Antifederalist No. 35 

FEDERAL TAXING POWER MUST BE RESTRAINED 


George Mason of Virginia opposed the Constitution because it 
lacked a Bill of Rights, and centralized powers further than he 
felt it necessary.  Mason delivered the following speech before 
the Virginia ratifying convention, June 4, 1788. 
 


     Mr. Chairman, whether the Constitution be good or bad, the 
present clause [Article 1, Section 2] clearly discovers that it 
is a national government, and no longer a Confederation.  I mean 
that clause which gives the first hint of the general government 
laying direct taxes.  The assumption of this power of laying 
direct taxes does, of itself, entirely change the confederation 
of the states into one consolidated government.  This power, 
being at discretion, unconfined, and without any kind of control, 
must carry every thing before it.  The very idea of converting 
what was formerly a confederation to a consolidated government is 
totally subversive of every principle which has hitherto governed 
us.  This power is calculated to annihilate totally the state 
governments.  Will the people of this great community [Virginia] 
submit to be individually taxed by two different and distinct 
powers? Will they suffer themselves to be doubly harassed?  These 
two concurrent powers cannot exist long together; the one will 
destroy the other.  The general government being paramount to, 
and in every respect more powerful than the state governments, 
the latter must give way to the former.... 
     Requisitions [under the Articles of Confederation] have been 
often refused, sometimes from an impossibility of complying with 
them; often from that great variety of circumstances which 
retards the collection of moneys; and perhaps sometimes from a 
wilful design of procrastinating.  But why shall we give up to 
the national government this power, so dangerous in its nature, 
and for which its members will not have sufficient information?  
Is it not well known that what would be a proper tax in one state 
would be grievous in another?  The gentleman who has favored us 
with a eulogium in favor of this system [Wilson C. Nicholas], 
must, after all the encomiums he has been pleased to bestow upon 
it, acknowledge that our federal representatives must be 
unacquainted with the situation of their constituents.  Sixty-
five members cannot possibly know the situation and circumstances 
of all the inhabitants of this immense continent.  When a certain 
sum comes to be taxed, and the mode of levying to be fixed, they 
will lay the tax on that article which will be most productive 
and easiest in the collection, without consulting the real 
circumstances or convenience of a country, with which, in fact, 
they cannot be sufficiently acquainted. 
     The mode of levying taxes is of the utmost consequence; and 
yet here it is to be determined by those who have neither 
knowledge of our situation, nor a common interest with us, nor a 
fellow-feeling for us.  The subject of taxation differs in three 
fourths, nay, I might say with truth, in four fifths of the 
states.  If we trust the national government with an effectual 
way of raising the necessary sums, it is sufficient: everything 
we do further is trusting the happiness and rights of the people.  
Why, then, should we give up this dangerous power of individual 
taxation?  Why leave the manner of laying taxes to those who, in 
the nature of things, cannot be acquainted with the situation of 
those on whom they are to impose them, when it can be done by 
those who are well acquainted with it? If, instead of giving this 
oppressive power, we give them such an effectual alternative as 
will answer the purpose, without encountering the evil and danger 
that might arise from it, then I would cheerfully acquiesce; and 
would it not be far more eligible? I candidly acknowledge the 
inefficacy of the Confederation; but requisitions have been made 
which were impossible to be complied with-requisitions for more 
gold and silver than were in the United States.  If we give the 
general government the power of demanding their quotas of the 
states, with an alternative of laying direct taxes in case of 
non-compliance, then the mischief would be avoided.  And the 
certainty of this conditional power would, in all human 
probability, prevent the application, and the sums necessary for 
the Union would be then laid by the states, by those who know how 
it can best be raised, by those who have a fellow-feeling for us.  
Give me leave to say, that the sum raised one way with 
convenience and case, would be very oppressive another way.  Why, 
then, not leave this power to be exercised by those who know the 
mode most convenient for the inhabitants, and not by those who 
must necessarily apportion it in such manner as shall be 
oppressive? . . . An indispensable amendment . . . is, that 
Congress shall not exercise the power of raising direct taxes 
till the states shall have refused to comply with the 
requisitions of Congress.  On this condition it may be granted; 
but I see no reason to grant it unconditionally, as the states 
can raise the taxes with more case, and lay them on the 
inhabitants with more propriety, than it is possible for the 
general government to do.  If Congress hath this power without 
control, the taxes will be laid by those who have no fellow-
feeling or acquaintance with the people.  This is my objection to 
the article now under consideration. It is a very great and 
important one.  I therefore beg gentlemen to consider it.  Should 
this power be restrained, I shall withdraw my objections to this 
part of the Constitution; but as it stands, it is an objection so 
strong in my mind, that its amendment is with me a sine qua non 
of its adoption.  I wish for such amendments, and such only, as 
are necessary to secure the dearest rights of the people....