Antifederalist No. 53 

A PLEA FOR THE RIGHT OF RECALL 


"AMICUS" appeared in the Columbian Herald, August 28, 1788. 



     Some time before a Convention of the United States was held, 
I mentioned in a paragraph which was published in one of the 
Charlestown papers, that it would be acting wisely in the 
formation of a constitution for a free government, to enact, that 
the electors should recall their representatives when they 
thought proper, although they should be chosen for a certain term 
of years; as a right to appoint (where the right of appointing 
originates with the appointees) implies a right to recall.  As 
the persons appointed are meant to act for the benefit of the 
appointees, as well as themselves, they, if they mean to act for 
their mutual benefit, can have no objection to a proposal of this 
kind.  But if they have any sinister designs, they will certainly 
oppose it, foreseeing that their electors will displace them as 
soon as they begin to act contrary to their interest.  I am 
therefore glad to find that the state of New York has proposed an 
amendment of this kind to the federal constitution, viz: That the 
legislatures of the respective states may recall their senators, 
or either of them, and elect others in their stead, to serve the 
remainder of the time for which the senators so recalled were 
appointed.  I wish this had been extended to the representatives 
in both houses, as it is as prudent to have a check over the 
members of one house as of the other. 
     Some persons as object to this amendment, in fact say, that 
it is safer to give a man an irrevocable power of attorney, than 
a revocable one; and that it is right to let a representative 
ruin us, rather than recall him and put a real friend of his 
country, and a truly honest man in his place, who would rather 
suffer ten thousand deaths than injure his country, or sully his 
honor and reputation.  Such persons seem to say, that power ought 
not to originate with the people (which is the wish, I fear, of 
some among us); and also that we are not safe in trusting our own 
legislature with the power of recalling such senators as will not 
abide by such instructions - as shall be either given them, when 
chosen, or sent to them afterwards, by the legislature of this or 
any other state, or by the electors that chose them, although 
they should have met together in a body for the purpose of 
instructing or sending them instructions on a matter on which the 
salvation of the state depends.  That we should insist on the 
amendment respecting this matter taking place, which the state of 
New York has proposed, appears to me to be absolutely necessary, 
the security of each state may be almost said to rest on it. For 
my own part, I would rather that this amendment should take place 
and give the new government unlimited powers to act for the 
public good, than give them limited powers, and at the same time 
put it out of our power, for a certain term of years, to recall 
our representatives, although we saw they were exceeding their 
powers, and were bent on making us miserable and themselves, by 
means of a standing army-a perpetual and absolute government.  
For power is a very intoxicating thing, and has made many a man 
do unwarrantable actions, which before he was invested with it, 
he had no thoughts of doing.  I hope by what I have said I shall 
not be thought to cast even the shadow of a reflection on the 
principles of either of the members of the federal convention-it 
is far from being my intention.  I wish for nothing more than a 
good government and a constitution under which our liberties will 
be perfectly safe.  To preserve which, I think the wisest conduct 
will be to keep the staff of power in our own hands as much as 
possible, and not wantonly and inconsiderately give up a greater 
share of our liberties with a view of contributing to the public 
good, than what the necessity of the case requires. 
     For our own sakes we shall keep in power those persons whose 
conduct pleases us as long as we can, and shall perhaps sometimes 
wish (when we meet with a person of an extra worthy character and 
abilities) that we could keep him in power for life. On the other 
hand, we shall dismiss from our employ as soon as possible, such 
persons as do not consult our interest and will not follow our 
instructions.  For there are, I fear, a few persons among us, so 
wise in their own eyes, that they would if they could, pursue 
their own will and inclinations, in opposition to the 
instructions of their constituents.  In so doing, they may 
perhaps, once in a hundred times, act for the interest of those 
they represent, more than if they followed the instructions given 
them.  But I wish that we would never suffer any person to 
continue our representative that obeyed not our instructions, 
unless something unforeseen and unknown by us turned up, which he 
knew would alter our sentiments, if we were made acquainted with 
it; and which would make his complying with our will highly 
imprudent.  In every government matter, on which our 
representatives were not instructed, we should leave them to act 
agreeable to their own judgment; on which account we should 
always choose men of integrity, honor and abilities to represent 
us.  But when we did instruct them, as they are our 
representatives and agents, we should insist on their acting and 
voting conformable to our directions.  But as they would each of 
them be a member of the community, they should have a right to 
deliver to the houses of representatives of which they were 
members, their own private sentiments so that if their private 
sentiments contained cogent reasons for acting contrary to the 
instructions given them-the other members of said houses who 
would not be bound by said instructions, would be guided by them; 
in which case, that would take place which would be most for the 
public good, which ought to be the wish of all of us. 
                  AMICUS