Antifederalist No. 9

A CONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT IS A TYRANNY


"MONTEZUMA," regarded as a Pennsylvanian, wrote this essay which 
showed up in the Independent Gazetteer on October 17, 1787. 



    We the Aristocratic party of the United States, lamenting the 
many inconveniences to which the late confederation subjected the 
well-born, the better kind of people, bringing them down to the 
level of the rabble-and holding in utter detestation that 
frontispiece to every bill of rights, "that all men are born 
equal"-beg leave (for the purpose of drawing a line between such 
as we think were ordained to govern, and such as were made to 
bear the weight of government without having any share in its 
administration) to submit to our Friends in the first class for 
their inspection, the following defense of our monarchical, 
aristocratical democracy. 
    lst.  As a majority of all societies consist of men who 
(though totally incapable of thinking or acting in governmental 
matters) are more readily led than driven, we have thought meet 
to indulge them in something like a democracy in the new 
constitution, which part we have designated by the popular name 
of the House of Representatives.  But to guard against every 
possible danger from this lower house, we have subjected every 
bill they bring forward, to the double negative of our upper 
house and president.  Nor have we allowed the populace the right 
to elect their representatives annually . . . lest this body 
should be too much under the influence and control of their 
constituents, and thereby prove the "weatherboard of our grand 
edifice, to show the shiftings of every fashionable gale,"-for we 
have not yet to learn that little else is wanting to 
aristocratize the most democratical representative than to make 
him somewhat independent of his political creators.  We have 
taken away that rotation of appointment which has so long 
perplexed us-that grand engine of popular influence.  Every man 
is eligible into our government from time to time for life.  This 
will have a two-fold good effect.  First, it prevents the 
representatives from mixing with the lower class, and imbibing 
their foolish sentiments, with which they would have come charged 
on re-election. 
    2d. They will from the perpetuality of office be under our 
eye, and in a short time will think and act like us, 
independently of popular whims and prejudices.  For the assertion 
"that evil communications corrupt good manners," is not more true 
than its reverse.  We have allowed this house the power to 
impeach, but we have tenaciously reserved the right to try.  We 
hope gentlemen, you will see the policy of this clause-for what 
matters it who accuses, if the accused is tried by his friends.  
In fine, this plebian house will have little power, and that 
little be rightly shaped by our house of gentlemen, who will have 
a very extensive influence-from their being chosen out of the 
genteeler class ... It is true, every third senatorial seat is to 
be vacated duennually, but two-thirds of this influential body 
will remain in office, and be ready to direct or (if necessary) 
bring over to the good old way, the young members, if the old 
ones should not be returned.  And whereas many of our brethren, 
from a laudable desire to support their rank in life above the 
commonalty, have not only deranged their finances, but subjected 
their persons to indecent treatment (as being arrested for debt, 
etc.) we have framed a privilege clause, by which they may laugh 
at the fools who trusted them.  But we have given out, that this 
clause was provided, only that the members might be able without 
interruption, to deliberate on the important business of their 
country. 
         We have frequently endeavored to effect in our 
respective states, the happy discrimination which pervades this 
system; but finding we could not bring the states into it 
individually, we have determined ... and have taken pains to 
leave the legislature of each free and independent state, as they 
now call themselves, in such a situation that they will 
eventually be absorbed by our grand continental vortex, or 
dwindle into petty corporations, and have power over little else 
than yoaking hogs or determining the width of cart wheels.   But 
(aware that an intention to annihilate state legislatures, would 
be objected to our favorite scheme) we have made their existence 
(as a board of electors) necessary to ours.  This furnishes us 
and our advocates with a fine answer to any clamors that may be 
raised on this subject.  We have so interwoven continental and 
state legislatures that they cannot exist separately; whereas we 
in truth only leave them the power of electing us, for what can a 
provincial legislature do when we possess the exclusive 
regulation of external and internal commerce, excise, duties, 
imposts, post-offices and roads; when we and we alone, have the 
power to wage war, make peace, coin money (if we can get bullion) 
if not, borrow money, organize the militia and call them forth to 
execute our decrees, and crush insurrections assisted by a noble 
body of veterans subject to our nod, which we have the power of 
raising and keeping even in the time of peace.  What have we to 
