Antifederalist No. 36 
    
REPRESENTATION AND INTERNAL TAXATION 


Richard Henry Lee was arguably the best known Antifederalist 
writer. His pamphlets were widely distributed and reprinted in 
newspapers.  Antifederalist Papers # 36/37 are excerpts from his 
first pamphlet.   Antifederalist Nos. 41, 42, 43, 55, 56, 57, 58, 
61, 63, 69, 76-77 are taken from his second pamphlet. 


    A power to lay and collect taxes at discretion, is, in 
itself, of very great importance.  By means of taxes, the 
government may command the whole or any part of the subject's 
property.  Taxes may be of various kinds; but there is a strong 
distinction between external and internal taxes.  External taxes 
are import duties, which are laid on imported goods; they may 
usually be collected in a few seaport towns, and of a few 
individuals, though ultimately paid by the consumer; a few 
officers can collect them, and they can be carried no higher than 
trade will bear, or smuggling permit-that in the very nature of 
commerce, bounds are set to them. But internal taxes, as poll and 
land taxes, excises, duties on all written instruments, etc., may 
fix themselves on every person and species of property in the 
community; they may be carried to any lengths, and in proportion 
as they are extended, numerous officers must be employed to 
assess them, and to enforce the collection of them. In the United 
Netherlands the general government has complete powers, as to 
external taxation; but as to internal taxes, it makes 
requisitions on the provinces. Internal taxation in this country 
is more important, as the country is so very extensive As many 
assessors and collectors of federal taxes will be above three 
hundred miles from the seat of the federal government, as will be 
less. Besides, to lay and collect taxes, in this extensive 
country, must require a great number of congressional ordinances, 
immediately operating upon the body of the people; these must 
continually interfere with the state laws, and thereby produce 
disorder and general dissatisfaction, till the one system of laws 
or the other, operating on the same subjects, shall be abolished.  
These ordinances alone, to say nothing of those respecting the 
militia, coin, commerce, federal judiciary, etc., will probably 
soon defeat the operations of the state laws and governments. 
     Should the general government think it politic, as some 
administration (if not all) probably will, to look for a support 
in a system of influence, the government will take every occasion 
to multiply laws, and officers to execute them, considering these 
as so many necessary props for its own support. Should this 
system of policy be adopted, taxes more productive than the 
impost duties will, probably, be wanted to support the 
government, and to discharge foreign demands, without leaving 
anything for the domestic creditors.  The internal sources of 
taxation then must be called into operation, and internal tax 
laws and federal assessors and collectors spread over this 
immense country.  All these circumstances considered, is it wise, 
prudent, or safe, to vest the powers of laying and collecting 
internal taxes in the general government, while imperfectly 
organized and inadequate?  And to trust to amending it hereafter, 
and making it adequate to this purpose?  It is not only unsafe 
but absurd to lodge power in a government before it is fitted to 
receive it.  It is confessed that this power and representation 
ought to go together. Why give the power first?  Why give the 
power to the few, who, when possessed of it, may have address 
enough to prevent the increase of representation?  Why not keep 
the power, and, when necessary, amend the constitution, and add 
to its other parts this power, and a proper increase of 
representation at the same time?  Then men who may want the power 
will be under strong inducements to let in the people, by their 
representatives, into the government, to hold their due 
proportion of this power.  If a proper representation be 
impracticable, then we shall see this power resting in the 
states, where it at present ought to be, and not inconsiderately 
given up. 
     When I recollect how lately congress, conventions, 
legislatures, and people contended in the cause of liberty, and 
carefully weighed the importance of taxation, I can scarcely 
believe we are serious in proposing to vest the powers of laying 
and collecting internal taxes in a government so imperfectly 
organized for such purposes.  Should the United States be taxed 
by a house of representatives of two hundred members, which would 
be about fifteen members for Connecticut, twenty-five for 
Massachusetts, etc., still the middle and lower classes of people 
could have no great share, in fact, in taxation.  I am aware it 
is said, that the representation proposed by the new constitution 
is sufficiently numerous; it may be for many purposes; but to 
suppose that this branch is sufficiently numerous to guard the 
rights of the people in the administration of the government, in 
which the purse and sword is placed, seems to argue that we have 
forgot what the true meaning of representation is. . . . 
     In considering the practicability of having a full and equal 
representation of the people from all parts of the union, not 
only distances and different opinions, customs and views, common 
in extensive tracts of country, are to be taken into view, but 
many differences peculiar to Eastern, Middle, and Southern 
States.  These differences are not so perceivable among the 
members of congress, and men of general information in the 
states, as among the men who would properly form the democratic 
branch. The Eastern states are very democratic, and composed 
chiefly of moderate freeholders; they have but few rich men and 
no slaves; the Southern states are composed chiefly of rich 
planters and slaves; they have but few moderate freeholders, and 
the prevailing influence in them is generally a dissipated 
aristocracy.  The Middle states partake partly of the Eastern and 
partly of the Southern character. . . . I have no idea that the 
interests, feelings, and opinions of three or four millions of 
people, especially touching internal taxation, can be collected 
in such a house.  In the nature of things, nine times in ten, men 
of the elevated classes in the community only can be chosen.... 
     I am sensible also, that it is said that congress will not 
attempt to lay and collect internal taxes; that it is necessary 
for them to have the power, though it cannot probably be 
exercised.  I admit that it is not probable that any prudent 
congress will attempt to lay and collect internal taxes, 
especially direct taxes: but this only proves, that the power 
would be improperly lodged in congress, and that it might be 
abused by imprudent and designing men. 
     I have heard several gentlemen, to get rid of objections to 
this part of the constitution, attempt to construe the powers 
relative to direct taxes, as those who object to it would have 
them; as to these, it is said, that congress will only have power 
to make requisitions, leaving it to the states to lay and collect 
them.  I see but very little color for this construction, and the 
attempt only proves that this part of the plan cannot be 
defended.  By this plan there can be no doubt, but that the 
powers of congress will be complete as to all kinds of taxes 
whatever.  Further, as to internal taxes, the state governments 
will have concurrent powers with the general government, and both 
may tax the same objects in the same year; and the objection that 
the general government may suspend a state tax, as a necessary 
measure for the promoting the collection of a federal tax, is not 
without foundation. 
         THE FEDERAL FARMER