Antifederalist No. 75 

A NOTE PROTESTING THE TREATY-MAKING PROVISIONS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 

    The following essay was penned anonymously by "HAMPDEN," and 
it appeared in The Pittsburgh Gazette on February 16, 1788. 



     .... It may be freely granted, that from a mistaken zeal in 
favor of that political liberty which was so recently purchased 
at so costly a rate, even good men may give it [the constitution] 
unreasonable opposition; but such men cannot be reasonably 
charged with sordid personal interest as their motive-because it 
is great and sudden changes which produces opportunities of 
preferment.  But that class of men-who either prompted by their 
own ambition or desperate fortunes, are expecting employments 
under the proposed plan; or those weak and ardent men who always 
expect to be gainers by revolutions, and who are never contented, 
but always hastening from one difficulty to another-may be 
expected to ascribe every excellence to the proposed system, and 
to urge a thousand reasons for our real or supposed distresses, 
to induce our adopting thereof.  Such characters may also be 
expected to promise us such extravagantly flattering advantages 
to arise from it, as if it was accompanied with such miraculous 
divine energy as divided the Red Sea, and spoke with thunder on 
Mount Sinai. . . . 
     The first clause of the constitution assures us, that the 
legislative powers shall be vested in a Congress, which shall 
consist of a senate and house of representatives; and in the 
second clause of the second article, it is declared that the 
president, by and with the consent of the senate, is to make 
treaties.  Here the supreme executive magistrate is officially 
connected with the highest branch of the legislature.  And in 
article sixth, clause second, we find that all treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, 
shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every 
state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or 
laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.  When we 
consider the extent of treaties-that in filing the tariff of 
trade, the imposts and port duties generally are or may be fixed 
by a large construction which interested rulers are never at a 
less to give to any constitutional power-treaties may be extended 
to almost every legislative object of the general government.  
Who is it that does not know, that by treaties in Europe the 
succession and constitution of many sovereign states, has been 
regulated.  The partition treaty, and the war of the grand 
alliance, respecting the government of Spain, are well 
remembered; nor is it long since three neighboring powers 
established a nobleman of that nation upon the throne and 
regulated and altered the fundamental laws of that country, as 
well as divided the territory thereof, and all this was done by 
treaty.  And from this power of making treaties, the house of 
representatives, which has the best chance of possessing virtue, 
and public confidence, is entirely excluded. Indeed, I see 
nothing to hinder the president and senate, at a convenient 
crisis, to declare themselves hereditary and supreme, and the 
lower house altogether useless, and to abolish what shadow of the 
state constitutions remain by this power alone; and as the 
president and senate have all that influence which arises from 
the creating and appointing of all offices and officers, who can 
doubt but at a proper occasion they will succeed in such an 
attempt?  And who can doubt but that men will arise who will 
attempt it? Will the doing so be a more flagrant breach of trust, 
or a greater degree of violence and perfidy, than has already 
been practised in order to introduce the proposed plan? . . . Of 
the same kind, and full as inconsistent and dangerous, is the 
first clause of the second article, compared with the second 
clause of the second section.  We first find the president fully 
and absolutely vested with the executive power, and presently we 
find the most important and most influential portion of the 
executive power-e.g., the appointment of all officers-vested in 
the senate, with whom the president only acts as a nominating 
member.  It is on this account that I have said above, that the 
greatest degree of virtue may be expected in the house of 
representatives; for if any considerable part of the executive 
power be joined with the legislature, it will as surely corrupt 
that branch with which it is combined, as poison will the human 
body.  Therefore, though the small house of representatives will 
consist of the natural aristocracy of the country, as well as the 
senate, yet not being dangerously combined with the executive 
branch, it has not such certain influential inducements to 
corruption. . . 
    It will be asked, no doubt, who is this that dares so boldly 
to arraign the conduct and censure the production of a convention 
composed of so chosen a band of patriots?  To this I answer, that 
I am a freeman, and it is the character of freemen to examine and 
judge for themselves.  They know that implicit faith respecting 
politics is the handmaid to slavery; and that the greatness of 
those names who frame a government, cannot sanctify its faults, 
nor prevent the evils that result from its imperfections. . . . 
     With respect to the majority, I do not doubt the testimony 
of a dignified supporter of the system, that they were all, or 
nearly all, eminent lawyers; but I do doubt the patriotism and 
political virtue of several of the most eminently active of them.  
But it is not with the men, but with the plan to which they gave 
birth, we have to contend, and to contend with such a degree of 
moderation and firmness, as will best promote political security, 
shall be the endeavor of
     
                                HAMPDEN