Post War Iraq:

Ironies of the American War for Iraqi Liberation

Leonard J. Hochberg, Ph.D.
Associate Professor – Research
Honors College
Louisiana State University
Baton Rogue, LA 70810

James D. Hardy, Jr., Ph.D.
Associate Dean & Professor
Honors College & Dept. of History
Louisiana State University
Baton Rouge, LA 70810

May 8, 2003

In post-war Iraq, generally speaking, what you see is what you get. The complex maze of interests, connections, alliances and enmities amongst tribes, clans and mosques continues unabated, of course, but it has been flattened a bit under the pressure of great events. These days, it is the surface, the large and obvious divisions that matter most, and it is these divisions that the American occupation forces and the new American-backed provisional government must address.

Foremost amongst these are the bitter religious fissures between the Shiite Muslims, about 60% of Iraq’s total population, and the heretofore-dominant Sunnis, who were the backbone of the Ba’ath party and the elite units of the now defeated, but soon to be reconstituted, Iraqi army. As important as religion is, ethnicity – particularly the split between the Kurds in the northeast and the Arabs in the rest of Iraq – carries co-equal possibility for communal violence. Though these divisions are noted by every commentator, they are not, on that account, either unreal or unimportant. Beyond the obvious splits of regionalism, ethnicity and religion is the endemic breakdown in law and order. Looting is only the most telegenic aspect of public disorder. There are also periodic ambushes of American troops, indeed these occur daily, a form of political expression bound to increase. Clerics have been murdered by rivals, and vigilante gangs have appeared in all the major cities under American control. All of this ought to be regarded not as unusual, triggered by the anarchy following upon liberation, but as a return to the normal expression of Iraqi political action now that the powerful central regime has been swept away.

More serious yet is the already established Iraqi adoption of best Arabic practice in politics, which is violence. American soldiers have already been killed and, in another incident, fortunately not televised directly, were forced to fire on a threatening Iraqi crowd. These civilians were clearly not sufficiently cowed by the all-too-precise weapons that exclusively targeted governmental installations and military assets.

Disaffected Iraqis, and that is almost everyone, promise suicide bombers and sniper attacks as casually as if discussing the weather. What is in practice by Hamas against the Israeli infidels is becoming an Iraqi response for dealing with the American infidels. It is the modern political way for the Arab street. Saddam kept this under control by massive terror, brutality, secret police, torture, murder of whole families, poison gas and the like. We do not think that America is ready for this remedy.

These problems require some solution beyond American soldiers policing the cities, trying to control violence on an ad hoc basis, and organizing rebuilding, in short the standard Marshall Plan model. Beyond the interim government, which is now being put together too slowly – this should have been done before the war, as everyone admits – we suggest that a “permanent” government be established, somewhat along the following lines: an emphasis on regionalism within a single regime; proportional representation of all salient Iraqi communities within a legislature, probably bicameral to capture representation of localities and regions in the lower chamber and communities in the upper; a fairly powerful president; a reconstituted military designed to keep internal order and for defense; a single economic regime for the entire country; and a legal system with western contract law for the whole country along with tribal family law for distinctive ethnic or religious groups. American force in Iraq will be removed from view as far as possible, ideally to bases in the western desert or in rural Kurdistan.

Regionalism is the one indispensable principle for reconstructing Iraq. Inter-group hostility, centuries old, has been rubbed raw by the Ba’athist (1957-2003) attempts to impose a unitary state on the western national Socialist model, upon Iraq. For a generation, the Iraqi political experience is that a unitary state also involves dictatorship, coups, repressions, and kleptocracy. Moreover, a regional arrangement is the only way to square the circle, by keeping a single state, making it at least quasi-democratic and at the same time diluting the influence of the majority Shiites, many of whom are Islamicists (i.e., those committed to a fundamentalist religious and aggressive political agenda).

A regionalist state containing quite unequal major population groups will require some form of proportional representation in the legislature and the government departments. This may take the form of a tribal/religious upper chamber, which would be more tactful, or through manipulation of voting strength in a single chamber, which would produce obvious grounds for complaint. But however done, the new political system must embody a communal veto, without which no minority could accept the new regime as safe. This departure from pure democracy will wound tender sensibilities, but seems to be the only communal safeguard consonant with home rule.

The new Iraqi president, who will represent the Americans to Iraq as well as Iraq to America, must be strong enough both electorally and constitutionally to mediate the inevitable and constant inter-communal fears and disputes. It seems to us that the new president inevitably will be a Shiite, and will “enjoy” the support of the most alienated and Islamicist part of the population. Secretary Rumsfeld has said that America will not accept an Islamicist Iraq, but to achieve that will require constant American supervision and careful intervention over the next couple of decades. A fairly powerful, but not dominant, president will be a necessary institutional requirement to keep the Iraqi communal politics down, the Iranians out of the western littoral of the Persian Gulf, and the Americans engaged.

The reconstituted Iraqi military must be able to keep law and order (Iraqi style, through acceptance of a constant level of local violence) and defend the territorial integrity of the regime, but be able to do nothing aggressive beyond that. The implicit, perhaps even explicitly, Anglo-American guarantee will (or at least ought) to help preserve Iraqi integrity against Iran. The troops and the commanders must come from all tribal and religious communities, thus becoming a national force, the only national force in Iraq. With luck the government might eventually follow.

The creators of and participants in the new government also need to adopt a single economic regime for the entire country. Kurdish ambitions to retain Kirkuk and Mosul oil for themselves cannot be indulged. The Iraqi oil resources must be managed as a single economic unit that will benefit all, perhaps eventually through an “Iraqi Stock Ownership Corp.” that would distribute shares of ownership (and dividends on profits) directly to all adult Iraqi citizens residing in country. We also suggest, however, that the oil will have two directions of exports; the southern field of Ar-Rumaylah will export through the Gulf while the Kirkuk fields will increasingly export through pipelines across Turkey. This will be part of the American strategic initiative to emphasize hydrocarbon extraction in the Caspian basin and export west toward the Mediterranean.

The legal system that will emerge in post-war Iraq will show the same combination of regional variety and state unity that politics and economics exhibits. Family law, including marriage and inheritance, will follow tribal norms, and thus differ from north to south. Here the effort will be an accommodation of traditional diversities, and respect for individual roles within a community. Commercial law, particularly regarding international trade, banking, and contracts, will reflect best western practice of transparency, accounting and legal recourse, and will, as the inevitable result of the war, reflect American norms. This seems likely to involve changes from the Saddam regime, both in the way contracts are negotiated and in the recipients of those contracts – particularly with the state. A certain amount of complaint can be expected as a result of these efforts, as money and influence always have that effect.

The inspiration for the new Iraqi regime can be found in American political experience, but not in the dominant classical liberal lines of constitutional thought. It can be found, instead, in the works of John C. Calhoun, particularly in A Disquisition on Government. Calhoun envisioned a republic in which cohesive and substantial communities, each with its peculiar institutions, would have a recognized constitutional position, and would in effect possess a veto over certain areas, internal of course, of national policy. The system is known as “concurrent majority,” with a majority of representatives of each ethnic and religious community in the upper house required to pass legislation. This might provide enough security for the central government to function on the local level.

Nonetheless, we feel obliged to add a final caveat. This program will be presented as a more or less permanent solution to the heretofore-insoluble problems of Iraqi government. Americans like solutions, not irony, in politics and history. But we wish to suggest it would be folly to ignore the wisdom of a nineteenth century political figure: “In human affairs, things are permanent only until they are changed.”