Antifederalist No. 57 

WILL THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BE GENUINELY REPRESENTATIVE? 
(PART 3) 




     . . . . But "the people must elect good men." Examine the 
system-is it practicable for them to elect fit and proper 
representatives where the number is so small?  "But the people 
may choose whom they please." This is an observation, I believe, 
made without due attention to facts and the state of the 
community, To explain my meaning, I will consider the 
descriptions of men commonly presented to the people as 
candidates for the offices of representatives.  We may rank them 
in three classes. 
    1. The men who form the natural aristocracy, as before 
defined. 
    2. Popular demagogues-these men also are often politically 
elevated, so as to be seen by the people through the extent of 
large districts; they often have some abilities, fare] without 
principle, and rise into notice by their noise and arts. 
    3.  The substantial and respectable part of the democracy-
they are a numerous and valuable set of men, who discern and 
judge well, but from being generally silent in public assemblies 
are often overlooked.  They are the most substantial and best 
informed men in the several towns, who occasionally fill the 
middle grades of offices, etc., who hold not a splendid, but 
respectable rank in private concerns.  These men are extensively 
diffused through all the counties, towns and small districts in 
the union; even they, and their immediate connections, are raised 
above the majority of the people, and as representatives are only 
brought to a level with a more numerous part of the community, 
the middle orders, and a degree nearer the mass of the people.  
Hence it is, that the best practical representation, even in a 
small state, must be several degrees more aristocratical than the 
body of the people.  A representation so formed as to admit but 
few or none of the third class, is in my opinion, not deserving 
of the name. Even in armies, courts-martial are so formed as to 
admit subaltern officers into them.  The true idea is, so to open 
and enlarge the representation as to let in a due proportion of 
the third class with those of the first.  Now, my opinion is, 
that the representation proposed is so small as that ordinarily 
very few or none of them can be elected.  And, therefore, after 
all the parade of words and forms, the government must possess 
the soul of aristocracy, or something worse, the spirit of 
popular leaders. 
     I observed in a former letter, that the state of Delaware, 
of Rhode Island, the Province of Maine, and each of the great 
counties in Massachusetts, etc., would have one member, and 
rather more than one when the representatives shall be increased 
to one for each 30,000 inhabitants.  In some districts the people 
are more dispersed and unequal than in others.  In Delaware they 
are compact, in the Province of Maine dispersed; how can the 
elections in either of those districts be regulated so that a man 
of the third class can be elected? Exactly the same principles 
and motives, the same uncontrollable circumstances, must govern 
the elections as in the choice of the governors.  Call upon the 
people of either of those districts to choose a governor, and it 
will probably never happen that they will not bestow a major 
part, or the greatest number, of their votes on some very 
conspicuous or very popular character.  A man that is known among 
a few thousands of people, may be quite unknown among thirty or 
forty thousand.  On the whole it appears to me to be almost a 
self-evident position, that when we call on thirty or forty 
thousand inhabitants to unite in giving their votes for one man 
it will be uniformly impracticable for them to unite in any men, 
except those few who have become eminent for their civil or 
military rank, or their popular legal abilities.  It will be 
found totally impracticable for men in the private walks of life, 
except in the profession of the law, to become conspicuous enough 
to attract the notice of so many electors and have their 
suffrages. 
     But if I am right, it is asked why so many respectable men 
advocate the adoption of the proposed system. Several reasons may 
be given.  Many of our gentlemen are attached to the principles 
of monarchy and aristocracy; they have an aversion to democratic 
republics.  The body of the people have acquired large powers and 
substantial influence by the revolution.  In the unsettled state 
of things, their numerous representatives, in some instances, 
misused their powers, and have induced many good men suddenly to 
adopt ideas unfavorable to such republics, and which ideas they 
will discard on reflection.  Without scrutinizing into the 
particulars of the proposed system, we immediately perceive that 
its general tendency is to collect the powers of government, now 
in the body of the people in reality, and to place them in the 
higher orders and fewer hands; no wonder then that all those of 
and about these orders are attached to it.  They feel there is 
something in this system advantageous to them.  On the other 
hand, the body of the people evidently feel there is something 
wrong and disadvantageous to them. Both descriptions perceive 
there is something tending to bestow on the former the height of 
power and happiness, and to reduce the latter to weakness, 
insignificance, and misery.  The people evidently feel all this 
though they want expressions to convey their ideas. Further, even 
the respectable part of the democracy have never yet been able to 
distinguish clearly where the fallacy lies.  They find there are 
defects in the confederation; they see a system presented; they 
think something must be done; and, while their minds are in 
suspense, the zealous advocates force a reluctant consent.  
