Antifederalist No. 66 


From North Carolina 

     Mr. JOSEPH TAYLOR objected to the provision made for 
impeaching.  He urged that there could be no security from it, as 
the persons accused were triable by the Senate, who were a part 
of the legislature themselves; that, while men were fallible, the 
senators were liable to errors, especially in a case where they 
were concerned themselves. . . . 
      Mr. [Timothy] BLOODWORTH wished to be informed, whether 
this sole power of impeachment, given to the House of 
Representatives, deprived the state of the power of impeaching 
any of its members. . . . 
     Mr. JOSEPH TAYLOR.  Mr. Chairman, the objection is very 
strong.  If there be but one body to try, where are we?  If any 
tyranny or oppression should arise, how are those who perpetrated 
such oppression to be tried and punished?  By a tribunal 
consisting of the very men who assist in such tyranny.  Can any 
tribunal be found, in any community, who will give judgment 
against their own actions?  Is it the nature of man to decide 
against himself? I am obliged to the worthy member from New 
Hanover for assisting me with objections. None can impeach but 
the representatives; and the impeachments are to be determined by 
the senators, who are one of the branches of power which we dread 
under this Constitution.... the words "sole power of impeachment" 
were so general, and might admit of such a latitude of 
construction, as to extend to every legislative member upon the 
continent, so as to preclude the representatives of the different 
states from impeaching.... 
     Mr. [William] PORTER wished to be informed, if every 
officer, who was a creature of that Constitution, was to be tried 
by the Senate-whether such officers, and those who had complaints 
against them, were to go from the extreme parts of the continent 
to the seat of government, to adjust disputes. . . . 
     Mr. J. TAYLOR.  Mr. Chairman, I conceive that, if this 
Constitution be adopted, we shall have a large number of officers 
in North Carolina under the appointment of Congress.  We shall 
undoubtedly, for instance, have a great number of tax-gatherers.  
If any of these officers shall do wrong, when we come to 
fundamental principles, we find that we have no way to punish 
them but by going to Congress, at an immense distance, whither we 
must carry our witnesses. Every gentlemen must see, in these 
cases, that oppressions will arise.  I conceive that they cannot 
be tried elsewhere.  I consider that the Constitution will be 
explained by the word "sole." If they did not mean to retain a 
general power of impeaching, there was no occasion for saying the 
"sole power." I consider therefore that oppressions will arise.  
If I am oppressed, I must go to the House of Representatives to 
complain.  I consider that, when mankind are about to part with 
rights, they ought only to part with those rights which they can 
with convenience relinquish, and not such as must involve them in 
distresses.... 
     I observe that, when these great men are met in Congress, in 
consequence of this power, they will have the power of appointing 
all the officers of the United States.  My experience in life 
shows me that the friends of the members of the legislature will 
get the offices.  These senators and members of the House of 
Representatives will appoint their friends to all offices.  These 
officers will be great men, and they will have numerous deputies 
under them.  The receiver-general of the taxes of North Carolina 
must be one of the greatest men in the country.  Will he come to 
me for his taxes?  No. He will send his deputy, who will have 
special instructions to oppress me.  How am I to be redressed?  I 
shall be told that I must go to Congress, to get him impeached. 
This being the case, whom am I to impeach? A friend of the 
representatives of North Carolina.  For, unhappily for us, these 
men will have too much weight for us; they will have friends in 
the government who will be inclined against us, and thus we may 
be oppressed with impunity.