fear from state legislatures or even from states, when we are 
armed with such powers, with a president at our head? (A name we 
thought proper to adopt in conformity to the prejudices of a 
silly people who are so foolishly fond of a Republican 
government, that we were obliged to accommodate in names and 
forms to them, in order more effectually to secure the substance 
of our proposed plan; but we all know that Cromwell was a King, 
with the title of Protector).  I repeat it, what have we to fear 
armed with such powers, with a president at our head who is 
captain--general of the army, navy and militia of the United 
States, who can make and unmake treaties, appoint and commission 
ambassadors and other ministers, who can grant or refuse 
reprieves or pardons, who can make judges of the supreme and 
other continental courts-in short, who will be the source, the 
fountain of honor, profit and power, whose influence like the 
rays of the sun, will diffuse itself far and wide, will exhale 
all democratical vapors and break the clouds of popular 
insurrection?  But again gentlemen, our judicial power is a 
strong work, a masked battery, few people see the guns we can and 
will ere long play off from it.  For the judicial power embraces 
every question which can arise in law or equity, under this 
constitution and under the laws of "the United States" (which 
laws will be, you know, the supreme laws of the land). This power 
extends to all cases, affecting ambassadors or other public 
ministers, "and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall 
be a party; to controversies between two or more States; between 
a State and citizens of another State; between citizens of 
different States; between citizens of the same State, claiming 
lands under grants of different States; and between a State or 
the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens or subjects." 
     Now, can a question arise in the colonial courts, which the 
ingenuity or sophistry of an able lawyer may not bring within one 
or other of the above cases? Certainly not.  Then our court will 
have original or appellate jurisdiction in all cases-and if so, 
how fallen are state judicatures-and must not every provincial 
law yield to our supreme flat?  Our constitution answers yes. . . 
. And finally we shall entrench ourselves so as to laugh at the 
cabals of the commonalty. A few regiments will do at first; it 
must be spread abroad that they are absolutely necessary to 
defend the frontiers.  Now a regiment and then a legion must be 
added quietly; by and by a frigate or two must be built, still 
taking care to intimate that they are essential to the support of 
our revenue laws and to prevent smuggling. We have said nothing 
about a bill of rights, for we viewed it as an eternal clog upon 
our designs, as a lock chain to the wheels of government-though, 
by the way, as we have not insisted on rotation in our offices, 
the simile of a wheel is ill.  We have for some time considered 
the freedom of the press as a great evil-it spreads information, 
and begets a licentiousness in the people which needs the rein 
more than the spur; besides, a daring printer may expose the 
plans of government and lessen the consequence of our president 
and senate-for these and many other reasons we have said nothing 
with respect to the "right of the people to speak and publish 
their sentiments" or about their "palladiums of liberty" and such 
stuff.  We do not much like that sturdy privilege of the people-
the right to demand the writ of habeas corpus.  We have therefore 
reserved the power of refusing it in cases of rebellion, and you 
know we are the judges of what is rebellion.... Our friends we 
find have been assiduous in representing our federal calamities, 
until at length the people at large-frightened by the gloomy 
picture on one side, and allured by the prophecies of some of our 
fanciful and visionary adherents on the other-are ready to accept 
and confirm our proposed government without the delay or forms of 
examination--which was the more to be wished, as they are wholly 
unfit to investigate the principles or pronounce on the merit of 
so exquisite a system. Impressed with a conviction that this 
constitution is calculated to restrain the influence and power of 
the LOWER CLASS-to draw that discrimination we have so long 
sought after; to secure to our friends privileges and offices, 
which were not to be ... [obtained] under the former government, 
because they were in common; to take the burden of legislation 
and attendance on public business off the commonalty, who will be 
much better able thereby to prosecute with effect their private 
business; to destroy that political thirteen headed monster, the 
state sovereignties; to check the licentiousness of the people by 
making it dangerous to speak or publish daring or tumultuary 
sentiments; to enforce obedience to laws by a strong executive, 
aided by military pensioners; and finally to promote the public 
and private interests of the better kind of people-we submit it 
to your judgment to take such measures for its adoption as you in 
your wisdom may think fit. 
         Signed by unanimous order of the lords spiritual and 
temporal. 
         MONTEZUMA