Antifederalist No. 52 

ON THE GUARANTEE OF CONGRESSIONAL BIENNIAL ELECTIONS 


The following essay was signed by Consider Arms, Malichi Maynard, 
and Samuel Field.  It was taken from The Hampshire Gazette of 
April 9, 1788. 



     We the subscribers being of the number, who did not assent 
to the ratification of the federal constitution, under 
consideration in the late state convention, held at Boston, to 
which we were called by the suffrages of the corporations to 
which we respectively belong-beg leave, through the channel of 
your paper, to lay before the public in general, and our 
constituents in particular, the reasons of our dissent, and the 
principles which governed us in our decision of this important 
question. 
     Fully convinced, ever since the late revolution, of the 
necessity of a firm, energetic government, we should have 
rejoiced in an opportunity to have given our assent to such a 
one; and should in the present case, most cordially have done it, 
could we at the same time been happy to have seen the liberties 
of the people and the rights of mankind properly guarded and 
secured.  We conceive that the very notion of government carries 
along with it the idea of justice and equity, and that the whole 
design of instituting government in the world, was to preserve 
men's properties from rapine, and their bodies from violence and 
bloodshed. 
     These propositions being established, we conceive must of 
necessity produce the following consequence: That every 
constitution or system, which does not quadrate with this 
original design, is not government, but in fact a subversion of 
it. 
     Having premised thus much, we proceed to mention some things 
in this constitution to which we object, and to enter into an 
inquiry, whether, and how far they coincide with those simple and 
original notions of government before mentioned. 
     In the first place, as direct taxes are to be apportioned 
according to the numbers in each state, and as Massachusetts has 
none in it but what are declared free men, so the whole, blacks 
as well as whites, must be numbered; this must therefore operate 
against us, as two-fifths of the slaves in the southern states 
are to be left out of the numeration.  Consequently, three 
Massachusetts infants will increase the tax equal to five sturdy 
full-grown Negroes of theirs, who work every day in the week for 
their masters, saving the Sabbath, upon which they are allowed to 
get something for their own support.  We can see no justice in 
this way of apportioning taxes.  Neither can we see any good 
reason why this was consented to on the part of our delegates. 
     We suppose it next to impossible that every individual in 
this vast continental union, should have his wish with regard to 
every single article composing a frame of government.  And 
therefore, although we think it More agreeable to the principles 
of republicanism, that elections should be annual, yet as the 
elections in our own state government are so, we did not view it 
so dangerous to the liberties of the people, that we should have 
rejected the constitution merely on account of the biennial 
elections of the representatives-had we been sure that the people 
have any security even of this.  But this we could not find.  For 
although it is said, that "the House of Representatives shall be 
chosen every second year, by the people of the several states," 
etc., and that "the times, places and manner of holding elections 
for senators and representatives, shall be prescribed in each 
state by the legislature thereof," yet all this is wholely 
superseded by a subsequent provision, which empowers Congress at 
any time to enact a law, whereby such regulations may be altered, 
except as to the places of choosing senators.  Here we conceive 
the people may be very materially injured, and in time reduced to 
a state of as abject vassalage as any people were under the 
control of the most mercenary despot that ever tarnished the 
pages of history.  The depravity of human nature, illustrated by 
examples from history, will warrant us to say, it may be 
possible, if not probable, that the congress may be composed of 
men, who will wish to burden and oppress the people.  In such 
case, will not their inventions be fruitful enough to devise 
occasions for postponing the elections?  And if they can do this 
once, they can twice; if they can twice, they can thrice, so by 
degrees render themselves absolute and perpetual. Or, if they 
choose, they have another expedient.  They can alter the place of 
holding elections. They can say, whatever the legislature of this 
state may order to the contrary, that all the elections of our 
representatives shall be made at Mechias, or at Williamstown.  
Consequently, nine-tenths of the people will never vote.  And if 
this should be thought a measure favorable to their reelection, 
or the election of some tool for their mercenary purposes, we 
doubt not it will be thus ordered.  But says the advocates for 
the constitution, "it is not likely this will ever happen; we are 
not to expect our rulers will ever proceed to a wanton exercise 
