Antifederalist No. 55
WILL THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BE GENUINELY REPRESENTATIVE?
(PART 1)
Following are four essays by "THE FEDERAL FARMER"
.... It being impracticable for the people to assemble to
make laws, they must elect legislators, and assign men to the
different departments of the government. In the representative
branch we must expect chiefly to collect the confidence of the
people, and in it to find almost entirely the force of
persuasion. In forming this branch, therefore, several important
considerations must be attended to. It must possess abilities to
discern the situation of the people and of public affairs, a
disposition to sympathize with the people, and a capacity and
inclination to make laws congenial to their circumstances and
condition. It must afford security against interest
combinations, corruption and influence. It must possess the
confidence, and have the voluntary support of the people.
I think these positions will not be controverted, nor the
one I formerly advanced, that a fair and equal representation is
that in which the interests, feelings, opinions and views of the
people are collected, in such manner as they would be were the
people all assembled. Having made these general observations, I
shall proceed to consider further my principal position, viz.
that there is no substantial representation of the people
provided for in a government, in which the most essential powers,
even as to the internal police of the country, are proposed to be
lodged; and to propose certain amendments as to the
representative branch....
The representation is insubstantial and ought to be
increased. In matters where there is much room for opinion, you
will not expect me to establish my positions with mathematical
certainty; you must only expect my observations to be candid, and
such as are well founded in the mind of the writer. I am in a
field where doctors disagree; and as to genuine representation,
though no feature in government can be more important, perhaps,
no one has been less understood, and no one that has received so
imperfect a consideration by political writers. The ephori in
Sparta, and the tribunes in Rome, were but the shadow; the
representation in Great Britain is unequal and insecure. In
America we have done more in establishing this important branch
on its true principles, than, perhaps, all the world besides.
Yet even here, I conceive, that very great improvements in
representation may be made. In fixing this branch, the situation
of the people must be surveyed, and the number of representatives
and forms of election apportioned to that situation. When we
find a numerous people settled in a fertile and extensive
country, possessing equality, and few or none of them oppressed
with riches or wants, it ought to be the anxious care of the
constitution and laws, to arrest them from national depravity,
and to preserve them in their happy condition. A virtuous people
make just laws, and good laws tend to preserve unchanged a
virtuous people. A virtuous and happy people by laws uncongenial
to their characters, may easily be gradually changed into servile
and depraved creatures. Where the people, or their
representatives, make the laws, it is probable they will
generally be fitted to the national character and circumstances,
unless the representation be partial, and the imperfect
substitute of the people. However the people may be electors, if
the representation be so formed as to give one or more of the
natural classes of men in society an undue ascendancy over
others, it is imperfect; the former will gradually become
masters, and the latter slaves. It is the first of all among the
political balances, to preserve in its proper station each of
these classes. We talk of balances in the legislature, and among
the departments of government; we ought to carry them to the body
of the people. Since I advanced the idea of balancing the
several orders of men in a community, in forming a genuine
representation, and seen that idea considered as chimerical, I
have been sensibly struck with a sentence in the Marquis
Beccaria's treatise. This sentence was quoted by Congress in
1774, and is as follows:-"In every society there is an effort
continually tending to confer on one part the height of power and
happiness, and to reduce the others to the extreme of weakness
and misery; the intent of good laws is to oppose this effort, and
to diffuse their influence universally and equally." Add to this
Montesquieu's opinion, that "in a free state every man, who is
supposed to be a free agent, ought to be concerned in his own
government: therefore, the legislative should reside in the whole
body of the people, or their representatives." It is extremely
clear that these writers had in view the several orders of men in
society, which we call aristocratical, democratical, mercantile,
mechanics etc., and perceived the efforts they are constantly,
from interested and ambitious views, disposed to make to elevate
themselves and oppress others. Each order must have a share in
the business of legislation actually and efficiently. It is
deceiving a people to tell them they are electors, and can choose
their legislators, if they cannot, in the nature of things,
choose men from among themselves, and genuinely like themselves.
I wish you to take another idea along with you. We are not only
to balance these natural efforts, but we are also to guard
against accidental combinations; combinations founded in the
connections of offices and private interests, both evils which
are increased in proportion as the number of men, among which the
elected must be, are decreased. To set this matter in a proper
point of view, we must form some general ideas and descriptions
of the different classes of men, as they may be divided by
occupation and politically. The first class is the
aristocratical. There are three kinds of aristocracy spoken of
in this country-the first is a constitutional one, which does not
exist in the United States in our common acceptation of the word.
Montesquieu, it is true, observes that where part of the persons
in a society, for want of property, age, or moral character, are
excluded any share in the government, the others, who alone are
the constitutional electors and elected, form this aristocracy.
This, according to him, exists in each of the United States,
where a considerable number of persons, as all convicted of
crimes, under age, or not possessed of certain property, are
excluded any share in the government. The second is an
aristocratic faction, a junto of unprincipled men, often
distinguished for their wealth or abilities, who combine together
and make their object their private interests and aggrandizement.
