Overlapping subgroups
From this post, there seem to be at least two ways of looking at the electorate on a given policy X: there is either a continuum or separate constituencies. Polls seem geared towards dividing them into the latter camp (Pro, Anti, Uncommitted or Independent). However, I find that to be wanting; I prefer the overlapping view in which there are somewhat independent groups, but there is broad overlap.
Take two voters at A and B: for this policy X, they seem to have the same opinion, so why are they separated into different groups? The answer is that their preferred broad coalitions may have this alignment for X, but a different alignment on policy Y, and yet another on Z, and so on.
An additional feature of the broad, overlapping coalition view is that shifts in policy may be accomplished by several different mechanisms, whereas there is really only one in the separated groups. The changes that may occur in the overlapping groups consist of shifting the center group one way or the other, appealing to the opposition members and causing broadening of it, and appealing to the base to bring outliers back into the fold. Any of these can cause a shift in the population majority.
Shifting the center group just a little one way or the other from equilibrium is the most obvious way of achieving a general majority. That is more true if the center group is homogeneous in its opinion (more of them are closer to the subgroup mean), since a little shift in either direction will carry many votes with it. If the independent group has a wide variety of opinion, however, a slight shift in the group will not have as much effect. Further, the independent group doesn't have much power to sway the argument generally since they don't have a strong pro- or con- investment and their slight moves may be countered by the other two appeals available to the pro- and con- groups.
Appealing to the opposite group and causing it to spread is akin to achieving consensus. As Buchanan and Tullock discuss in Calculus of Consent, it therefore has the least external costs, but possibly the highest cost of decision-making. Politicians don't want to expend political capital to get their way, but this would be the outcome most beneficial to the constituency as a whole. This is a government failure, a situation in which politicians systematically fail to achieve the best outcome for the constituencies because it runs against their own self-interest. You can't make a campaign commercial out of "I compromised with my opponents 9 times out of every 10" or "We agreed on X" that is as powerful as "I forced my opponents to bend to my will 9 times out of 10" or "I obtained X for my district". If the independent group can be seen as libertarians, broadly defined, then Kos' attempts to appeal to the independent group are a sham; Matthew Yglesias makes occasional forays, but seems to always lack the moral courage right at the moment of commitment; leaving only the Freedom Democrats with a principled appeal.
Change may also occur if one of the groups manages to bring its outliers "back into the fold", as shown in the following illustration. This is what happens when they "appeal to the base", but it seems likely that this activity will cause an equal reaction by the bots in the opposite camp. In fact, that is the goal of people like Kos and Anne Coulter.
Use of this method results in pushing the groups further away from each other; it collapses in the extreme case to the three non-overlapping groups (from the first link above).
That means that more power is given to the independent group in the center to effect outcomes even as the rhetoric of the parties grows in its rancor. This, unfortunately, looks to the victorious side like conversion, and will only serve to fire their rhetoric.
A further observation about the overlapping groups model is that each group may also consist of separate but overlapping groups. Partisans like to gleefully observe the fractures and factions of the opposing group as if they didn't suffer from the same problem, but that isn't so. Democrats consist of socialists, environmentalists, labor activists, progressive business, religious leaders, secularists, and other groups who overlap generally but don't agree on every detail, while Republicans consist of traditionalists, evangelical Christians, militarists, and other groups who overlap generally. Do they bicker? Yes. Does the other side have its internal squabbles? Of course. Does this suggest that it is possible that we may actually be a more diverse society than the party bosses would like us to think? Absolutely.
I favor first consensus and supermajority over simple majority. That encourages some combination of proselytization without pandering. But I also realize that unless supermajorities are required constitutionally, politicians have no motivation to seek them.
Take two voters at A and B: for this policy X, they seem to have the same opinion, so why are they separated into different groups? The answer is that their preferred broad coalitions may have this alignment for X, but a different alignment on policy Y, and yet another on Z, and so on.
An additional feature of the broad, overlapping coalition view is that shifts in policy may be accomplished by several different mechanisms, whereas there is really only one in the separated groups. The changes that may occur in the overlapping groups consist of shifting the center group one way or the other, appealing to the opposition members and causing broadening of it, and appealing to the base to bring outliers back into the fold. Any of these can cause a shift in the population majority.
Shifting the center group just a little one way or the other from equilibrium is the most obvious way of achieving a general majority. That is more true if the center group is homogeneous in its opinion (more of them are closer to the subgroup mean), since a little shift in either direction will carry many votes with it. If the independent group has a wide variety of opinion, however, a slight shift in the group will not have as much effect. Further, the independent group doesn't have much power to sway the argument generally since they don't have a strong pro- or con- investment and their slight moves may be countered by the other two appeals available to the pro- and con- groups.
Appealing to the opposite group and causing it to spread is akin to achieving consensus. As Buchanan and Tullock discuss in Calculus of Consent, it therefore has the least external costs, but possibly the highest cost of decision-making. Politicians don't want to expend political capital to get their way, but this would be the outcome most beneficial to the constituency as a whole. This is a government failure, a situation in which politicians systematically fail to achieve the best outcome for the constituencies because it runs against their own self-interest. You can't make a campaign commercial out of "I compromised with my opponents 9 times out of every 10" or "We agreed on X" that is as powerful as "I forced my opponents to bend to my will 9 times out of 10" or "I obtained X for my district". If the independent group can be seen as libertarians, broadly defined, then Kos' attempts to appeal to the independent group are a sham; Matthew Yglesias makes occasional forays, but seems to always lack the moral courage right at the moment of commitment; leaving only the Freedom Democrats with a principled appeal.
Change may also occur if one of the groups manages to bring its outliers "back into the fold", as shown in the following illustration. This is what happens when they "appeal to the base", but it seems likely that this activity will cause an equal reaction by the bots in the opposite camp. In fact, that is the goal of people like Kos and Anne Coulter.
Use of this method results in pushing the groups further away from each other; it collapses in the extreme case to the three non-overlapping groups (from the first link above).
That means that more power is given to the independent group in the center to effect outcomes even as the rhetoric of the parties grows in its rancor. This, unfortunately, looks to the victorious side like conversion, and will only serve to fire their rhetoric.
A further observation about the overlapping groups model is that each group may also consist of separate but overlapping groups. Partisans like to gleefully observe the fractures and factions of the opposing group as if they didn't suffer from the same problem, but that isn't so. Democrats consist of socialists, environmentalists, labor activists, progressive business, religious leaders, secularists, and other groups who overlap generally but don't agree on every detail, while Republicans consist of traditionalists, evangelical Christians, militarists, and other groups who overlap generally. Do they bicker? Yes. Does the other side have its internal squabbles? Of course. Does this suggest that it is possible that we may actually be a more diverse society than the party bosses would like us to think? Absolutely.
I favor first consensus and supermajority over simple majority. That encourages some combination of proselytization without pandering. But I also realize that unless supermajorities are required constitutionally, politicians have no motivation to seek them.
Labels: philosophy, politics
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