Antifederalist No. 61 

QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL  PROVISIONS 
REGARDING THE ELECTION OF CONGRESSMEN 



     . . . . It is well observed by Montesquieu, that in 
republican governments the forms of elections are fundamental; 
and that it is an essential part of the social compact, to 
ascertain by whom, to whom, when, and in what manner, suffrages 
are to be given.  Wherever we find the regulation of elections 
have not been carefully fixed by the constitution, or the 
principles of them, we constantly see new legislatures modifying 
. . . [their] own form, and changing the spirit of the government 
to answer partial purposes. 
    By the proposed plan it is -fixed, that the qualifications of 
the electors of the federal representatives shall be the same as 
those of the electors of state representatives; though these vary 
some in the several states the electors are fixed and designated. 
    The qualifications of the representatives are also fixed and 
designated, and no person under 25 years of age, not an 
inhabitant of the state, and not having been seven years a 
citizen of the United States, can be elected.  The clear 
inference is, that all persons 25 years of age, and upwards, 
inhabitants of the state, and having been, at any period or 
periods, seven years citizens of the United States, may be 
elected representatives.  They have a right to be elected by the 
constitution, and the electors have a right to choose them.  This 
is fixing the federal representation, as to the elected, on a 
very broad basis.  It can be no objection to the elected, that 
they are Christians, Pagans, Mahometans, or Jews; that they are 
of any color, rich or poor, convict or not.  Hence many men may 
be elected, who cannot be electors. Gentlemen who have commented 
so largely upon the wisdom of the constitution, for excluding 
from being elected young men under a certain age, would have done 
well to have recollected, that it positively makes pagans, 
convicts, etc., eligible.  The people make the constitution; they 
exclude a few persons, by certain descriptions, from being 
elected, and all not thus excluded are clearly admitted.  Now a 
man 25 years old, an inhabitant of the state, and having been a 
citizen of the states seven years, though afterwards convicted, 
may be elected, because not within any of the excluding clauses; 
the same of a beggar, an absentee, etc. 
     The right of the electors, and eligibility of the elected, 
being fixed by the people, they cannot be narrowed by the state 
legislatures, or congress.  It is established, that a man being 
(among other qualifications) an inhabitant of the state, shall be 
eligible.  Now it would be narrowing the right of the people to 
confine them in their choice to a man, an inhabitant of a 
particular county or district in the state.  Hence it follows, 
that neither the state legislatures nor congress can establish 
district elections; that is, divide the state into districts, and 
confine the electors of each district to the choice of a man 
resident in it.  If the electors could be thus limited in one 
respect, they might in another be confined to choose a man of a 
particular religion, of certain property, etc., and thereby half 
of the persons made eligible by the constitution be excluded.  
All laws, therefore, for regulating elections must be made on the 
broad basis of the constitution. 
     Next, we may observe, that representatives are to be chosen 
by the people of the state.  What is a choice by the people of 
the state? If each given district in it choose one, will that be 
a choice within the meaning of the constitution? Must the choice 
be by plurality of votes, or a majority?  In connection with 
these questions, we must take the 4th Sect., Art I., where it is 
said the state legislatures shall prescribe the times, places, 
and manner of holding elections; but congress may make or alter 
such regulations.  By this clause, I suppose, the electors of 
different towns and districts in the state may be assembled in 
different places, to give their votes; but when so assembled, by 
another clause they cannot, by congress or the state 
legislatures, be restrained from giving their votes for any man 
an inhabitant of the state, and qualified as to age, and having 
been a citizen the time required.  But I see nothing in the 
constitution by which to decide, whether the choice shall be by a 
plurality or a majority of votes.  This, in my mind, is by far 
the most important question in the business of elections.  When 
we say a representative shall be chosen by the people, it seems 
to imply that he shall be chosen by a majority of them; but 
states which use the same phraseology in this respect, practice 
both ways.  I believe a majority of the states choose by 
pluralities; and, I think it probable, that the federal house of 
representatives will decide that a choice of its members by 
pluralities is constitutional.  A man who has the most votes is 
chosen in Great Britain.  It is this, among other things, that 
gives every man fair play in the game of influence and 
corruption.  I believe that not much stress was laid upon the 
objection that congress may assemble the electors at some out of 
the way place.  However, the advocates seem to think they obtain 
a victory of no small glory and importance, when they can show, 
with some degree of color, that the evil is rather a possibility 
than a probability. . .  
