Antifederalist No. 59 

THE DANGER OF CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF ELECTIONS 


Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist #59, addresses this same topic 
from an opposing viewpoint.  This essay was written anonymously 
by "VOX POPULI," and appeared in The Massachusetts Gazette on 
October 30, 1787. 


     . . I beg leave to Jay before the candid public the first 
clause in the fourth section of the first article of the proposed 
Constitution: 
     "The times, places and manner of holding elections, for 
senators and representatives, shall be prescribed in each state 
by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may, at any time, by 
law, make or alter such regulations except as to the places of 
choosing senators." 
     By this clause, the time, place and manner of choosing 
representatives is wholly at the disposal of Congress. 
     Why the Convention who formed the proposed Constitution 
wished to invest Congress with such a power, I am by no means 
capable of saying; or why the good people of this commonwealth 
[Massachusetts] should delegate such a power to them, is no less 
hard to determine.  But as the subject is open for discussion, I 
shall make a little free inquiry into the matter. 
    And, first.  What national advantage is there to be acquired 
by giving them such a power? 
     The only advantage which I have heard proposed by it is, to 
prevent a partial representation of the several states in 
Congress; "for if the time, manner and place were left wholly in 
the hands of the state legislatures, it is probable they would 
not make provision by appointing time, manner and place for an 
election; in which case there could be no election, and 
consequently the federal government weakened." 
     But this provision is by no means sufficient to prevent an 
evil of that nature.  For will any reasonable man suppose-that 
when the legislature of any state, who are annually chosen, are 
so corrupt as to break thro' that government which they have 
formed, and refuse to appoint time, place and manner of choosing 
representatives-I say, can any person suppose, that a state so 
corrupt would not be full as likely to neglect, or even refuse, 
to choose representatives at the time and place and in the manner 
prescribed by Congress?  Surely they would.  So it could answer 
no good national purpose on that account; and I have not heard 
any other national advantage proposed thereby. 
    We will now proceed, in the next place, to consider why the 
people of this commonwealth should vest Congress with such a 
power. 
     No one proposes that it would be any advantage to the people 
of this state.  Therefore, it must be considered as a matter of 
indifference, except there is an opportunity for its operating to 
their disadvantage-in which case, I conceive it ought to be 
disapprobated. 
     Whether there is danger of its operating to the good 
people's disadvantage, shall now be the subject of our inquiry. 
     Supposing Congress should direct, that the representatives 
of this commonwealth should be chosen all in one town, (Boston, 
for instance) on the first day of March - would not that be a 
very injurious institution to the good people of this 
commonwealth?  Would not there be at least nine-tenths of the 
landed interest of this commonwealth entirely unrepresented?  
Surely one may reasonably imagine there would. What, then, would 
be the case if Congress should think proper to direct, that the 
elections should be held at the north-west, south-west, or north-
east part of the state, the last day of March?  How many electors 
would there attend the business?  And it is a little remarkable, 
that any gentleman should suppose, that Congress could possibly 
be in any measure as good judges of the time, place and manner of 
elections as the legislatures of the several respective states. 
     These as objections I could wish to see obviated.  And I 
could wish the public inquiry might extend to a consideration, 
whether or not it would not be more conducive, to prevent a 
partial representation, to invest Congress with power to levy 
such a fine as they might think proper on states not choosing 
representatives, than by giving them this power of appointing 
time, manner and place. 
     It is objected by some, that Congress could not levy, or at 
least, could not collect, such a fine of a delinquent state.  If 
that is the case, Congress could not collect any tax they might 
think proper to levy, nor execute any order whatever; but at any 
time any state might break through the national compact, dissolve 
the federal constitution, and set the whole structure afloat on 
the ocean of chaos. 
     It is, therefore, proposed to the public to consider, 
whether the said clause in the fourth section of the first 
article can answer the only purposes for which it is said to have 
been provided, or any other which will prove any advantage either 
to the nation or state. 
                        VOX POPULI