Benchmark I, Part II

In this part of Benchmark I, the students have examined the nuclear capabilities of the regional parties.

North Korean Nuclear Capabilities

 

Has North Korea become the world’s ninth nuclear power? According to the CIA, the DPRK might have one or two nuclear weapons, since they have been working on them for many years. North Korea continues to be nervous about nuclear warfare, and with good reason. The United States threatened to use nuclear weapons against them during the Korean War. We also deployed nuclear weapons in South Korea at one time. It is not surprising that president Kim Il Sung was motivated to start a nuclear weapons program. (1)
Between 1964 and the present the DPRK has set up a nuclear energy research complex (assisted by the USSR) including reactors, a plutonium reprocessing plant, numerous uranium mining and milling plants, and fuel fabrication facilities. At the same time they have played a cat and mouse game with other nations including joining the NPT but subsequentially withdrawing from it, thwarting and deceiving IAEA inspectors, and making agreements between themselves and the US which were eventually renounced.
Clearly, the DPRK has reprocessed significant plutonium. The amount of uranium or plutonium needed to make a bomb depends on how smart the scientists making it are. It also depends on the “desired yield” of the bomb. One kilogram of plutonium can make a bomb with a 1-kiloton “yield”, and 3 kilograms, a 20-kiloton “yield”, but if the designers have low skills, they would need 3 kilograms for only a 1-kiloton “yield”. No one can be sure how skilled the North Korean designers are, but they think that they could at least reach the mid-point. To make a “lower-yield weapon” the North Korean’s would need 2 kilograms of plutonium, and for a “higher-yield weapon”, about 3 kilograms. As a result, 8–9 kilograms of plutonium could make 4-5 weapons, but it would take many years to finish these. Defense Secretary William Perry said, “If they had a very advanced technology, they could make five bombs out of the amount of plutonium we estimate they have.”(1)
They say that the United States has not lived up to their nonaggression promise. In fact, the chief of U.S. Strategic Command told Congress that “the United States threatened Iraq with nuclear weapons in 1991, that same message was passed on to the North Koreans back in 1995, and documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act show that the Air Force carried out simulated nuclear strikes against North Korea in 1998.” (1) The DPRK considers a nuclear weapon “deterrent” necessary. They continue to stress that the US promise explicitly not to use nuclear weapons against them. (2)
In conclusion, the crisis is built on distrust combined with political will on the part of the North Koreans to use nuclear weapons capability as a bargaining chip.