The existence of this description is merely accidental, but
particularly to be guarded against. The third is the natural
aristocracy; this term we use to designate a respectable order of
men, the line between whom and the natural democracy is in some
degree arbitrary. We may place men on one side of this line,
which others may place on the other, and in all disputes between
the few and the many, a considerable number are wavering and
uncertain themselves on which side they are, or ought to be. In
my idea of our natural aristocracy in the United States, I
include about four or five thousand men; and among these I reckon
those who have been placed in the offices of governors, of
members of Congress, and state senators generally, in the
principal officers of the army and militia, the superior judges,
the most eminent professional men, etc., and men of large
property. The other persons and orders in the community form the
natural democracy; this includes in general, the yeomanry, the
subordinate officers, civil and military, the fishermen,
mechanics and traders, many of the merchants and professional
men. It is easy to perceive that men of these two classes, the
aristocratical and democratical, with views equally honest, have
sentiments widely different, especially respecting public and
private expenses, salaries, taxes, etc. Men of the first class
associate more extensively, have a high sense of honor, possess
abilities, ambition, and general knowledge; men of the second
class are not so much used to combining great objects; they
possess less ambition, and a larger share of honesty; their
dependence is principally on middling and small estates,
industrious pursuits, and hard labor, while that of the former is
principally on the emoluments of large estates, and of the chief
offices of government. Not only the efforts of these two great
parties are to be balanced, but other interests and parties also,
which do not always oppress each other merely for want of power,
and for fear of the consequences; though they, in fact, mutually
depend on each other. Yet such are their general views, that the
merchants alone would never fail to make laws favorable to
themselves and oppressive to the farmers. The farmers alone
would act on like principles; the former would tax the land, the
latter the trade. The manufacturers are often disposed to
contend for monopolies; buyers make every exertion to lower
prices; and sellers to raise them. Men who live by fees and
salaries endeavor to raise them; and the part of the people who
pay them, endeavor to lower them; the public creditors to augment
the taxes, and the people at large to lessen them. Thus, in
every period of society, and in all the transactions of men, we
see parties verifying the observation made by the Marquis; and
those classes which have not their centinels in the government,
in proportion to what they have to gain or lose, must infallibly
be ruined.
Efforts among parties are not merely confined to property.
They contend for rank and distinctions; all their passions in
turn are enlisted in political controversies. Men, elevated in
society, are often disgusted with the changeableness of the
democracy, and the latter are often agitated with the passions of
jealousy and envy. The yeomanry possess a large share of
property and strength, are nervous and firm in their opinions and
habits; the mechanics of towns are ardent and changeable-honest
and credulous, they are inconsiderable for numbers, weight and
strength, not always sufficiently stable for supporting free
governments; the fishing interest partakes partly of the strength
and stability of the landed, and partly of the changeableness of
the mechanic interest. As to merchants and traders, they are our
agents in almost all money transactions, give activity to
government, and possess a considerable share of influence in it.
It has been observed by an able writer, that frugal industrious
merchants are generally advocates for liberty. It is an
observation, I believe, well founded, that the schools produce
but few advocates for republican forms of government. Gentlemen
of the law, divinity, physic, etc., probably form about a fourth
part of the people; yet their political influence, perhaps, is
equal to that of all the other descriptions of men. If we may
judge from the appointments to Congress, the legal characters
will often, in a small representation, be the majority; but the
more the representatives are increased, the more of the farmers,
merchants, etc., will be found to be brought into the government.
These general observations will enable you to discern what I
intend by different classes, and the general scope of my ideas,
when I contend for uniting and balancing their interests,
feelings, opinions, and views in the legislature. We may not
only so unite and balance these as to prevent a change in the
government by the gradual exaltation of one part to the
depression of others, but we may derive many other advantages
from the combination and full representation. A small
representation can never be well informed as to the circumstances
of the people. The members of it must be too far removed from
the people, in general, to sympathize with them, and too few to
communicate with them. A representation must be extremely
imperfect where the representatives are not circumstanced to make
the proper communications to their constituents, and where the
constituents in turn cannot, with tolerable convenience, make
known their wants, circumstances, and opinions to their
representatives. Where there is but one representative to 30,000
or 40,000 inhabitants, it appears to me, he can only mix and be
acquainted with a few respectable characters among his
constituents. Even double the general representation, and then
there must be a very great distance between the representatives
and the people in general represented. On the proposed plan, the
state of Delaware, the city of Philadelphia, the state of Rhode
Island, the province of Maine, the county of Suffolk in
Massachusetts, will have one representative each. There can be
but little personal knowledge, or but few communications, between
him and the people at large of either of those districts. It has
been observed that mixing only with the respectable men, he will
get the best information and ideas from them; he will also
receive impressions favorable to their purposes particularly....
Could we get over all our difficulties respecting a balance
of interests and party efforts, to raise some and oppress others,
the want of sympathy, information and intercourse between the
representatives and the people, an insuperable difficulty will
still remain. I mean the constant liability of a small number of
representatives to private combinations. The tyranny of the one,
or the licentiousness of the multitude, are, in my mind, but
small evils, compared with the factions of the few. It is a
consideration well worth pursuing, how far this house of
representatives will be liable to be formed into private juntos,
how far influenced by expectations of appointments and offices,
how far liable to be managed by the president and senate, and how
far the people will have confidence in them....
THE FEDERAL FARMER