Antifederalist No. 34 
    
THE PROBLEM OF CONCURRENT TAXATION 


The following speech by Patrick Henry was delivered to the 
Virginia ratifying convention, June 5, 1788. 


    I never will give up the power of direct taxation but for a 
scourge.  I am willing to give it conditionally; that is, after 
non-compliance with requisitions.  I will do more, sir, and what 
I hope will convince the most skeptical man that I am a lover of 
the American Union-that, in case Virginia shall not make punctual 
payment, the control of our custom-houses, and the whole 
regulation of trade, shall be given to Congress, and that 
Virginia shall depend on Congress even for passports, till 
Virginia shall have paid the last farthing, and furnished the 
last soldier. Nay, sir, there is another alternative to which I 
would consent; even that they should strike us out of the Union, 
and take away from us all federal privileges, till we comply with 
federal requisitions: but let it depend upon our own pleasure to 
pay our money in the most easy manner for our people. Were all 
the states, more terrible than the mother country, to join 
against us, I hope Virginia could defend herself; but, sir, the 
dissolution of the Union is most abhorrent to my mind.  The first 
thing I have at heart is American liberty; the second thing is 
American union; and I hope the people of Virginia will endeavor 
to preserve that union.  The increasing population of the 
Southern States is far greater than that of New England; 
consequently, in a short time, they will be far more numerous 
than the people of that country. Consider this, and you will find 
this state more particularly interested to support American 
liberty, and not bind our posterity by an improvident 
relinquishment of our rights.  I would give the best security for 
a punctual compliance with requisitions; but I beseech gentlemen, 
at all hazards, not to give up this unlimited power of taxation. 
. . . 
     In this scheme of energetic government, the people will find 
two sets of taxgatherers-the state and the federal sheriffs.  
This, it seems to me, will produce such dreadful oppression as 
the people cannot possibly bear.  The federal sheriff may commit 
what oppression, make what distresses, he pleases, and ruin you 
with impunity; for how are you to tie his hands?  Have you any 
sufficiently decided means of preventing him from sucking your 
blood by speculations, commissions, and fees?  Thus thousands of 
your people will be most shamefully robbed: our state sheriffs, 
those unfeeling blood-suckers, have, under the watchful eye of 
our legislature, committed the most horrid and barbarous ravages 
on our people.  It has required the most constant vigilance of 
the legislature to keep them from totally ruining the people; a 
repeated succession of laws has been made to suppress their 
iniquitous speculations and cruel extortions; and as often has 
their nefarious ingenuity devised methods of evading the force of 
those laws: in the struggle they have generally triumphed over 
the legislature. It is a fact that lands have been sold for five 
shillings, which were worth one hundred pounds: if sheriffs, thus 
immediately under the eye of our state legislature and judiciary, 
have dared to commit these outrages, what would they not have 
done if their masters had been at Philadelphia or New York?  If 
they perpetrate the most unwarrantable outrage on your person or 
property, you cannot get redress on this side of Philadelphia or 
New York; and how can you get it there? If your domestic 
avocations could permit you to go thither, there you must appeal 
to judges sworn to support this Constitution, in opposition to 
that of any state, and who may also be inclined to favor their 
own officers.  When these harpies are aided by excisemen, who may 
search, at any time, your houses, and most secret recesses, will 
the people bear it?  If you think so, you differ from me.  Where 
I thought there was a possibility of such mischiefs, I would 
grant power with a niggardly hand; and here there is a strong 
probability that these oppressions shall actually happen.  I may 
be told that it is safe to err on that side, because such 
regulations may be made by Congress as shall restrain these 
officers, and because laws are made by our representatives, and 
judged by righteous judges: but, Sir, as these regulations may be 
made, so they may not; and many reasons there are to induce a 
belief that they will not, I shall therefore be an infidel on 
that point till the day of my death.