Antifederalist No. 25
OBJECTIONS TO A STANDING ARMY (PART II)
From the tenth letter of "BRUTUS" appearing in The New-York
Journal, January 24, 1788.
The liberties of a people are in danger from a large standing
army, not only because the rulers may employ them for the
purposes of supporting themselves in any usurpations of power,
which they may see proper to exercise; but there is great hazard,
that an army will subvert the forms of the government, under
whose authority they are raised, and establish one [rule]
according to the pleasure of their leaders.
We are informed, in the faithful pages of history, of such
events frequently happening. Two instances have been mentioned
in a former paper. They are so remarkable, that they are worthy
of the most careful attention of every lover of freedom. They
are taken from the history of the two most powerful nations that
have ever existed in the world; and who are the most renowned,
for the freedom they enjoyed, and the excellency of their
constitutions-I mean Rome and Britain.
In the first, the liberties of the commonwealth were
destroyed, and the constitution over-turned, by an army, led by
Julius Caesar, who was appointed to the command by the
constitutional authority of that commonwealth. He changed it
from a free republic, whose fame ... is still celebrated by all
the world, into that of the most absolute despotism. A standing
army effected this change, and a standing army supported it
through a succession of ages, which are marked in the annals of
history with the most horrid cruelties, bloodshed, and carnage-
the most devilish, beastly, and unnatural vices, that ever
punished or disgraced human nature.
The same army, that in Britain, vindicated the liberties of
that people from the encroachments and despotism of a tyrant
king, assisted Cromwell, their General, in wresting from the
people that liberty they had so dearly earned.
You may be told, these instances will not apply to our case.
But those who would persuade you to believe this, either mean to
deceive you, or have not themselves considered the subject.
I firmly believe, no country in the world had ever a more
patriotic army, than the one which so ably served this country in
the late war. But had the General who commanded them been
possessed of the spirit of a Julius Caesar or a Cromwell, the
liberties of this country . - . [might have] in all probability
terminated with the war. Or bad they been maintained, [they]
might have cost more blood and treasure than was expended in the
conflict with Great Britain. When an anonymous writer addressed
the officers of the army at the close of the war, advising them
not to part with their arms, until justice was done them-the
effect it had is well known. It affected them like an electric
shock. He wrote like Caesar; and had the commander in chief, and
a few more officers of rank, countenanced the measure, the
desperate resolution. . . [might have] been taken, to refuse to
disband. What the consequences of such a determination would
have been, heaven only knows. The army were in the full vigor of
health and spirits, in the habit of discipline, and possessed of
all our military stores and apparatus. They would have acquired
great accessions of strength from the country. Those who were
disgusted at our republican forms of government (for such there
then were, of high rank among us) would have lent them all their
aid. We should in all probability have seen a constitution and
laws dictated to us, at the head of an army, and at the point of
a bayonet, and the liberties for which we had so severely
struggled, snatched from us in a moment. It remains a secret, yet
to be revealed, whether this measure was not suggested, or at
least countenanced, by some, who have bad great influence in
producing the present system. Fortunately indeed for this
country, it had at the head of the army, a patriot as well as a
general; and many of our principal officers had not abandoned the
characters of citizens, by assuming that of soldiers; and
therefore, the scheme proved abortive. But are we to expect,
that this will always be the case? Are we so much better than the
people of other ages and of other countries, that the same
allurements of power and greatness, which led them aside from
their duty, will have no influence upon men in our country? Such
an idea is wild and extravagant. Had we indulged such a
delusion, enough has appeared in a little time past, to convince
the most credulous, that the passion for pomp, power, and
greatness, works as powerfully in the hearts of many of our
better sort, as it ever did in any country under heaven. Were the
same opportunity again to offer, we should very probably be
grossly disappointed, if we made dependence, that all who then
rejected the overture, would do it again.
From these remarks, it appears, that the evils to be feared
from a large standing army in time of peace, do not arise solely
from the apprehension, that the rulers may employ them for the
purpose of promoting their own ambitious views; but that equal,
and perhaps greater danger, is to be apprehended from their
overturning the constitutional powers of the government, and
assuming the power to dictate any form they please.
The advocates for power, in support of this right in the
proposed government, urge that a restraint upon the discretion of
the legislatures, in respect to military establishments in time
of peace, would be improper to be imposed, because they say, it
will be necessary to maintain small garrisons on the frontiers,
to guard against the depredations of the Indians, and to be
prepared to repel any encroachments or invasions that may be made
by Spain or Britain.
The amount of this argument stripped of the abundant
verbiages with which the author has dressed it, is this:
It will probably be necessary to keep up a small body of
troops to garrison a few posts, which it will be necessary to
maintain, in order to guard against the sudden encroachments of
the Indians, or of the Spaniards and British; and therefore, the
general government ought to be invested with power to raise and
keep up a standing army in time of peace, without restraint, at
their discretion.
I confess, I cannot perceive that the conclusion follows from
the premises. Logicians say, it is not good reasoning to infer a
general conclusion from particular premises. Though I am not
much of a logician, it seems to me, this argument is very like
that species of reasoning.
When the patriots in the parliament in Great Britain,
contended with such force of argument, and all the powers of
eloquence, against keeping up standing armies in time of peace,
it is obvious they never entertained an idea, that small
garrisons on their frontiers, or in the neighborhood of powers
from whom they were in danger of encroachments, or guards to take
care of public arsenals, would thereby be prohibited.
