Antifederalist No. 24

OBJECTIONS TO A STANDING ARMY   (PART I)

BRUTUS



The first essay is taken from the ninth letter of "BRUTUS" which 
appeared in The New-York Journal, January 17, 1788. 



    . . . . Standing armies are dangerous to the liberties of a 
people. . . . [If] necessary, the truth of the position might be 
confirmed by the history of almost every nation in the world.  A 
cloud of the most illustrious patriots of every age and country, 
where freedom has been enjoyed, might be adduced as witnesses in 
support of the sentiment.  But I presume it would be useless, to 
enter into a labored argument, to prove to the people of America, 
a position which has so long and so generally been received by 
them as a kind of axiom. 
     Some of the advocates for this new system controvert this 
sentiment, as they do almost every other that has been maintained 
by the best writers on free government.  Others, though they will 
not expressly deny, that standing armies in times of peace are 
dangerous, yet join with these in maintaining, that it is proper 
the general government should be vested with the power to do it.  
I shall now proceed to examine the arguments they adduce in 
support of their opinions. 
     A writer, in favor of this system, treats this objection as 
a ridiculous one. He supposes it would be as proper to provide 
against the introduction of Turkish Janizaries, or against making 
the Alcoran a rule of faith.' 

     {1 A citizen of America [Noah Webster], An Examination Into 
the Leading Principles of the Federal Constitution proposed by 
the late Convention held at Philadelphia.  With Answers to the 
Principal Objections Raised Against the System (Philadelphia, 
1787), reprinted in Ford (ed.), Pamphlets pp. 29-65.} 

