Antifederalist No. 25

OBJECTIONS TO A STANDING ARMY   (PART II)


From the tenth letter of "BRUTUS" appearing in The New-York 
Journal, January 24, 1788. 



    The liberties of a people are in danger from a large standing 
army, not only because the rulers may employ them for the 
purposes of supporting themselves in any usurpations of power, 
which they may see proper to exercise; but there is great hazard, 
that an army will subvert the forms of the government, under 
whose authority they are raised, and establish one [rule] 
according to the pleasure of their leaders. 
    We are informed, in the faithful pages of history, of such 
events frequently happening.  Two instances have been mentioned 
in a former paper.  They are so remarkable, that they are worthy 
of the most careful attention of every lover of freedom.  They 
are taken from the history of the two most powerful nations that 
have ever existed in the world; and who are the most renowned, 
for the freedom they enjoyed, and the excellency of their 
constitutions-I mean Rome and Britain. 
    In the first, the liberties of the commonwealth were 
destroyed, and the constitution over-turned, by an army, led by 
Julius Caesar, who was appointed to the command by the 
constitutional authority of that commonwealth.  He changed it 
from a free republic, whose fame ... is still celebrated by all 
the world, into that of the most absolute despotism.  A standing 
army effected this change, and a standing army supported it 
through a succession of ages, which are marked in the annals of 
history with the most horrid cruelties, bloodshed, and carnage-
the most devilish, beastly, and unnatural vices, that ever 
punished or disgraced human nature. 
    The same army, that in Britain, vindicated the liberties of 
that people from the encroachments and despotism of a tyrant 
king, assisted Cromwell, their General, in wresting from the 
people that liberty they had so dearly earned. 
    You may be told, these instances will not apply to our case.  
But those who would persuade you to believe this, either mean to 
deceive you, or have not themselves considered the subject. 
    I firmly believe, no country in the world had ever a more 
patriotic army, than the one which so ably served this country in 
the late war.  But had the General who commanded them been 
possessed of the spirit of a Julius Caesar or a Cromwell, the 
liberties of this country . - . [might have] in all probability 
terminated with the war.  Or bad they been maintained, [they] 
might have cost more blood and treasure than was expended in the 
conflict with Great Britain.  When an anonymous writer addressed 
the officers of the army at the close of the war, advising them 
not to part with their arms, until justice was done them-the 
effect it had is well known. It affected them like an electric 
shock. He wrote like Caesar; and had the commander in chief, and 
a few more officers of rank, countenanced the measure, the 
desperate resolution. . . [might have] been taken, to refuse to 
disband.  What the consequences of such a determination would 
have been, heaven only knows.  The army were in the full vigor of 
health and spirits, in the habit of discipline, and possessed of 
all our military stores and apparatus.  They would have acquired 
great accessions of strength from the country.  Those who were 
disgusted at our republican forms of government (for such there 
then were, of high rank among us) would have lent them all their 
aid.  We should in all probability have seen a constitution and 
laws dictated to us, at the head of an army, and at the point of 
a bayonet, and the liberties for which we had so severely 
struggled, snatched from us in a moment. It remains a secret, yet 
to be revealed, whether this measure was not suggested, or at 
least countenanced, by some, who have bad great influence in 
producing the present system.  Fortunately indeed for this 
country, it had at the head of the army, a patriot as well as a 
general; and many of our principal officers had not abandoned the 
characters of citizens, by assuming that of soldiers; and 
therefore, the scheme proved abortive.  But are we to expect, 
that this will always be the case? Are we so much better than the 
people of other ages and of other countries, that the same 
allurements of power and greatness, which led them aside from 
their duty, will have no influence upon men in our country?  Such 
an idea is wild and extravagant.  Had we indulged such a 
delusion, enough has appeared in a little time past, to convince 
the most credulous, that the passion for pomp, power, and 
greatness, works as powerfully in the hearts of many of our 
better sort, as it ever did in any country under heaven. Were the 
same opportunity again to offer, we should very probably be 
grossly disappointed, if we made dependence, that all who then 
rejected the overture, would do it again. 