The advocates for this power further urge that it is
necessary, because it may, and probably will happen, that
circumstances will render it requisite to raise an army to be
prepared to repel attacks of an enemy, before a formal
declaration of war, which in modern times has fallen into disuse.
If the constitution prohibited the raising an army, until a war
actually commenced, it would deprive the government of the power
of providing for the defense of the country, until the enemy were
within our territory. If the restriction is not to extend to the
raising armies in cases of emergency, but only to the keeping
them up, this would leave the matter to the discretion of the
legislature, and they might, under the pretence that there was
danger of an invasion, keep up the army as long as they judged
proper-and hence it is inferred, that the legislature should have
authority to raise and keep up an army without any restriction.
But from these premises nothing more will follow than this: that
the legislature should not be so restrained, as to put it out of
their power to raise an army, when such exigencies as are
instanced shall arise. But it does not thence follow, that the
government should be empowered to raise and maintain standing
armies at their discretion as well in peace as in war. If
indeed, it is impossible to vest the general government with the
power of raising troops to garrison the frontier posts, to guard
arsenals, or to be prepared to repel an attack, when we saw a
power preparing to make one, without giving them a general and
indefinite authority to raise and keep up armies, without any
restriction or qualification, then this reasoning might have
weight; but this has not been proved nor can it be.
It is admitted that to prohibit the general government from
keeping up standing armies, while yet they were authorised to
raise them in case of exigency, would be an insufficient guard
against the danger. A discretion of such latitude would give
room to elude the force of the provision.
It is also admitted that an absolute prohibition against
raising troops, except in cases of actual war, would be improper;
because it will be requisite to raise and support a small number
of troops to garrison the important frontier posts, and to guard
arsenals; and it may happen, that the danger of an attack from a
foreign power may be so imminent, as to render it highly proper
we should raise an army, in order to be prepared to resist them.
But to raise and keep up forces for such purposes and on such
occasions, is not included in the idea of keeping up standing
armies in times of peace.
It is a thing very practicable to give the government
sufficient authority to provide for these cases, and at the same
time to provide a reasonable and competent security against the
evil of a standing army-a clause to the following purpose would
answer the end:
As standing armies in time of peace arc dangerous to
liberty, and have often been the means of overturning the best
constitutions of government, no standing army, or troops of any
description whatsoever, shall be raised or kept up by the
legislature, except so many as shall be necessary for guards to
the arsenals of the United States, or for garrisons to such posts
on the frontiers, as it shall be deemed absolutely necessary to
hold, to secure the inhabitants, and facilitate the trade with
the Indians: unless when the United States are threatened with an
attack or invasion from some foreign power, in which case the
legislature shall be authorised to raise an army to be prepared
to repel the attack; provided that no troops whatsoever shall be
raised in time of peace, without the assent of two thirds of the
members, composing both houses of the legislature.
A clause similar to this would afford sufficient latitude to
the legislature to raise troops in all cases that were really
necessary, and at the same time competent security against the
establishment of that dangerous engine of despotism, a standing
army.
The same writer who advances the arguments I have noticed,
makes a number of other observations with a view to prove that
the power to raise and keep up armies ought to be discretionary
in the general legislature. Some of them are curious. He
instances the raising of troops in Massachusetts and
Pennsylvania, to show the necessity of keeping a standing army in
time of peace; the least reflection must convince every candid
mind that both these cases are totally foreign to his purpose.
Massachusetts raised a body of troops for six months, at the
expiration of which they were to disband ... ; this looks very
little like a standing army. But beside, was that commonwealth in
a state of peace at that time? So far from it, that they were in
the most violent commotions and contests, and their legislature
had formally declared that an unnatural rebellion existed within
the state. The situation of Pennsylvania was similar; a number
of armed men had levied war against the authority of the state
and openly avowed their intention of withdrawing their allegiance
from it. To what purpose examples are brought, of states raising
troops for short periods in times of war or insurrections, on a
question concerning the propriety of keeping up standing armies
in times of peace, the public must judge.
It is further said, that no danger can arise from this power
being lodged in the hands of the general government, because the
legislatures will be a check upon them, to prevent their abusing
it.
This is offered, as what force there is in it will hereafter
receive a more particular examination. At present, I shall only
remark, that it is difficult to conceive how the state
legislatures can, in any case, hold a check over the general
legislature, in a constitutional way. The latter has, in every
instance to which their powers extend, complete control over the
former. The state legislatures can, in no case-by law,
resolution, or otherwise of right, prevent or impede the general
government, from enacting any law, or executing it, which this
constitution authorizes them to enact or execute. If then the
state legislatures check the general legislature, it must be by
exciting the people to resist constitutional laws. In this way
every individual, or every body of men, may check any government,
in proportion to the influence they may have over the body of the
people. But such kinds of checks as these, though they sometimes
correct the abuses of government, [more) often destroy all
government.
It is further said, that no danger is to be apprehended from
the exercise of this power, because it is lodged in the hands of
representatives of the people. If they abuse it, it is in the
power of the people to remove them, and choose others who will
pursue their interests.... That it is unwise in any people, to
authorize their rulers to do, what, if done, would prove
injurious-I have, in some former numbers, shown. . . . The
representation in the proposed government will be a mere shadow
without the substance. I am so confident that I am well founded
in this opinion, that I am persuaded if it was to be adopted or
rejected, upon a fair discussion of its merits without taking
into contemplation circumstances extraneous to it, as reasons for
its adoption, nineteen-twentieths of the sensible men in the
union would reject it on this account alone; unless its powers
were confined to much fewer objects than it embraces.
BRUTUS