an extensive empire, 
shall feel the evil, without retaining that influence in 
government, which may enable us to procure redress.  There ought, 
then, to have been inserted a restraining clause which might 
prevent the Congress from making any such grant, because they 
consequentially defeat the trade of the out-ports, and are also 
injurious to the general commerce, by enhancing prices and 
destroying that rivalship which is the great stimulus to 
industry. . . . 
     There cannot be a doubt, that, while the trade of this 
continent remains free, the activity of our countrymen will 
secure their full share.  AR the estimates for the present year, 
let them be made by what party they may, suppose the balance of 
trade to be largely in our favor.  The credit of our merchants 
is, therefore, fully established in foreign countries. This is a 
sufficient proof, that when business is unshackled, it will find 
out that channel which is most friendly to its course.  We ought, 
therefore, to be exceedingly cautious about diverting or 
restraining it.  Every day produces fresh proofs, that people, 
under the immediate pressure of difficulties, do not, at first 
glance, discover the proper relief.  The last year, a desire to 
get rid of embarrassments induced many honest people to agree to 
a tender act, and many others, of a different description, to 
obstruct the courts of justice.  Both these methods only 
increased the evil they were intended to cure.  Experience has 
since shown that, instead of trying to lesson an evil by altering 
the present course of things, that every endeavor should have 
been applied to facilitate the course of law, and thus to 
encourage a mutual confidence among the citizens, which increases 
the resources of them all, and renders easy the payment of debts.  
By this means one does not grow rich at the expense of another, 
but all are benefited.  The case is the same with the States. 
Pennsylvania, with one port and a large territory, is less 
favorably situated for trade than Massachusetts, which has an 
extensive coast in proportion to its limits of jurisdiction.  
Accordingly a much larger proportion of our people are engaged in 
maritime affairs.  We ought therefore to be particularly 
attentive to securing so great an interest.  It is vain to tell 
us that we ought to overlook local interests.  It is only by 
protecting local concerns that the interest of the whole is 
preserved.  No man when he enters into society does it from a 
view to promote the good of others, but he does it for his own 
good.  All men having the same view are bound equally to promote 
the welfare of the whole.  To recur then to such a principle as 
that local interests must be disregarded, is requiring of one man 
to do more than another, and is subverting the foundation of a 
free government.  The Philadelphians would be shocked with a 
proposition to place the seat of general government and the 
unlimited right to regulate trade in Massachusetts.  There can be 
no greater reason for our surrendering the preference to them.  
Such sacrifices, however we may delude ourselves with the form of 
words, always originate in folly, and not in generosity. 
                         AGRIPPA