    From the positive, and dogmatic manner, in which this author 
delivers his opinions, and answers objections made to his 
sentiments-one would conclude, that he was some pedantic 
pedagogue who had been accustomed to deliver his dogmas to 
pupils, who always placed implicit faith in what he delivered. 
    But, why is this provision so ridiculous?  Because, says this 
author, it is unnecessary.  But, why is it unnecessary?  Because, 
"the principles and habits, as well as the power of the Americans 
are directly opposed to standing armies; and there is as little 
necessity to guard against them by positive constitutions, as to 
prohibit the establishment of the Mahometan religion." It is 
admitted then, that a standing army in time of peace is an evil. 
I ask then, why should this government be authorised to do evil?  
If the principles and habits of the people of this country are 
opposed to standing armies in time of peace, if they do not 
contribute to the public good, but would endanger the public 
liberty and happiness, why should the government be vested with 
the power?  No reason can be given, why rulers should be 
authorised to do, what, if done, would oppose the principles and 
habits of the people, and endanger the public safety; but there 
is every reason in the world, that they should be prohibited from 
the exercise of such a power.  But this author supposes, that no 
danger is to be apprehended from the exercise of this power, 
because if armies are kept up, it will be by the people 
themselves, and therefore, to provide against it would be as 
absurd as for a man to "pass a law in his family, that no troops 
should be quartered in his family by his consent." This reasoning 
supposes, that the general government is to be exercised by the 
people of America themselves.  But such an idea is groundless and 
absurd.  There is surely a distinction between the people and 
their rulers, even when the latter are representatives of the 
former.  They certainly are not identically the same, and it 
cannot be disputed, but it may and often does happen, that they 
do not possess the same sentiments or pursue the same interests.  
I think I have shown [in a previous paper] that as this 
government is constructed, there is little reason to expect, that 
the interest of the people and their rulers will be the same. 
    Besides, if the habits and sentiments of the people of 
America are to be relied upon, as the sole security against the 
encroachment of their rulers, all restrictions in constitutions 
are unnecessary; nothing more is requisite, than to declare who 
shall be authorized to exercise the powers of government, and 
about this we need not be very careful-for the habits and 
principles of the people will oppose every abuse of power.  This 
I suppose to be the sentiments of this author, as it seems to be 
of many of the advocates of this new system.  An opinion like 
this, is as directly opposed to the principles and habits of the 
people of America, as it is to the sentiments of every writer of 
reputation on the science of government, and repugnant to the 
principles of reason and common sense. 
    The idea that there is no danger of the establishment of a 
standing army, under the new constitution, is without foundation. 
    It is a well known fact, that a number of those who had an 
agency in producing this system, and many of those who it is 
probable will have a principal share in the administration of the 
government under it, if it is adopted, are avowedly in favor of 
standing armies.  It is a language common among them, "That no 
people can be kept in order, unless the government have an army 
to awe them into obedience; it is necessary to support the 
dignity of government, to have a military establishment. And 
there will not be wanting a variety of plausible reasons to 
justify the raising one, drawn from the danger we are in from the 
Indians on our frontiers, or from the European provinces in our 
neighborhood.  If to this we add, that an army will afford a 
decent support, and agreeable employment to the young men of many 
families, who are too indolent to follow occupations that will 
require care and industry, and too poor to live without doing any 
business, we can have little reason to doubt but that we shall 
have a large standing army as soon as this government can find 
money to pay them, and perhaps sooner. 
         A writer, who is the boast of the advocates of this new 
constitution, has taken great pains to show, that this power was 
proper and necessary to be vested in the general government. 
     He sets out with calling in question the candor and 
integrity of those who advance the objection; and with 
insinuating, that it is their intention to mislead the people, by 
alarming their passions, rather than to convince them by 
arguments addressed to their understandings. 
    The man who reproves another for a fault, should be careful 
that he himself be not guilty of it.  How far this writer has 
manifested a spirit of candor, and has pursued fair reasoning on 
this subject, the impartial public will judge, when his arguments 
pass before them in review. 
     He first attempts to show, that this objection is futile and 
disingenuous, because the power to keep up standing armies, in 
time of peace, is vested, under the present government, in the 
legislature of every state in the union, except two. Now this is 
so far from being true, that it is expressly declared by the 
present articles of confederation, that no body of forces "Shall 
be kept up by any state, in time of peace, except such number 
only, as in the judgment of the United States in Congress 
assembled, shall be deemed requisite to garrison the forts 
necessary for the defence of such state." Now, was it candid and 
ingenuous to endeavour to persuade the public, that the general 
government had no other power than your own legislature have on 
this head; when the truth is, your legislature have no authority 
to raise and keep up any forces? 
     He next tells us, that the power given by this constitution, 
on this head, is similar to that which Congress possess under the 
present confederation.  As little ingenuity is manifested in this 
representation as in that of the former. 
     I shall not undertake to inquire whether or not Congress are 
vested with a power to keep up a standing army in time of peace; 
it has been a subject warmly debated in Congress, more than once, 
since the peace; and one of the most respectable states in the 
union, were so fully convinced that they had no such power, that 
they expressly instructed their delegates to enter a solemn 
protest against it on the journals of Congress, should they 
attempt to exercise it. 
    But should it be admitted that they have the power, there is 
such a striking dissimilarity between the restrictions under 
which the present Congress can exercise it, and that of the 
proposed government, that the comparison will serve rather to 
show the impropriety of vesting the proposed government with the 
power, than of justifying it. 
     It is acknowledged by this writer, that the powers of 
Congress, under the present confederation, amount to little more 
than that of recommending.  If they determine to raise troops, 
they are obliged to effect it through the authority of the state 
legislatures.  This will, in the first instance, be a most 
powerful restraint upon them, against ordering troops to be 
raised.  But if they should vote an army, contrary to the opinion 
and wishes of the people, the legislatures of the respective 
states would not raise them.  Besides, the present Congress hold 
their places at the wilt and pleasure of the legislatures of the 
states who send them, and no troops can be raised, but by the 
assent of nine states out of the thirteen.  Compare the power 
proposed to be lodged in the legislature on this head, under this 
constitution, with that vested in the present Congress, and every 
person of the least discernment, whose understanding is not 
totally blinded by prejudice, will perceive, that they bear no 
analogy to each other.  Under the present confederation, the 
representatives of nine states, out of thirteen, must assent to 
the raising of troops, or they cannot be levied.  Under the 
proposed constitution, a less number than the representatives of 
two states, in the house of representatives, and the 
representatives of three states and an half in the senate, with 
the assent of the president, may raise any number of troops they 
please.  The present Congress are restrained from an undue 
exercise of this power; from this consideration, they know the 
state legislatures, through whose authority it must be carried 
into effect, would not comply with the requisition for the 
purpose, [if] it was evidently opposed to the public good.  The 
proposed constitution authorizes the legislature to carry their 
determinations into execution, without intervention of any other 
body between them and the people.  The Congress under the present 
form are amenable to, and removable by, the legislatures of the 
respective states, and are chosen for one year only.  The 
proposed constitution does not make the members of the 
legislature accountable to, or removable by the state 
legislatures at all; and they are chosen, the one house for six, 
and the other for two years; and cannot be removed until their 
time of service is expired, let them conduct ever so badly.  The 
public will judge, from the above comparison, how just a claim 
this writer has to that candor he asserts to possess.  In the 
mean time, to convince him, and the advocates for this system, 
that I possess some share of candor, I pledge myself to give up 
all opposition to it, on the head of standing armies, if the 
power to raise them be restricted as it is in the present 
confederation; and I believe I may safely answer, not only for 
myself, but for all who make the objection, that they will [not] 
be satisfied with less.