Nothing can be a stronger evidence of the nature of this system, 
than the general sense of the several orders in the community 
respecting its tendency. The parts taken generally by them proves 
my position, that notwithstanding the parade of words and forms, 
the government must possess the soul of aristocracy. 
     Congress, heretofore, have asked for moderate additional 
powers.  The cry was give them-be federal.  But the proper 
distinction between the cases that produce this disposition, and 
the system proposed, has not been fairly made 

and seen in all its consequences. We have seen some of our state 
representations too numerous and without examining a medium we 
run to the opposite extreme.  It is true, the proper number of 
federal representatives, is matter of opinion in some degree; but 
there are extremes which we immediately perceive, and others 
which we clearly discover on examination.  We should readily 
pronounce a representative branch of 15 members small in a 
federal government, having complete powers as to taxes, military 
matters, commerce, the coin, etc.  On the other hand, we should 
readily pronounce a federal representation as numerous as those 
of the several states, consisting of about 1,500 representatives, 
unwieldy and totally improper.  It is asked, has not the wisdom 
of the convention found the medium? Perhaps not.  The convention 
was divided on this point of numbers. At least some of its ablest 
members urged, that instead of 65 representatives there ought to 
be 130 in the first instance.  They fixed one representative for 
each 40,000 inhabitants, and at the close of the work, the 
president suggested that the representation appeared to be too 
small and without debate, it was put at, not exceeding one for 
each 30,000. I mention these facts to show, that the convention 
went on no fixed data.  In this extensive country it is difficult 
to get a representation sufficiently numerous.  Necessity, I 
believe, will oblige us to sacrifice in some degree the true 
genuine principles of representation.   But this sacrifice ought 
to be as little as possible.  How far we ought to increase the 
representation I will not pretend to say; but that we ought to 
increase it very considerably, is clear-to double it at least, 
making full allowances for the state representations.  And this 
we may evidently do and approach accordingly towards safety and 
perfection without encountering any inconveniences.  It is with 
great difficulty the people can unite these different interests 
and views even tolerably, in the state senators, who are more 
than twice as numerous as the federal representatives, as 
proposed by the convention; even these senators are considered as 
so far removed from the people, that they are not allowed 
immediately to hold their purse strings. The principal objections 
made to the increase of the representation are, the expense and 
difficulty in getting the members to attend.  The first cannot be 
important; the last, if founded, is against any federal 
government. As to the expense, I presume the house of 
representatives will not be in sessions more than four months in 
the year.  We find by experience that about two-thirds of the 
members of representative assemblies usually attend; therefore, 
of the representation proposed by the convention, about forty-
five members probably will attend.  Doubling their number, about 
90 will probably attend.  Their pay, in one case, at four dollars 
a day each (which is putting it high enough) will amount to, 
yearly, 21,600 dollars; in the other case, 43,200 dollars-[a] 
difference [of] 21,600 dollars. Reduce the state representatives 
from 1,500 down to 1,000 and thereby save the attendance of two-
thirds of the 500, say three months in a year, at one dollar and 
a quarter a day each [would amount to] 37,125 dollars.  Thus we 
may leave the state representations sufficient large, and yet 
save enough by the reduction nearly to support exceeding well the 
whole federal representation I propose.  Surely we -never can be 
so unwise as to sacrifice, essentially, the all-important 
principles of representation for so small a sum as 21,600 dollars 
a year for the United States.  A single company of soldiers would 
cost this sum.  It is a fact that can easily be shown, that we 
expend three times this sum every year upon useless inferior 
offices and very trifling concerns. It is also a fact which can 
be shown that the United States in the late war suffered more by 
a faction in the federal government, then the pay of the federal 
representation will amount to for twenty years. 
     As to the attendance-can we be so unwise as to establish an 
unsafe and inadequate representative branch, and give it as a 
reason, that we believe only a few members will be induced to 
attend?  We ought certainly to establish an adequate 
representative branch, and adopt measures to induce an 
attendance.  I believe that a due proportion of 130 or 140 
members may be induced to attend.  There are various reasons for 
the non-attendance of the members of the present congress; it is 
to be presumed that these will not exist under the new system... 
