Antifederalist No. 23
CERTAIN POWERS NECESSARY FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE, CAN AND SHOULD
BE LIMITED
In Federalist No. 23, Alexander Hamilton spoke of the necessity
for an energetic government. "BRUTUS" replied.
Taken from the 7th and 8th essays of "Brutus" in The New-York
Journal, January 3 and 10, 1788.
In a confederated government, where the powers are divided
between the general and the state government, it is essential . .
. that the revenues of the country, without which no government
can exist, should be divided between them, and so apportioned to
each, as to answer their respective exigencies, as far as human
wisdom can effect such a division and apportionment....
No such allotment is made in this constitution, but every
source of revenue is under the control of Congress; it therefore
follows, that if this system is intended to be a complex and not
a simple, a confederate and not an entire consolidated
government, it contains in it the sure seeds of its own
dissolution. One of two things must happen. Either the new
constitution will become a mere nudum pactum, and all the
authority of the rulers under it be cried down, as has happened
to the present confederacy. Or the authority of the individual
states will be totally supplanted, and they will retain the mere
form without any of the powers of government. To one or the
other of these issues, I think, this new government, if it is
adopted, will advance with great celerity.
It is said, I know, that such a separation of the sources of
revenue, cannot be made without endangering the public safety-
"unless (says a writer) [Alexander Hamilton] it can be shown that
the circumstances which may affect the public safety are
reducible within certain determinate limits; unless the contrary
of this position can be fairly and rationally disputed, it must
be admitted, as a necessary consequence, that there can be no
limitation of that authority which is to provide for the defense
and protection of the community, etc."(1) (1 Federalist, No. 23.)
The pretended demonstration of this writer will instantly
vanish, when it is considered, that the protection and defense of
the community is not intended to be entrusted solely into the
hands of the general government, and by his own confession it
ought not to be. It is true this system commits to the general
government the protection and defense of the community against
foreign force and invasion, against piracies and felonies on the
high seas, and against insurrection among ourselves. They are
also authorized to provide for the administration of justice in
certain matters of a general concern, and in some that I think
are not so. But it ought to be left to the state governments to
provide for the protection and defense of the citizen against the
hand of private violence, and the wrongs done or attempted by
individuals to each other. Protection and defense against the
murderer, the robber, the thief, the cheat, and the unjust
person, is to be derived from the respective state governments.
The just way of reasoning therefore on this subject is this, the
general government is to provide for the protection and defense
of the community against foreign attacks, etc. They therefore
ought to have authority sufficient to effect this, so far as is
consistent with the providing for our internal protection and
defense. The state governments are entrusted with the care of
administering justice among its citizens, and the management of
other internal concerns; they ought therefore to retain power
adequate to that end. The preservation of internal peace and
good order, and the due administration of law and justice, ought
to be the first care of every government. The happiness of a
people depends infinitely more on this than it does upon all that
glory and respect which nations acquire by the most brilliant
martial achievements. And I believe history will furnish but few
examples of nations who have duly attended to these, who have
been subdued by foreign invaders. If a proper respect and
submission to the laws prevailed over all orders of men in our
country; and if a spirit of public and private justice, economy,
and industry influenced the people, we need not be under any
apprehensions but what they would be ready to repel any invasion
that might be made on the country. And more than this, I would
not wish from them. A defensive war is the only one I think
justifiable. I do not make these observations to prove, that a
government ought not to be authorised to provide for the
protection and defense of a country against external enemies, but
to show that this is not the most important, much less the only
object of their care.
