TAXATION TO AID INDIVIDUALS HAS NEVER BEEN CONSTITUTIONAL

Today, our federal government spends money on private purposes to an extent which is not fathomable. Public welfare, Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, and FEMA disaster aid are just a few of these programs. In fact, the majority of monies spent by he federal government appear to be in these areas. The following except from "The Constitution of the United States" by John Randolph Tucker, 1899, should stir emotions and thoughts. These expenditures, regardless of the good intentions, are not constitutional. In spending even one cent of tax monies for private purposes, of which all of these are classed, the government is literally stealing from one citizen to give to another. Many feel the need to aid needy and helpless victims but most would not want to provide aid those who are not in need. However, if a line is drawn between the two then the aid given becomes no longer general welfare, as you will understand after reading below. These thefts are made under the "common Defence and general Welfare" phrase but the placement is not legitimate.

"232. Let us now consider some of the forms to which this question has presented itself."

"1st. Can bounties on products be paid, in the form of appropriations, to aid one or more of the interests of private persons? Does the fact that such industries aid partially the general welfare justify the public aid through taxation to mere personal industries? Is it proper to make appropriations for the unfortunate victims of overflows, fire, grasshoppers, and the like, in order to promote the general welfare? Does help by public money to individuals who may need it elevate such a case to the promotion of the general welfare? Do a number of such particular cases constitute general welfare? If so, how many such is required to make it general? Some one says that the general welfare is made up of the welfare of private individuals; but are not these appropriations for private benefit the principal object, while the public welfare is merely incident?

Let us examine this question in light of judicial authority. In Fletcher v Peck1 Chief Justice Marshall said: 'It may well be doubted whether the nature of society and of government does not prescribe some limits to the legislative power. And if any be prescribed, where are they to be found, if the property of an individual fairly and honestly acquired may be seized without compensation.' And Chief Justice Chase adds in the Legal Tender Cases2, 'And if the property of an individual cannot be transferred to the public, how much less to another individual.' In accord with these declarations, the late Mr. Justice Miller, in Loan Ass'n v. Topeka3, speaks with great force in these words:"

"'The theory of our governments, State and National, is opposed to the deposit of unlimited power anywhere. The executive, the legislative, and the judicial branches of these governments are all of limited and defined powers. There are limitations on such powers which grow out of the essential nature of all free governments; implied reservation of'"

" 1 6 Cr. 135 3 20 Wall. 655"
" 2 12 Wall. 581"

"'individual rights, without which the social compact could not exist, and which are respected by all governments entitled to the name. No court, for instance, would hesitate to declare void a statute which enacted that A and B, who were husband and wife to each other, should be so no longer, but that A should thereafter be the husband of C, and B the wife of D. Or which should enact that the homestead now owned by A should no longer be his, but should be henceforth the property of B.'"

"'Of all the powers conferred upon government, that of taxation is the most liable to abuse. Given a purpose of object for which taxation may be lawfully used, and the extent of the exercise is in its nature unlimited. It is true that express limitation on the amount of tax to be levied or the things to be taxed may be imposed by constitution or statute, but in most instances for which taxes are levied, as the support of government, the prosecution of war, the national defense, any limitation is unsafe. The entire resources of the people would in some instances be at the disposal of the government'"

"'The power to tax is therefore the strongest, the most pervading, of all the powers of government, reaching directly or indirectly to all classes of the people. It was said by Chief Justice Marshall in the case of McCulloch v. State of Maryland, 4 Wheat. 431, that the power to tax is the power to destroy. A striking instance of the truth of the proposition is seen in the fact that the existing tax of ten percent, imposed by the United States on the circulation of all other banks than the national banks, drove out of existence every State bank of circulation within a year or two after its passage. This power can as readily be employed against one class of individuals and in favor of another, so as to ruin the one class and give unlimited wealth and prosperity to the other, if there is no implied limitation on the uses for which the power may be exercised.'"

"'To lay with one hand the power of the government on the property of the citizen, and with the other to bestow it upon favored individuals to aid private enterprises and build up private fortunes, is none the less a robbery because it is done under the forms of law and is called taxation. This is not legislation. It is a decree under legislative forms.'" "'Nor is it taxation. A 'tax' says Webster's Dictionary, 'is a rate or sum of money assessed on the person or property of a citizen by government for the use of the nation or state.' 'Taxes are burdens or charges imposed by the legislature upon persons or property of raise money for public purposes.'"

"'Coulter, J. in Northern Liberties v. St. John's Church, 12 Pa.St. 104, says very forcibly: 'I think the common mind has everywhere taken in the understanding that taxes are a public imposition, levied by the authority of the government for the purpose of carrying on the government in all its machinery and operations - that they are imposed for a public purpose.'"

"'We have established, we think beyond cavil, that there can be no lawful tax which is not laid for a public purpose. It may not be easy to draw the line so as to decide what is a public purpose in this sense and what is not.'"

"'It is undoubtedly the duty of the legislature which imposes or authorizes municipalities to impose a tax to see that it is not to be used for purposes of private interest instead of public use, and the courts can only be justified in interposing when a violation of this principle is clear and the reason for interfering cogent.' .... 'But in the case before us, in which the towns are authorized to contribute aid by way of taxation to any class of manufacturers, there is no difficulty in holding that this is not such a public purpose as we have been considering. If it be said that a benefit results in the local public town by establishing manufactures, the same may be said of any other business or pursuit which employs capital or labor. The merchant, the mechanic, the innkeeper, the banker, the builder, the steamboat owner, are equally promoters of the public good, and equally deserving of the aid of the citizens by forced contributions. No line can be drawn in favor of the manufacturer which would not open the coffers of the public treasury to the importunities of two-thirds of the business men of the city or town.'"

"223. Several cases are cited by the justice in illustration of this. A town meeting voted the town's credit to the amount of ten thousand dollars to certain individuals if they would invest twelve thousand dollars in certain mills, etc., to be built in that town by them. Provision was made to secure the town by mortgage on the mills. The Supreme Court of Maine held that this was not a public purpose, and the town could levy no taxes in aid of the enterprise, and could issue no bonds for the purpose, though an act of the legislature had ratified the vote of the town.1 The disastrous fire in Boston in 1872 gave rise to the passage of a law by the legislature of Massachusetts which authorized the city to issue its bonds which were to be loaned under proper security by the city to owners of the ground on which the buildings had been destroyed by fire, to aid them in rebuilding. The court held the law unconstitutional as authorizing taxation for what was not a public purpose.2"

"These decisions of the States, sanctioned by the high authority of the Supreme Court in reference to the limitations upon State power are, a fortieri, applicable in principle to the limited and enumerated powers of the federal government. Besides, the fifth amendment of the Constitution, which vested Congress with the power to take private property for public use upon just compensation, involves the negation of power to take private property for private use without compensation. Judge Cooley2 takes the same view, and cites a case where a tax was laid to supply with provisions and seed, such farmers as had lost their crops, which was held unconstitutional.4"

" 1 . Allen v. Inhabitants of J. 60 Me. 124"
" 2. Lowell v. Boston, 111 Mass. 484. See also Jenkins v Saunders, 103 Mass. 74; Curtis v. Whipple, 24 Wis. 350; Whiting v. Fond du Lac, 25 id. 185."
" 3. Cooley's Constitutional Law. p.59."
" 4. State v. Osawkee, 14 Kan. 418"

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