Antifederalist No. 63 

ON THE ORGANIZATION AND POWERS OF THE SENATE        (PART 2) 



     . . . . The senate is an assembly of 26 members, two from 
each state; though the senators are apportioned on the federal 
plan, they will vote individually. They represent the states, as 
bodies politic, sovereign to certain purposes. The states being 
sovereign and independent, are all considered equal, each with 
the other in the senate.  In this we are governed solely by the 
ideal equalities of sovereignties; the federal and state 
governments forming one whole, and the state governments an 
essential part, which ought always to be kept distinctly in view, 
and preserved.  I feel more disposed, on reflection, to acquiesce 
in making them the basis of the senate, and thereby to make it 
the interest and duty of the senators to preserve distinct, and 
to perpetuate the respective, sovereignties they shall represent. 
. . . 
     The senate, as a legislative branch, is not large, but as an 
executive branch quite too numerous.  It is not to be presumed 
that we can form a genuine senatorial branch in the United 
States, a real representation of the aristocracy and balance in 
the legislature, any more than we can form a genuine 
representation of the people.  Could we separate the 
aristocratical and democratical interest, compose the senate of 
the former, and the house of assembly of the latter, they are too 
unequal in the United States to produce a balance.  Form them on 
pure principles, and leave each to be supported by its real 
weight and connections, the senate would be feeble and the house 
powerful.  I say, on pure principles; because I make a 
distinction between a senate that derives its weight and 
influence from a pure source-its numbers and wisdom, its 
extensive property, its extensive and permanent connections -and 
a senate composed of a few men, possessing small property, and 
small and unstable connections, that derives its weight and 
influence from a corrupt or pernicious source: that is, merely 
from the power given it by the constitution and laws, to dispose 
of the public offices, and the annexed emoluments, and by those 
means to interest officers, and the hungry expectants of offices, 
in support of its measures.  I wish the proposed senate may not 
partake too much of the latter description. 
     To produce a balance and checks, the constitution proposes 
two branches in the legislature.  But they are so formed, that 
the members of both must generally be the same kind of men-men 
having similar interests and views, feelings and connections - 
men of the same grade in society, and who associate on all, 
occasions (probably, if there be any difference, the senators 
will be the most democratic.) Senators and representatives thus 
circumstanced, as men, though convened in two rooms to make laws, 
must be governed generally by the same motives and views, and 
therefore pursue the same system of politics.  The partitions 
between the two branches will be merely those of the building in 
which they fit. There will not be found in them any of those 
genuine balances and checks, among the real different interests, 
and efforts of the several classes of men in the community we aim 
at.  Nor can any such balances and checks be formed in the 
present condition of the United States in any considerable degree 
of perfection. . . 
    Though I conclude the senators and representatives will not 
form in the legislature those balances and checks which 
correspond with the actual state of the people, yet I approve of 
two branches, because we may notwithstanding derive several 
advantages from them.  The senate, from the mode of its 
appointment, will probably be influenced to support the state 
governments; and, from its periods of service will produce 
stability in legislation, while frequent elections may take place 
in the other branch.  There is generally a degree of competition 
between two assemblies even composed of the same kind of men; and 
by this, and by means of every law passing a revision in the 
second branch, caution, coolness, and deliberation are produced 
in the business of making laws.  By means of a democratic branch 
we may particularly secure personal liberty; and by means of a 
senatorial branch we may particularly protect property.  By the 
division, the house becomes the proper body to impeach all 
officers for misconduct in office, and the senate the proper 
court to try them; and in a country where limited powers must be 
lodged in the first magistrate, the senate, perhaps, may be the 
most proper body to be found to have a negative upon him in 
making treaties, and managing foreign affairs. 
     Though I agree the federal senate, in the form proposed, may 
be useful to many purposes, and that it is not very necessary to 
alter the organization, modes of appointment, and powers of it in 
several respects; yet, without alterations in others, I sincerely 
believe it will, in a very few years, become the source of the 
greatest evils.  Some of these alterations, I conceive, to be 
absolutely necessary and some of them at least advisable. 
     1.   By the confederation the members of congress are chosen 
annually.  By Art. 1. Sect. 2. of the constitution, the senators 
shall be chosen for six years. As the period of service must be, 
in a considerable degree, matter of opinion on this head, I shall 
only make a few observations, to explain why I think it more 
advisable to limit it to three or four years. 
     The people of this country have not been accustomed to so 
long appointments in their state governments.  They have 
generally adopted annual elections.  The members of the present 
congress are chosen yearly, who, from the nature and multiplicity 
of their business, ought to be chosen for longer periods than the 
federal senators.  Men six years in office absolutely contract 
callous habits, and cease, in too great a degree, to feel their 
dependence, and for the condition of their constituents.  