   It is easy to perceive that there is an essential difference 
between elections by pluralities and by majorities, between 
choosing a man in a small or limited district, and choosing a 
number of men promiscuously by the people of a large state.  And 
while we are almost secure of judicious unbiased elections by 
majorities in such districts, we have no security against 
deceptions, influence and corruption in states or large districts 
in electing by pluralities.  When a choice is made by a plurality 
of votes, it is often made by a very small part of the electors, 
who attend and give their votes; when by a majority, never by so 
few as one half of them.  The partialities and improprieties 
attending the former mode may be illustrated by a case that 
lately happened in one of the middle states.  Several 
representatives were to be chosen by a large number of 
inhabitants compactly settled, among whom there were four or five 
thousand voters.  Previous to the time of election a number of 
lists of candidates were published, to divide and distract the 
voters in general.  About half a dozen men of some influence, who 
had a favorite list to carry, met several times, fixed their 
list, and agreed to hand it about among all who could probably be 
induced to adopt it, and to circulate the other lists among their 
opponents, to divide them. The poll was opened, and several 
hundred electors, suspecting nothing, attended and put in their 
votes.  The list of the half dozen was carried, and men were 
found to be chosen, some of whom were very disagreeable to a 
large majority of the electors.  Though several hundred electors 
voted, men on that list were chosen who had only 45, 43, 44, 
etc., votes each. They had a plurality, that is, more than any 
other persons.  The votes generally were scattered, and those who 
made even a feeble combination succeeded in placing highest upon 
the list several very unthought of and very unpopular men.  This 
evil never could have happened in a town where all the voters 
meet in one place, and consider no man as elected unless he have 
a majority, or more than half of all the votes.  Clear it is, 
that the man on whom thus but a small part of the votes are 
bestowed cannot possess the confidence of the people, or have any 
considerable degree of influence over them. But as partial, as 
liable to secret influence, and corruption as the choice by 
pluralities may be, I think, we cannot avoid it, without 
essentially increasing the federal representation, and adopting 
the principle of district elections. There is but one case in 
which the choice by the majority is practicable, and that is, 
where districts are formed of such moderate extent that the 
electors in each can conveniently meet in one place, and at one 
time, and proceed to the choice of a representative; when, if no 
man have a majority or more than half of all the votes the first 
time, the voters may examine the characters of those brought 
forward, accommodate, and proceed to repeat their votes till some 
one shall have that majority.  This, I believe, cannot be a case 
under the constitution proposed in its present form.  To explain 
my ideas, take Massachusetts, for instance.  She is entitled to 
eight representatives. She has 370,000 inhabitants, about 46,000 
to one representative.  If the elections be so held that the 
electors throughout the state meet in their several towns or 
places, and each elector puts in his vote for eight 
representatives, the votes of the electors will ninety-nine times 
in a hundred, be so scattered that on collecting the votes from 
the several towns or places, no men will be found, each of whom 
have a majority of the votes, and therefore the election will not 
be made .... I might add many other observations to evince the 
superiority and solid advantages of proper district elections, 
and a choice by a majority, and to prove that many evils attend 
the contrary practice.  These evils we must encounter as the 
constitution now stands. I see no way to fix elections on a 
proper footing, and to render tolerably equal and secure the 
federal representation, but by increasing the representation, so 
as to have one representative for each district in which the 
electors may conveniently meet in one place, and at one time, and 
choose by a majority.  Perhaps this might be effected pretty 
generally, by fixing one representative for each twelve thousand 
inhabitants; dividing, or fixing the principles for dividing the 
states into proper districts; and directing the electors of each 
district to the choice, by a majority, of some men having a 
permanent interest and residence in it.  I speak of a 
representation tolerably equal, etc., because I am still of 
opinion, that it is impracticable in this extensive country to 
have a federal representation sufficiently democratic, or 
substantially drawn from the body of the people.  The principles 
just mentioned may be the best practical ones we can expect to 
establish.  By thus increasing the representation we not only 
make it more democratical and secure, strengthen the confidence 
of the people in it, and thereby render it more nervous and 
energetic; but it will also enable the people essentially to 
change, for the better, the principles and forms of elections.  
To provide for the people's wandering throughout the state for a 
representative may sometimes enable them to elect a more 
brilliant or an abler man, than by confining them to districts; 
but generally this latitude will be used to pernicious purposes, 
especially connected with the choice by plurality-when a man in 
the remote part of the state, perhaps obnoxious at home, but 
ambitious and intriguing, may be chosen to represent the people 
in another part of the state far distant, and by a small part of 
them, or by a faction, or by a combination of some particular 
description of men among them.  This has been long the case in 
Great Britain; it is the case in several states; nor do I think 
that such pernicious practices will be merely possible in our 
federal concerns, but highly probable.  By establishing district 
elections, we exclude none of the best men from being elected; 
and we fix what, in my mind, is of far more importance than 
brilliant talents-I mean a sameness, as to residence and 
interests, between the representative and his constituents. And 
by the election by a majority, he is sure to be the man, the 
choice of more than half of them.... 
                        THE FEDERAL FARMER