Antifederalist No. 37 

FACTIONS AND THE CONSTITUTION 


     .... To have a just idea of the government before us, and to 
show that a consolidated one is the object in view, it is 
necessary not only to examine the plan, but also its history, and 
the politics of its particular friends. 
    The confederation was formed when great confidence was placed 
in the voluntary exertions of individuals, and of the respective 
states; and the framers of it, to guard against usurpation, so 
limited, and checked the powers, that, in many respects, they are 
inadequate to the exigencies of the union.  We find, therefore, 
members of congress urging alterations in the federal system 
almost as soon as it was adopted.  It was early proposed to vest 
congress with powers to levy an impost, to regulate trade, etc., 
but such was known to be the caution of the states in parting 
with power, that the vestment even of these, was proposed to be 
under several checks and limitations.  During the war, the 
general confusion, and the introduction of paper money, infused 
in the minds of the people vague ideas respecting government and 
credit.  We expected too much from the return of peace, and of 
course we have been disappointed.  Our governments have been new 
and unsettled; and several legislatures, by making tender, 
suspension, and paper money laws, have given just cause of 
uneasiness to creditors. By these and other causes, several 
orders of men in the community have been prepared, by degrees, 
for a change of government.  And this very abuse of power in the 
legislatures, which in some cases has been charged upon the 
democratic part of the community, has furnished aristocratical 
men with those very weapons, and those very means, with which, in 
great measure, they are rapidly effecting their favorite object.  
And should an oppressive government be the consequence of the 
proposed change, posterity may reproach not only a few 
overbearing, unprincipled men, but those parties in the states 
which have misused their powers. 
     The conduct of several legislatures, touching paper money, 
and tender laws, has prepared many honest men for changes in 
government, which otherwise they would not have thought of-when 
by the evils, on the one hand, and by the secret instigations of 
artful men, on the other, the minds of men were become 
sufficiently uneasy, a bold step was taken, which is usually 
followed by a revolution, or a civil war.  A general convention 
for mere commercial purposes was moved for-the authors of this 
measure saw that the people's attention was turned solely to the 
amendment of the federal system; and that, had the idea of a 
total change been started, probably no state would have appointed 
members to the convention.  The idea of destroying ultimately, 
the state government, and forming one consolidated system, could 
not have been admitted-a convention, therefore, merely for 
vesting in congress power to regulate trade was proposed.  This 
was pleasing to the commercial towns; and the landed people had 
little or no concern about it.  In September, 1786, a few men 
from the middle states met at Annapolis, and hastily proposed a 
convention to be held in May, 1787, for the purpose, generally, 
of amending the confederation.  This was done before the 
delegates of Massachusetts, and of the other states arrived-still 
not a word was said about destroying the old constitution, and 
making a new one. The states still unsuspecting, and not aware 
that they were passing the Rubicon, appointed members to the new 
convention, for the sole and express purpose of revising and 
amending the confederation-and, probably, not one man in ten 
thousand in the United States, till within these ten or twelve 
days, had an idea that the old ship was to be destroyed, and be 
put to the alternative of embarking in the new ship presented, or 
of being left in danger of sinking.  The States, I believe, 
universally supposed the convention would report alterations in 
the confederation, which would pass an examination in congress, 
and after being agreed to there, would be confirmed by all the 
legislatures, or be rejected. Virginia made a very respectable 
appointment, and placed at the head of it the first man in 
America. In this appointment there was a mixture of political 
characters; but Pennsylvania appointed principally those men who 
are esteemed aristocratical.  Here the favorite moment for 
changing the government was evidently discerned by a few men, who 
seized it with address. Ten other states appointed, and tho' they 
chose men principally connected with commerce and the judicial 
department yet they appointed many good republican characters.  