of the powers given them." But what reason have we more than past 
ages, to expect that we shall be blessed with impeccable rulers?  
We think not any.  Although it has been said that every 
generation grows wiser and wiser, yet we have no reason to think 
they grow better and better.  And therefore the probability lies 
upon the dark side.  Does not the experience of past ages leach, 
that men have generally exercised all the powers they had given 
them, and even have usurped upon them, in order to accomplish 
their own sinister and avaricious designs, whenever they thought 
they could do it with impunity?  This we presume will not be 
denied.  And it appeared to us that the arguments made use of by 
the favorers of the constitution, in the late convention at 
Boston, proceeded upon the plan of righteousness in those who are 
to rule over us, by virtue of this new form of government.  But 
these arguments, we confess, could have no weight with us, while 
we judge them to be founded altogether upon a slippery perhaps. 
     We are sensible, that in order to the due administration of 
government, it is necessary that certain powers should be 
delegated to the rulers from the people.  At the same time, we 
think they ought carefully to guard against giving so much as 
will enable those rulers, by that means, at once, or even in 
process of time, to render themselves absolute and despotic. This 
we think is the case with the form of government lately submitted 
to our consideration.  We could not, therefore, acting uprightly, 
consulting our own good and the good of our constituents, give 
our assent unto it.  We could not then and we still cannot see, 
that because people are many times guilty of crimes and deserving 
of punishment, that it from thence follows the authority ought to 
have power to punish them when they are not guilty, or to punish 
the innocent with the guilty without discrimination, which 
amounts to the same thing.  But this we think in fact to be the 
case as to this federal constitution.  For the congress, whether 
they have provocation or not, can at any time order the elections 
in any or all the states to be conducted in such manner as 
wholely to defeat and render entirely nugatory the intention of 
those elections, and convert that which was considered and 
intended to be the palladium of the liberties of the people-the 
grand bulwark against any invasion upon them-into a formidable 
engine, by which to overthrow them all, and thus involve them in 
the depth of misery and distress.  But it was pled by some of the 
ablest advocates of the constitution, that if congress should 
exercise such powers to the prejudice of the people (and they did 
not deny but they could if they should be disposed) they (the 
people) would not suffer it.  They would have recourse to the 
ultima ratio, the dernier resort of the oppressed-the sword. 
     But it appeared to us a piece of superlative incongruity 
indeed, that the people, whilst in the full and indefeasible 
possession of their liberties and privileges, should be so very 
profuse, so very liberal in the disposal of them, as consequently 
to place themselves in a predicament miserable to an extreme.  So 
wretched indeed, that they may at once be reduced to the sad 
alternative of yielding themselves vassals into the hands of a 
venal and corrupt administration, whose only wish may be to 
aggrandize themselves and families-to wallow in luxury and every 
species of dissipation, and riot upon the spoils of the 
community; or take up the sword and involve their country in all 
the horrors of a civil war-the consequences of which, we think, 
we may venture to augur will more firmly rivet their shackles and 
end in the entailment of vassalage to their posterity.  We think 
this by no means can fall within the description of government 
before mentioned.  Neither can we think these suggestions merely 
chimerical, or that they proceed from an overheated enthusiasm in 
favor of republicanism; neither yet from an illplaced detestation 
of aristocracy; but from the apparent danger the people are in by 
establishing this constitution. When we take a forward view of 
the proposed congress-seated in the federal city, ten miles 
square, fortified and replenished with all kinds of military 
stores and every implement; with a navy at command on one side, 
and a land army on the other-we say, when we view them thus 
possessed of the sword in one hand and the purse strings of the 
people in the other, we can see no security left for them in the 
enjoyment of their liberties, but what may proceed from the bare 
possibility that this supreme authority of the nation may be 
possessed of virtue and integrity sufficient to influence them in 
the administration of equal justice and equity among those whom 
they shall govern.  But why should we voluntarily choose to trust 
our all upon so precarious a tenure as this?  We confess it gives 
us pain to anticipate the future scene: a scene presenting to 
view miseries so complicated and extreme, that it may be part of 
the charms of eloquence to extenuate, or the power of art to 
remove. 
         CONSIDER ARMS 
         MALICHI MAYNARD 
         SAMUEL FIELD