Antifederalist No. 68
ON THE MODE OF ELECTING THE PRESIDENT
From a speech by William Grayson given to the Virginia ratifying
convention on June 18, 1788.
Mr. [William] GRAYSON. Mr. Chairman, one great objection
with me is this: If we advert to..... [the] democratical,
aristocratical, or executive branch, we shall find their powers
are perpetually varying and fluctuating throughout the whole.
Perhaps the democratic branch would be well constructed, were it
not for this defect. The executive is still worse, in this
respect, than the democratic branch. He is to be elected by a
number of electors in the country; but the principle is changed
when no person has a majority of the whole number of electors
appointed, or when more than one have such a majority, and have
an equal number of votes; for then the lower house is to vote by
states. It is thus changing throughout the whole. It seems
rather founded on accident than any principle of government I
ever heard of. We know that there scarcely ever was an election
of such an officer without the interposition of foreign powers.
Two causes prevail to make them intermeddle in such cases:-one
is, to preserve the balance of power; the other, to preserve
their trade. These causes have produced interferences of foreign
powers in the election of the king of Poland. All the great
powers of Europe have interfered in an election which took place
not very long ago, and would not let the people choose for
themselves. We know how much the powers of Europe have
interfered with Sweden. Since the death of Charles XII, that
country has been a republican government. Some powers were
willing it should be so; some were willing her imbecility should
continue; others wished the contrary; and at length the court of
France brought about a revolution, which converted it into an
absolute government. Can America be free from these
interferences? France, after losing Holland, will wish to make
America entirely her own. Great Britain will wish to increase
her influence by a still closer connection. It is the interest
of Spain, from the contiguity of her possessions in the western
hemisphere to the United States, to be in an intimate connection
with them, and influence their deliberations, if possible. I
think we have every thing, to apprehend from such interferences.
It is highly probable the President will be continued in office
for life. To gain his favor, they will support him. Consider
the means of importance he will have by creating officers. If he
has a good understanding with the Senate, they will join to
prevent a discovery of his misdeeds. . . .
This quadrennial power cannot be justified by ancient
history. There is hardly an instance where a republic trusted
its executive so long with much power; nor is it warranted by
modern republics. The delegation of power is, in most of them,
only for one year.
When you have a strong democratical and a strong
aristocratical branch, you may have a strong executive. But when
those are weak, the balance will not be preserved, if you give
the executive extensive powers for so long a time. As this
government is organized, it would be dangerous to trust the
President with such powers. How will you punish him if he abuse
his power? Will you call him before the Senate? They are his
counsellors and partners in crime. Where are your checks? We
ought to be extremely cautious in this country. If ever the
government be changed, it will probably be into a despotism. The
first object in England was to destroy the monarchy; but the
aristocratic branch restored him, and of course the government
was organized on its ancient principles. But were a revolution
to happen here, there would be no means of restoring the
government to its former organization. This is a caution to us
not to trust extensive powers. I have an extreme objection to
the mode of his election. I presume the seven Eastern States
will always elect him. As he is vested with the power of making
treaties, and as there is a material distinction between the
carrying and productive states, the former will be disposed to
have him to themselves. He will accommodate himself to their
interests in forming treaties, and they will continue him
perpetually in office. Thus mutual interest will lead them
reciprocally to support one another. It will be a government of
a faction, and this observation will apply to every part of it;
for, having a majority, they may do what they please. I have
made an estimate which shows with what facility they will be able
to reelect him. The number of electors is equal to the number of
representatives and senators; viz., ninety-one. They are to vote
for two persons. They give, therefore, one hundred and eighty-
two votes. Let there be forty-five votes for four different
candidates, and two for the President. He is one of the five
highest, if he have but two votes, which he may easily purchase.
In this case, by the 3d clause of the lst section of the 2d
article, the election is to be by the representatives, according
to states. Let New Hampshire be for him,-a majority of its . .
. . .
3 representatives is 2 Rhode Island 1
1 Connecticut 5 3 New Jersey 4
3 Delaware 1 1 Georgia 3
2 North Carolina 5 3
A majority of seven states is 15 Thus the majority of
seven states is but 15, while the minority amounts to 50. The
total number of voices (91 electors and 65 representatives) is .
. 156 Voices in favor of the President are, 2 state
electors and 15 representatives ..... 17
139
So that the President may be reelected by the voices of 17
against 139.
It may be said that this is an extravagant case, and will
never happen. In my opinion, it will often happen. A person who
is a favorite of Congress, if he gets but two votes of electors,
may, by the subsequent choice of 15 representatives, be elected
President. Surely the possibility of such a case ought to be
excluded.