Had they all attended we should now see, I am persuaded, a better 
system presented.  The nonattendance of eight or nine men, who 
were appointed members of the convention, I shall ever consider 
as a very unfortunate event to the United States.  Had they 
attended, I am pretty clear that the result of the convention 
would not have had that strong tendency to aristocracy now 
discernible in every part of the plan.  There would not have been 
so great an accumulation of powers, especially as to the internal 
police of this country in a few hands as the constitution 
reported proposes to vest in them-the young visionary men, and 
the consolidating aristocracy, would have been more restrained 
than they have been. Eleven states met in the convention, and 
after four months close attention presented the new constitution, 
to be adopted or rejected by the people.  The uneasy and fickle 
part of the community may be prepared to receive any form of 
government; but I presume the enlightened and substantial part 
will give any constitution presented for their adoption a candid 
and thorough examination.... We shall view the convention with 
proper respect-and, at the same time, that we reflect there were 
men of abilities and integrity in it, we must recollect how 
disproportionately the democratic and aristocratic parts of the 
community were represented.  Perhaps the judicious friends and 
opposers of the new constitution will agree, that it is best to 
let it rely solely on its own merits, or be condemned for its own 
defects. . . . 
     This subject of consolidating the states is new.  And 
because forty or fifty men have agreed in a system, to suppose 
the good sense of this country, an enlightened nation, must adopt 
it without examination, and though in a state of profound peace, 
without endeavoring to amend those parts they perceive are 
defective, dangerous to freedom, and destructive of the valuable 
principles of republican government -is truly humiliating.  It is 
true there may be danger in delay; but there is danger in 
adopting the system in its present form. 
     And I see the danger in either case will arise principally 
from the conduct and views of two very unprincipled parties in 
the United States-two fires, between which the honest and 
substantial people have long found themselves situated.  One 
party is composed of little insurgents, men in debt, who want no 
law, and who want a share of the property of others; these are 
called revellers, Shayites, etc.  The other party is composed of 
a few, but more dangerous men, with their servile dependents; 
these avariciously grasp at all power and property; you may 
discover in all the actions of these men, an evident dislike to 
free and equal government, and they will go systematically to 
work to change, essentially, the forms of government in this 
country; these are called aristocrats, monarchists, etc.  Between 
these two parties is the weight of the community; the men of 
middling property, men not in debt on the one hand, and men, on 
the other, content with republican governments, and not aiming at 
immense fortunes, offices, and power.  In 1786, the little 
insurgents, the revellers, came forth, invaded the rights of 
others, and attempted to establish governments according to their 
wills.  Their movements evidently gave encouragement to the other 
party, which, in 1787, has taken the political field, and with 
its fashionable dependents, and the tongue and the pen, is 
endeavoring to establish in a great haste, a politer kind of 
government.  These two parties, which will probably be opposed or 
united as it may suit their interests and views, are really 
insignificant, compared with the solid, free, and independent 
part of the community. It is not my intention to suggest, that 
either of these parties, and the real friends of the proposed 
constitution, are the same men.  The fact is, these aristocrats 
support and hasten the adoption of the proposed constitution, 
merely because they think it is a stepping stone to their 
favorite object.  I think I am well founded in this idea.  I 
think the general politics of these men support it, as well as 
the common observation among them: That the proffered plan is the 
best that can be got at present, it will do for a few years, and 
lead to something better.  The sensible and judicious part of the 
community will carefully weigh all these circumstances; they will 
view the late convention as a respectable body of men-America 
probably never will see an assembly of men, of a like number, 
more respectable.  But the members of the convention met without 
knowing the sentiments of one man in ten thousand in these states 
respecting the new ground taken.  Their doings are but the first 
attempts in the most important scene ever opened.  Though each 
individual in the state conventions will not, probably, be so 
respectable as each individual in the federal convention, yet as 
the state conventions will probably consist of fifteen hundred or 
two thousand men of abilities, and versed in the science of 
government, collected from all parts of the community and from 
all orders of men, it must be acknowledged that the weight of 
respectability will be in them.  In them will be collected the 
solid sense and the real political character of the country. 
Being revisers of the subject, they will possess peculiar 
advantages. To say that these conventions ought not to attempt, 
coolly and deliberately, the revision of the system, or that they 
cannot amend it, is very foolish or very assuming. . . . 
                                THE FEDERAL FARMER