Antifederalist No. 67 

VARIOUS FEARS CONCERNING THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 



From the "CATO" letters of George Clinton, taken from The New-
York Journal of November 8, 1787. 


     I shall begin with observations on the executive branch of 
this new system; and though it is not the first in order, as 
arranged therein, yet being the chief, is perhaps entitled by the 
rules of rank to the first consideration.  The executive power as 
described in the 2d article, consists of a president and vice-
president, who are to hold their offices during the term of four 
years; the same article has marked the manner and time of their 
election, and established the qualifications of the president; it 
also provides against the removal, death, or inability of the 
president and vice-president - regulates the salary of the 
president, delineates his duties and powers; and, lastly, 
declares the causes for which the president and vice-president 
shall be removed from office. 
     Notwithstanding the great learning and abilities of the 
gentlemen who composed the convention, it may be here remarked 
with deference, that the construction of the first paragraph of 
the first section of the second article is vague and inexplicit, 
and leaves the mind in doubt as to the election of a president 
and vice-president, after the expiration of the election for the 
first term of four years; in every other case, the election of 
these great officers is expressly provided for; but there is no 
explicit provision for their election which is to set this 
political machine in motion; no certain and express terms as in 
your state constitution, that statedly once in every four years, 
and as often as these offices shall become vacant, by expiration 
or otherwise, as is therein expressed, an election shall be held 
as follows, etc.; this inexplicitness perhaps may lead to an 
establishment for life. 
     It is remarked by Montesquieu, in treating of republics, 
that in all magistracies, the greatness of the power must be 
compensated by the brevity of the duration, and that a longer 
time than a year would be dangerous. It is, therefore, obvious to 
the least intelligent mind to account why great power in the 
hands of a magistrate, and that power connected with considerable 
duration, may be dangerous to the liberties of a republic.  The 
deposit of vast trusts in the hands of a single magistrate 
enables him in their exercise to create a numerous train of 
dependents. This tempts his ambition, which in a republican 
magistrate is also remarked, to be pernicious, and the duration 
of his office for any considerable time favors his views, gives 
him the means and time to perfect and execute his designs; he 
therefore fancies that he may be great and glorious by oppressing 
his fellow citizens, and raising himself to permanent grandeur on 
the ruins of his country.  And here it may be necessary to 
compare the vast and important powers of the president, together 
with his continuance in office, with the foregoing doctrine-his 
eminent magisterial situation will attach many adherents to him, 
and he will be surrounded by expectants and courtiers. His power 
of nomination and influence on all appointments; the strong posts 
in each state comprised within his superintendence, and 
garrisoned by troops under his direction; his control over the 
army, militia, and navy; the unrestrained power of granting 
pardons for treason, which may be used to screen from punishment 
those whom he had secretly instigated to commit the crime, and 
thereby prevent a discovery of his own guilt; his duration in 
office for four years-these, and various other principles 
evidently prove the truth of the position, that if the president 
is possessed of ambition, he has power and time sufficient to 
ruin his country. 
     Though the president, during the sitting of the legislature, 
is assisted by the senate, yet he is without a constitutional 
council in their recess. He will therefore be unsupported by 
proper information and advice, and will generally be directed by 
minions and favorites, or a council of state will grow out of the 
principal officers of the great departments, the most dangerous 
council in a free country. . . . The language and the manners of 
this court will be what distinguishes them from the rest of the 
community, not what assimilates them to it; and in being remarked 
for a behavior that shows they are not meanly born, and in 
adulation to people of fortune and power. 
     The establishment of a vice-president is as unnecessary as 
it is dangerous. This officer, for want of other employment, is 
made president of the senate, thereby blending the executive and 
legislative powers, besides always giving to some one state, from 
which he is to come, an unjust pre-eminence. 
     It is a maxim in republics that the representative of the 
people should be of their immediate choice; but by the manner in 
which the president is chosen, he arrives to this office at the 
fourth or fifth hand.  Nor does the highest vote, in the way he 
is elected, determine the choice-for it is only necessary that he 
should be taken from the highest of five, who may have a 
plurality of votes. . . . 
     And wherein does this president, invested with his powers 
and prerogatives, essentially differ from the king of Great 
Britain (save as to name, the creation of nobility, and some 
immaterial incidents, the offspring of absurdity and locality)? 
The direct prerogatives of the president, as springing from his 
political character, are among the following: It is necessary, in 
order to distinguish him from the rest of the community, and 
enable him to keep, and maintain his court, that the compensation 
for his services, or in other words, his revenue, should be such 
as to enable him to appear with the splendor of a prince.  He has 
the power of receiving ambassadors from, and a great influence on 
their appointments to foreign courts; as also to make treaties, 
leagues, and alliances with foreign states, assisted by the 
Senate, which when made becomes the supreme law of land.  He is a 
constituent part of the legislative power, for every bill which 
shall pass the House of Representatives and Senate is to be 
presented to him for approbation.  If he approves of it he is to 
sign it, if he disapproves he is to return it with objections, 
which in many cases will amount to a complete negative; and in 
this view he will have a great share in the power of making 
peace, coining money, etc., and all the various objects of 
legislation, expressed or implied in this Constitution.  For 
though it may be asserted that the king of Great Britain has the 
express power of making peace or war, yet he never thinks it 
prudent to do so without the advice of his Parliament, from whom 
be is to derive his support -and therefore these powers, in both 
president and king, are substantially the same.  He is the 
generalissimo of the nation, and of course has the command and 
control of the army, navy and militia; he is the general 
conservator of the peace of the union-he may pardon all offenses, 
except in cases of impeachment, and the principal fountain of all 
offices and employments.  Will not the exercise of these powers 
therefore tend either to the establishment of a vile and 
arbitrary aristocracy or monarchy? The safety of the people in a 
republic depends on the share or proportion they have in the 
government; but experience ought to teach you, that when a man is 
at the head of an elective government invested with great powers, 
and interested in his re-election, in what circle appointments 
will be made; by which means an imperfect aristocracy bordering 
on monarchy may be established. You must, however, my countrymen, 
beware that the advocates of this new system do not deceive you 
by a fallacious resemblance between it and your own state 
government [New York] which you so much prize; and, if you 
examine, you will perceive that the chief magistrate of this 
state is your immediate choice, controlled and checked by a just 
and full representation of the people, divested of the 
prerogative of influencing war and peace, making treaties, 
receiving and sending embassies, and commanding standing armies 
and navies, which belong to the power of the confederation, and 
will be convinced that this government is no more like a true 
picture of your own than an Angel of Darkness resembles an Angel 
of Light. 
                                CATO