     From these remarks, it appears, that the evils to be feared 
from a large standing army in time of peace, do not arise solely 
from the apprehension, that the rulers may employ them for the 
purpose of promoting their own ambitious views; but that equal, 
and perhaps greater danger, is to be apprehended from their 
overturning the constitutional powers of the government, and 
assuming the power to dictate any form they please. 
    The advocates for power, in support of this right in the 
proposed government, urge that a restraint upon the discretion of 
the legislatures, in respect to military establishments in time 
of peace, would be improper to be imposed, because they say, it 
will be necessary to maintain small garrisons on the frontiers, 
to guard against the depredations of the Indians, and to be 
prepared to repel any encroachments or invasions that may be made 
by Spain or Britain. 
    The amount of this argument stripped of the abundant 
verbiages with which the author has dressed it, is this: 
     It will probably be necessary to keep up a small body of 
troops to garrison a few posts, which it will be necessary to 
maintain, in order to guard against the sudden encroachments of 
the Indians, or of the Spaniards and British; and therefore, the 
general government ought to be invested with power to raise and 
keep up a standing army in time of peace, without restraint, at 
their discretion. 
    I confess, I cannot perceive that the conclusion follows from 
the premises. Logicians say, it is not good reasoning to infer a 
general conclusion from particular premises.  Though I am not 
much of a logician, it seems to me, this argument is very like 
that species of reasoning. 
    When the patriots in the parliament in Great Britain, 
contended with such force of argument, and all the powers of 
eloquence, against keeping up standing armies in time of peace, 
it is obvious they never entertained an idea, that small 
garrisons on their frontiers, or in the neighborhood of powers 
from whom they were in danger of encroachments, or guards to take 
care of public arsenals, would thereby be prohibited. 
     The advocates for this power further urge that it is 
necessary, because it may, and probably will happen, that 
circumstances will render it requisite to raise an army to be 
prepared to repel attacks of an enemy, before a formal 
declaration of war, which in modern times has fallen into disuse.  
If the constitution prohibited the raising an army, until a war 
actually commenced, it would deprive the government of the power 
of providing for the defense of the country, until the enemy were 
within our territory.  If the restriction is not to extend to the 
raising armies in cases of emergency, but only to the keeping 
them up, this would leave the matter to the discretion of the 
legislature, and they might, under the pretence that there was 
danger of an invasion, keep up the army as long as they judged 
proper-and hence it is inferred, that the legislature should have 
authority to raise and keep up an army without any restriction. 
But from these premises nothing more will follow than this: that 
the legislature should not be so restrained, as to put it out of 
their power to raise an army, when such exigencies as are 
instanced shall arise. But it does not thence follow, that the 
government should be empowered to raise and maintain standing 
armies at their discretion as well in peace as in war.  If 
indeed, it is impossible to vest the general government with the 
power of raising troops to garrison the frontier posts, to guard 
arsenals, or to be prepared to repel an attack, when we saw a 
power preparing to make one, without giving them a general and 
indefinite authority to raise and keep up armies, without any 
restriction or qualification, then this reasoning might have 
weight; but this has not been proved nor can it be. 
     It is admitted that to prohibit the general government from 
keeping up standing armies, while yet they were authorised to 
raise them in case of exigency, would be an insufficient guard 
against the danger.  A discretion of such latitude would give 
room to elude the force of the provision. 
     It is also admitted that an absolute prohibition against 
raising troops, except in cases of actual war, would be improper; 
because it will be requisite to raise and support a small number 
of troops to garrison the important frontier posts, and to guard 
arsenals; and it may happen, that the danger of an attack from a 
foreign power may be so imminent, as to render it highly proper 
we should raise an army, in order to be prepared to resist them.  
But to raise and keep up forces for such purposes and on such 
occasions, is not included in the idea of keeping up standing 
armies in times of peace. 