Senators continued in offices three or four years, will be in 
them longer than any popular erroneous opinions will probably 
continue to actuate their electors.  Men appointed for three or 
four years will generally be long enough in office to give 
stability, and amply to acquire political information. By a 
change of legislators, as often as circumstances will permit, 
political knowledge is diffused more extensively among the 
people, and the attention of the electors and elected more 
constantly kept alive-circumstances of infinite importance in a 
free country.  Other reasons might be added, but my subject is 
too extensive to admit of my dwelling upon less material points. 
     2.   When the confederation was formed, it was considered 
essentially necessary that the members of congress should at any 
time be recalled by their respective states, when the states 
should see fit, and others be sent in their room. I do not think 
it is less necessary that this principle should be extended to 
the members of congress under the new constitution, and 
especially to the senators.  I have had occasion several times to 
observe, that let us form a federal constitution as extensively, 
and on the best principles in our power, we must, after all, 
trust a vast deal to a few men, who, far removed from their 
constituents, will administer the federal government.  There is 
but little danger these men will feel too great a degree of 
dependence.  The necessary and important object to be attended 
to, is to make them feel dependent enough.  Men elected for 
several years, several hundred miles distant from their states, 
possessed of very extensive powers, and the means of paying 
themselves, will not, probably, be oppressed with a sense of 
dependence and responsibility. 
     The senators will represent sovereignties, which generally 
have, and always ought to retain, the power of recalling their 
agents.  The principle of responsibility is strongly felt in men 
who are liable to be recalled and censured for their misconduct; 
and, if we may judge from experience, the latter will not abuse 
the power of recalling their members; to possess it will at least 
be a valuable check.  It is in the nature of all delegated power, 
that the constituents should retain the right to judge concerning 
the conduct of their representatives.  They must exercise the 
power, and their decision itself, their approving or disapproving 
that conduct implies a right, a power to continue in office, or 
to remove from it.  But whenever the substitute acts under a 
constitution, then it becomes necessary that the power of 
recalling him be expressed.  The reasons for lodging a power to 
recall are stronger, as they respect the senate, than as they 
respect the representatives.  The latter will be more frequently 
elected, and changed of course, and being chosen by the people at 
large, it would be more difficult for the people than for the 
legislatures to take the necessary measures for recalling.  But 
even the people, if the powers will be more beneficial to them 
than injurious, ought to possess it.  The people are not apt to 
wrong a man who is steady and true to their interests.  They may 
for a while be misled by party representations, and leave a good 
man out of office unheard; but every recall supposes a deliberate 
decision, and a fair hearing.  And no man who believes his 
conduct proper, and the result of honest views, will be the less 
useful in his public character on account of the examination his 
actions may be liable to.  A man conscious of the contrary 
conduct ought clearly to be restrained by the apprehensions of a 
trial.  I repeat it, it is interested combinations and factions 
we are particularly to guard against in the federal government, 
and all the rational means that can be put into the hands of the 
people to prevent them ought to be provided and furnished for 
them.  Where there is a power to recall, trusty sentinels among 
the people, or in the state legislatures will have a fair 
opportunity to become useful.  If the members in congress from 
the states join in such combinations, or favor them, or pursue a 
pernicious line of conduct, the most attentive among the people 
or in the state legislatures may formally charge them before 
their constituents.  The very apprehensions of such 
constitutional charge may prevent many of the evils mentioned; 
and the recalling the members of a single state, a single senator 
or representative, may often prevent many more.  Nor do 1, at 
present, discover any danger in such proceedings, as every man 
who shall move for a recall will put his reputation at stake, to 
show he has reasonable grounds for his motion.  It is not 
probable such motions will be made unless there be good apparent 
grounds for succeeding.  Nor can the charge or motion be anything 
more than the attack of an individual or individuals unless a 
majority of the constituents shall see cause to go into the 
inquiry.  Further, the circumstances of such a power being lodged 
in the constituents will tend continually to keep up their 
watchfulness, as well as the attention and dependence of the 
federal senators and representatives. 
     3.   By the confederation it is provided, that no delegate 
shall serve more than three years in any term of six years; and 
thus, by the forms of the government a rotation of members is 
produced.  A like principle has been adopted in some of the state 
governments, and also in some ancient and modern republics.  
Whether this exclusion of a man for a given period, after he 
shall have served a given time, ought to be ingrafted into a 
constitution or not is a question, the proper decision [of which] 
materially depends upon the leading features of the government.  