The European governments are almost all of them framed, and
administered with a view to arms, and war, as that in which their
chief glory consists. They mistake the end of government. It
was designed to save men's lives, not to destroy them. We ought
to furnish the world with an example of a great people, who in
their civil institutions hold chiefly in view, the attainment of
virtue, and happiness among ourselves. Let the monarchs in
Europe share among them the glory of depopulating countries, and
butchering thousands of their innocent citizens, to revenge
private quarrels, or to punish an insult offered to a wife, a
mistress, or a favorite. I envy them not the honor, and I pray
heaven this country may never be ambitious of it. The czar Peter
the great, acquired great glory by his arms; but all this was
nothing, compared with the true glory which he obtained, by
civilizing his rude and barbarous subjects, diffusing among them
knowledge, and establishing and cultivating the arts of life. By
the former he desolated countries, and drenched the earth with
human blood; by the latter he softened the ferocious nature of
his people, and pointed them to the means of human happiness.
The most important end of government then, is the proper
direction of its internal police, and economy; this is the
province of the state governments, and it is evident, and is
indeed admitted, that these ought to be under their control. Is
it not then preposterous, and in the highest degree absurd, when
the state governments are vested with powers so essential to the
peace and good order of society, to take from them the means of
their own preservation?
The idea that the powers of congress in respect to revenue
ought to be unlimited, because 'the circumstances which may
affect the public safety are not reducible to certain determinate
limits' is novel, as it relates to the government of the United
States. The inconveniencies which resulted from the feebleness
of the present confederation was discerned, and felt soon after
its adoption. It was soon discovered, that a power to require
money, without either the authority or means to enforce a
collection of it, could not be relied upon either to provide for
the common defense, discharge the national debt, or for support
of government. Congress therefore, as early as February 1781,
recommended to the states to invest them with a power to levy an
impost of :five per cent ad valorem, on all imported goods, as a
fund to be appropriated to discharge the debts already
contracted, or which should hereafter be contracted for the
support of the war, to be continued until the debts should be
fully and finally discharged. There is not the most distant idea
held out in this act, that an unlimited power to collect taxes,
duties and excises was necessary to be vested in the United
States, and yet this was a time of the most pressing danger and
distress. The idea then was, that if certain definite funds were
assigned to the union, which were certain in their natures,
productive, and easy of collection, it would enable them to
answer their engagements, and provide for their defense, and the
impost of five per cent was fixed upon for the purpose.
This same subject was revived in the winter and spring
of 1783, and after a long consideration of the subject, many
schemes were proposed. The result was, a recommendation of the
revenue system of April 1783; this system does not suggest an
idea that it was necessary to grant the United States unlimited
authority in matters of revenue. A variety of amendments were
proposed to this system, some of which are upon the journals of
Congress, but it does not appear that any of them proposed to
invest the general government with discretionary power to raise
money. On the contrary, all of them limit them to certain
definite objects, and fix the bounds over which they could not
pass. This recommendation was passed at the conclusion of the
war, and was founded on an estimate of the whole national debt.
It was computed, that one million and an half of dollars, in
addition to the impost, was a sufficient sum to pay the annual
interest of the debt, and gradually to abolish the principal.
Events have proved that their estimate was sufficiently liberal,
as the domestic debt appears upon its being adjusted to be less
than it was computed; and since this period a considerable
portion of the principal of the domestic debt has been discharged
by the sale of the western lands. It has been constantly urged
by Congress, and by individuals, ever since, until lately, that
had this revenue been appropriated by the states, as it was
recommended, it would have been adequate to every exigency of the
union. Now indeed it is insisted, that all the treasures of the
country are to be under the control of that body, whom we are to
appoint to provide for our protection and defense against foreign
enemies. The debts of the several states, and the support of the
governments of them are to trust to fortune and accident. If the
union should not have occasion for all the money they can raise,
they will leave a portion for the state, but this must be a
matter of mere grace and favor. Doctrines like these would not
have been listened to by any state in the union, at a time when
we were pressed on every side by a powerful enemy, and were
called upon to make greater exertions than we have any reason to
expect we shall ever be again. . . .
I may be asked to point out the sources, from which the
general government could derive a sufficient revenue, to answer
the demands of the union. ... There is one source of revenue,
which it is agreed, the general government ought to have the sole
control of. This is an impost upon all goods imported from
foreign countries. This would, of itself, be very productive,
and would be collected with ease and certainty. It will be a
fund too, constantly increasing, for our commerce will grow with
the productions of the country. And these, together with our
consumption of foreign goods, wilt increase with our population.