     It is a thing very practicable to give the government 
sufficient authority to provide for these cases, and at the same 
time to provide a reasonable and competent security against the 
evil of a standing army-a clause to the following purpose would 
answer the end: 
     As standing armies in time of peace arc dangerous to 
liberty, and have often been the means of overturning the best 
constitutions of government, no standing army, or troops of any 
description whatsoever, shall be raised or kept up by the 
legislature, except so many as shall be necessary for guards to 
the arsenals of the United States, or for garrisons to such posts 
on the frontiers, as it shall be deemed absolutely necessary to 
hold, to secure the inhabitants, and facilitate the trade with 
the Indians: unless when the United States are threatened with an 
attack or invasion from some foreign power, in which case the 
legislature shall be authorised to raise an army to be prepared 
to repel the attack; provided that no troops whatsoever shall be 
raised in time of peace, without the assent of two thirds of the 
members, composing both houses of the legislature. 
     A clause similar to this would afford sufficient latitude to 
the legislature to raise troops in all cases that were really 
necessary, and at the same time competent security against the 
establishment of that dangerous engine of despotism, a standing 
army. 
     The same writer who advances the arguments I have noticed, 
makes a number of other observations with a view to prove that 
the power to raise and keep up armies ought to be discretionary 
in the general legislature.  Some of them are curious. He 
instances the raising of troops in Massachusetts and 
Pennsylvania, to show the necessity of keeping a standing army in 
time of peace; the least reflection must convince every candid 
mind that both these cases are totally foreign to his purpose.  
Massachusetts raised a body of troops for six months, at the 
expiration of which they were to disband ... ; this looks very 
little like a standing army. But beside, was that commonwealth in 
a state of peace at that time?  So far from it, that they were in 
the most violent commotions and contests, and their legislature 
had formally declared that an unnatural rebellion existed within 
the state.  The situation of Pennsylvania was similar; a number 
of armed men had levied war against the authority of the state 
and openly avowed their intention of withdrawing their allegiance 
from it.  To what purpose examples are brought, of states raising 
troops for short periods in times of war or insurrections, on a 
question concerning the propriety of keeping up standing armies 
in times of peace, the public must judge. 
     It is further said, that no danger can arise from this power 
being lodged in the hands of the general government, because the 
legislatures will be a check upon them, to prevent their abusing 
it. 
     This is offered, as what force there is in it will hereafter 
receive a more particular examination.  At present, I shall only 
remark, that it is difficult to conceive how the state 
legislatures can, in any case, hold a check over the general 
legislature, in a constitutional way.  The latter has, in every 
instance to which their powers extend, complete control over the 
former.  The state legislatures can, in no case-by law, 
resolution, or otherwise of right, prevent or impede the general 
government, from enacting any law, or executing it, which this 
constitution authorizes them to enact or execute.  If then the 
state legislatures check the general legislature, it must be by 
exciting the people to resist constitutional laws.  In this way 
every individual, or every body of men, may check any government, 
in proportion to the influence they may have over the body of the 
people.  But such kinds of checks as these, though they sometimes 
correct the abuses of government, [more) often destroy all 
government. 
     It is further said, that no danger is to be apprehended from 
the exercise of this power, because it is lodged in the hands of 
representatives of the people. If they abuse it, it is in the 
power of the people to remove them, and choose others who will 
pursue their interests.... That it is unwise in any people, to 
authorize their rulers to do, what, if done, would prove 
injurious-I have, in some former numbers, shown. . . . The 
representation in the proposed government will be a mere shadow 
without the substance.  I am so confident that I am well founded 
in this opinion, that I am persuaded if it was to be adopted or 
rejected, upon a fair discussion of its merits without taking 
into contemplation circumstances extraneous to it, as reasons for 
its adoption, nineteen-twentieths of the sensible men in the 
union would reject it on this account alone; unless its powers 
were confined to much fewer objects than it embraces. 
                                    BRUTUS