I 
     In the second place, it is said the members of congress must 
return home, and share in the burdens they may impose; and, 
therefore, private motives will induce them to make mild laws, to 
support liberty, and ease the burdens of the people, This brings 
us to a mere question of interest under this head.  I think these 
observations will appear, on examination, altogether fallacious; 
because this individual interest, which may coincide with the 
rights and interests of the people, will be far more than 
balanced by opposite motives and opposite interests.  If, on a 
fair calculation, a man will gain more by measures oppressive to 
others than he will lose by them, he is interested in their 
adoption.  It is true, that those who govern generally, by 
increasing the public burdens, increase their own share of them; 
but by this increase they may, and often do, increase their 
salaries, fees, and emoluments, in a tenfold proportion, by 
increasing salaries, forming armies and navies, and by making 
offices.  If it shall appear the members of congress will have 
these temptations before them, the argument is on my side.  They 
will view the account, and be induced continually to make efforts 
advantageous to themselves and connections, and oppressive to 
others. 
     We must examine facts. Congress, in its present form, have 
but few offices to dispose of worth the attention of the members, 
or of men of the aristocracy.  Yet from 1774 to this time, we 
find a large proportion of those offices assigned to those who 
were or had been members of congress; and though the states 
choose annually sixty or seventy members, many of them have been 
provided for.  But few men are known to congress in this 
extensive country, and, probably, but few will be to the 
president and senate, except those who have or shall appear as 
members of congress, or those whom the members may bring forward.  
The states may now choose yearly ninety-one members of congress; 
under the new constitution they will have it in their power to 
choose exactly the same number, perhaps afterwards, one hundred 
and :fifteen, but these must be chosen once in two and six years.  
So that, in the course of ten years together, not more than two-
thirds so many members of congress will be elected and brought 
into view, as there now are under the confederation in the same 
term of time.  But at least there will be five, if not ten times, 
as many offices and places worthy of the attention of the 
members, under the new constitution, as there are under the 
confederation.  Therefore, we may fairly presume, that a very 
great proportion of the members of congress, especially the 
influential ones, instead of returning to private life, will be 
provided for with lucrative offices, in the civil or military 
department; and not only the members, but many of their sons, 
friends, and connections.  These offices will be in the 
constitutional disposition of the president and senate, and, 
corruption out of the question, what kind of security can we 
expect in a representation so many of the members of which may 
rationally feel themselves candidates for these offices?  Let 
common sense decide. It is true, that members chosen to offices 
must leave their seats in congress; and to some few offices they 
cannot be elected till the time shall be expired for which they 
were elected members.  But this scarcely will effect the bias 
arising from the hopes and expectations of office.... 
     But it is asked how shall we remedy the evil, so as to 
complete and perpetuate the temple of equal laws and equal 
liberty?  Perhaps we never can do it.  Possibly we never may be 
able to do it in this immense country, under any one system of 
laws however modified. Nevertheless, at present, I think the 
experiment worth making.  I feel an aversion to the disunion of 
the states, and to separate confederacies; the states have fought 
and bled in a common cause, and great dangers too may attend 
these confederacies.  I think the system proposed capable of very 
considerable degrees of perfection, if we pursue first 
principles.  I do not think that De Lolme, or any writer I have 
seen, has sufficiently pursued the proper inquiries and efficient 
means for making representation and balances in government more 
perfect.  It is our task to do this in America.  Our object is 
equal liberty, and equal laws diffusing their influence among all orders of men.  To obtain this we must guard against the bias 
of interest and passions, against interested combinations, secret 
or open.  We must aim at a balance of efforts and strength. 
     Clear it is, by increasing the representation we lessen the 
prospects of each member of congress being provided for in public 
offices.  We proportionably lessen official influence, and 
strengthen his prospects of becoming a private citizen, subject 
to the common burdens, without the compensation of the emoluments 
of office.  By increasing the representation we make it more 
difficult to corrupt and influence the members.  We diffuse them 
more extensively among the body of the people, perfect the 
balance, multiply information, strengthen the confidence of the 
people, and consequently support the laws on equal and free 
principles. There are two other ways, I think, of obtaining in 
some degree the security we want; the one is, by excluding more 
extensively the members from being appointed to offices; the 
other is, by limiting some of their powers.  These two I shall 
examine hereafter. 
                THE FEDERAL FARMER