It is said, that the impost will not produce a sufficient sum to
satisfy the demands of the general government; perhaps it would
not.... My own opinion is, that the objects from which the
general government should have authority to raise a revenue,
should be of such a nature, that the tax should be raised by
simple laws, with few officers, with certainty and expedition,
and with the least interference with the internal police of the
states. Of this nature is the impost on imported goods. And it
appears to me that a duty on exports, would also be of this
nature. Therefore, for ought I can discover, this would be the
best source of revenue to grant the general government. I know
neither the Congress nor the state legislatures will have
authority under the new constitution to raise a revenue in this
way. But I cannot perceive the reason of the restriction. It
appears to me evident, that a tax on articles exported, would be
as nearly equal as any that we can expect to lay, and it
certainly would be collected with more ease and less expense than
any direct tax. I do not however, contend for this mode; it may
be liable to well founded objections that have not occurred to
me. But this I do contend for, that some mode is practicable, and
that limits must be marked between the general government, and
the states on this head, or if they be not, either the Congress
in the exercise of this power, will deprive the state
legislatures of the means of their existence, or the states by
resisting the constitutional authority of the general government,
will render it nugatory....
The next powers vested by this Constitution in the general
government, which we shall consider, are those which authorize
them to "borrow money on the credit of the United States, and to
raise and support armies." I take these two together and connect
them with the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and
excises, because their extent, and the danger that will arise
from the exercise of these powers, cannot be fully understood,
unless they are viewed in relation to each other.
The power to borrow money is general and unlimited, and the
clause so often before referred to, authorizes the passing [of]
any laws proper and necessary to carry this into execution.
Under this authority, Congress may mortgage any or all the
revenues of the union, as a fund to loan money upon; and it is
probable, in this way, they may borrow of foreign nations, a
principal sum, the interest of which will be equal to the annual
revenues of the country. By this means, they may create a
national debt, so large, as to exceed the ability of the country
ever to sink. I can scarcely contemplate a greater calamity that
could befall this country, than to be loaded with a debt
exceeding their ability ever to discharge. If this be a just
remark, it is unwise and improvident to vest in the general
government a power to borrow at discretion, without any
limitation or restriction.
It may possibly happen that the safety and welfare of the
country may require, that money be borrowed, and it is proper
when such a necessity arises that the power should be exercised
by the general government. But it certainly ought never to be
exercised, but on the most urgent occasions, and then we should
not borrow of foreigners if we could possibly avoid it.
The constitution should therefore have so restricted the
exercise of this power as to have rendered it very difficult for
the government to practice it. The present confederation
requires the assent of nine states to exercise this, and a number
of other important powers of the confederacy. It would certainly
have been a wise provision in this constitution, to have made it
necessary that two thirds of the members should assent to
borrowing money. When the necessity was indispensable, this
assent would always be given, and in no other cause ought it to
be.
The power to raise armies is indefinite and unlimited, and
authorises the raising [of] forces, as well in peace as in war.
Whether the clause which empowers the Congress to pass all laws
which are proper and necessary, to carry this into execution,
will not authorise them to impress men for the army, is a
question well worthy [of] consideration. If the general
legislature deem it for the general welfare to raise a body of
troops, and they cannot be procured by voluntary enlistments, it
seems evident, that it will be proper and necessary to effect it,
that men be impressed from the militia to make up the deficiency.
These powers taken in connection, amount to this: that the
general government have unlimited authority and control over all
the wealth and all the force of the union. The advocates for
this scheme, would favor the world with a new discovery, if they
would show, what kind of freedom or independency is left to the
state governments, when they cannot command any part of the
property or of the force of the country, but at the will of the
Congress. It seems to me as absurd, as it would be to say, that
I was free and independent, when I had conveyed all my property
to another, and was tenant to him, and had beside, given an
indenture of myself to serve him during life. . . .