Some governments are so formed as to produce a sufficient 
fluctuation and change of members; in the ordinary course of 
elections proper numbers of new members are from time to time 
brought into the legislature, and a proportionate number of old 
ones go out, mix, and become diffused among the people.  This is 
the case with all numerous representative legislatures, the 
members of which are frequently elected, and constantly within 
the view of their constituents.  This is the case with our state 
governments, and in them a constitutional rotation is 
unimportant. But in a government consisting of but a few members, 
elected for long periods, and far removed from the observation of 
the people, but few changes in the ordinary course of elections 
take place among the members.  They become in some measure a 
fixed body, and often inattentive to the public good, callous, 
selfish, and the fountain of corruption.  To prevent these evils, 
and to force a principle of pure animation into the federal 
government, which will be formed much in this last manner 
mentioned, and to produce attention, activity, and a diffusion of 
knowledge in the community, we ought to establish among others 
the principle of rotation.  Even good men in office, in time, 
imperceptibly lose sight of the people, and gradually fall into 
measures prejudicial to them.  It is only a rotation among the 
members of the federal legislature I shall contend for.  Judges 
and officers at the heads of the judicial and executive 
departments are in a very different situation.  Their offices and 
duties require the information and studies of many years for 
performing them in a manner advantageous to the people.  These 
judges and officers must apply their whole time to the detail 
business of their offices, and depend on them for their support.  
Then, they always act under masters or superiors, and may be 
removed from office for misconduct.  They pursue a certain round 
of executive business; their offices must be in all societies 
confined to a few men, because but few can become qualified to 
fill them.  And were they, by annual appointments, open to the 
people at large, they are offices of such a nature as to be of no 
service to them.  They must leave these offices in the possession 
of the few individuals qualified to fill them, or have them badly 
filled.  In the judicial and executive departments also, the body 
of the people possess a large share of power and influence, as 
jurors and subordinate officers, among whom there are many and 
frequent rotations.  But in every free country the legislatures 
are all on a level, and legislation becomes partial whenever, in 
practice, it rests for any considerable time in a few hands. It 
is the true republican principle to diffuse the power of making 
the laws among the people and so to modify the forms of the 
government as to draw in turn the well informed of every class 
into the legislature. To determine the propriety or impropriety 
of this rotation, we must take the inconveniencies as well as the 
advantages attending it into view.  On the one hand by this 
rotation, we may sometimes exclude good men from being elected.  
On the other hand, we guard against those pernicious connections, 
which usually grow up among men left to continue long periods in 
office.  We increase the number of those who make the laws and 
return to their constituents; and thereby spread information, and 
preserve a spirit of activity and investigation among the people.  
Hence a balance of interests and exertions are preserved, and the 
ruinous measures of actions rendered more impracticable.  I would 
not urge the principle of rotation, if I believed the consequence 
would be an uninformed federal legislature; but I have no 
apprehension of this in this enlightened country.  The members of 
congress, at any one time, must be but very few compared with the 
respectable well informed men in the United States; and I have no 
idea there will be any want of such men for members of congress, 
though by a principle of rotation the constitution should exclude 
from being elected for two years those federal legislators, who 
may have served the four years immediately preceding, or any four 
years in the six preceding years. If we may judge from experience 
and fair calculations, this principle will never operate to 
exclude at any one period a fifteenth part even of those men who 
have been members of congress.  Though no man can sit in congress 
by the confederation more than three years in any term of six 
years, yet not more than three, four, or five men in any one 
state have been made ineligible at any one period.  And if a good 
man happens to be excluded by this rotation, it is only for a 
short time. All things considered, the inconveniencies of the 
principle must be very inconsiderable compared with the many 
advantages of it.  It will generally be expedient for a man who 
has served four years in congress to return home, mix with the 
people, and reside some time with them.  This will tend to 
reinstate him in the interests, feelings, and views similar to 
theirs, and thereby confirm in him the essential qualifications 
of a legislator. Even in point of information, it may be 
observed, the useful information of legislators is not acquired 
merely in studies in offices, and in meeting to make laws from 
day to day.  They must learn the actual situation of the people 
by being among them, and when they have made laws, return home 
and observe how they operate. Thus occasionally to be among the 
people, is not only necessary to prevent or banish the callous 
habits and self-interested views of office in legislators, but to 
afford them necessary information, and to render them useful.  
Another valuable end is answered by it, sympathy, and the means 
of communication between them and their constituents, is 
substantially promoted. So that on every principle legislators, 
at certain periods, ought to live among their constituents. Some 
men of science are undoubtedly necessary in every legislature; 
but the knowledge, generally, necessary for men who make laws, is 
a knowledge of the common concerns, and particular circumstances 
of the people. In a republican government seats in the 
legislature are highly honorable.  I believe but few do, and 
surely none ought to, consider them as places of profit and 
permanent support.  Were the people always properly attentive, 
they would, at proper periods, call their lawmakers home, by 
sending others in their room.  But this is not often the case; 
and therefore, in making constitutions, when the people are 
attentive, they ought cautiously to provide for those benefits, 
those advantageous changes in the administration of their 
affairs, which they are often apt to be inattentive to in 
practice.  On the whole, to guard against the evils, and to 
secure the advantages I have mentioned, with the greatest degree 
of certainty, we ought clearly in my opinion, to increase the 
federal representation, to secure elections on proper principles, 
to establish a right to recall members, and a rotation among 
them. 
                        THE FEDERAL FARMER