Chronology of North Korean Nuclear Activities

North Korea first began gathering information to help in the production of nuclear weapons in the 1960’s. They did this by getting people to come from the Soviet Union to train their students. The North Koreans later set up an atomic energy complex at Yongbyon. In 1965, in a small town near Yongbyon a Soviet IRT-2M research reactor was construvted. Fuel which was enriched to 10% was supplied for the North Korean reactor. (2) Kim Il Sung demanded the nuclear warhead research begin in 1967. (5)
In the 1970’s the DPRK was studying the fuel cycle. In 1974 the North Koreans modernized the reactor the Soviet Union had helped them build. In modernizing the reactor the capacity was upgraded to eight megawatts and the fuel enrichment level upgraded to 80%.(2) At the same time ROK and the DPRK signed a joint declaration for Korean reunification. Two years later, in 1974 North Korean joined the IAEA. (5)
The nuclear weapons program in North Korea goes back to the 1980’s. In the 1980’s North Korea began running facilities for fuel fabrication and conversion. They began building a 30mW graphite-moderated reactor. They also began mining and milling of uranium and completed high explosives tests. (5)
In 1985 the United States announced their knowledge of the reactor near Yongbyon. The DPRK signed the NPT but refused to sign the safeguards agreement with the IAEA. (2)
In 1988 the President of South Korea cried out for reunification and inter-Korean trade. In 1990 the first of the “prime minister level” meetings took place. At this meeting, two things were discussed. One of the topics discussed is known as the “basic agreement,” which was about Korean reunification, nonaggression, exchanges and cooperation. The second topic is known as the “joint declaration” which was the declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. (2)
In 1990 the Washington Post announced that photographs from a new satellite showed that there was a plant in North Korea where plutonium could be separated from nuclear fuel. The reconciliation agreement between North and South Korea was signed in late 1991. The Declaration on the denuclearization came into force on February 19th, 1992. This declaration stated that neither the North nor the South Koreans “shall test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons.” (2)
The DPRK signed the safeguards with the IAEA on January 30th, 1992. This agreement gave permission to the IAEA inspections to start in the June of 1992. The North Koreans would not let the inspectors see two undeclared facilities. Also in 1992 the South Korean President said unless the North Korean nuclear issue was resolved continued North-South Korean cooperation could not take place. In 1993, North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. In 1994 the DPRK unloaded fuel from its 5 megawatt nuclear reactor. (2)
Diplomatic efforts from the U.S. resulted in an Agreed Framework treaty in which the DPRK would freeze their nuclear program. Their nuclear program included a 50mW reactor as well as a 200mW reactor. In return they would get fuel oil and eventually a light water reactor. (2)
In April of 1997 a spokesman from the US Defense Department announced that the United States believed that North Korea already had enough plutonium to construct at least one nuclear weapon. On August 19th 1997 North Korea held a ceremony to begin constructing two light water reactors. (2)
In October of 2002 North Korea acknowledged the program they had to enrich uranium to produce nuclear weapons. This was in direct violation of the agreements North Korea had previously made. (2) In January of 2003 North Korea withdrew from NPT. In April of 2003 North Korea declared the reunification agreements with ROK invalid. (5)
There are twenty-two reported nuclear facilities in North Korea. These facilities are in eighteen locations and include many steps for producing nuclear weapons. They include research, and reprocessing facilities, as well as refinery and nuclear fuel plants. They also include uranium mines and nuclear reactors. (4)

Bibliography
1) "Bulletin of Atomic Scientists." March/April 2003. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 30 Jan 2004. <http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/nukenotes/ma03nukenote.html>.


2) Aftergood, Steven. "Weapons of Mass Destruction." 9 June 2003. 30 Jan 2004. <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/>.


3) "Dilemmas of Energy Choice in Northeast Asia." 03 June 1999. 30 Jan 2004. <http://www.nautilus.org/papers/energy/choice.html>.

4) "WMD around the World." 10 October 1997. 30 Jan 2004. <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/facility/other_nuke.htm>.

5) "NTI: Country Overviews. " 31 Jan 2004, http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Nk/print/46.prt

The North Korean Nuclear Fuel Cycle from the Mine to the
Testing Ground


For purposes of this project a select number of North Kore'an nuclear facilities have been included by name. Other mining locations exist, for example but the ones selected are representative. This is a step-by-step guide to the to the nuclear fuel cycle with a visual aid to give you some idea were these steps occur.


Step 1: MINING: Uranium is mined from the ground at the Unggi mine site on the northeastern edge of North Korea near the Sea of Japan. The ore is mined using a saturation method, soaking the ground with a special type of water, and is collected at the surface at a plant that separates the water from the solids.
The ore then goes to step two of its journey.
Step 2: MILLING: The uranium ore solids are then taken to be processed at a mill in Using at the northwest region of North Korea near the Yellow Sea. The mill processes the ore by mixing it in nitric acid which separates all the different elements and chemicals. The elements separated include: U-235 and U-238 (uranium); Th-230 (thorium); Ra-226 (radium); Fe-55 (iron); Na-24 (sodium); I- 131, I-129, and I-123 (iodine isotopes); C-14 (carbon); deuterium; Ca-47 (calcium); tritium and very rarely Pu-239 among countless others. The U-235 and U-238 are taken from the mix and move on to step 3. The deuterium and tritium
are also separated from the mix and sent to research and development facilities for nuclear research or weapons production. The radium from this process can be used in clocks, watches, and dials for its glow-in-the-dark properties. The sodium-24 is used to locate pipeline leaks. The calcium-47 and thorium-230 and other isotopes are used for medical treatments.
Step 3: FUEL FABRICATION: The uranium is the taken to a fuel fabrication plant in Yongbyon in a form called yellow cake which is soluble. Transformation to the gaseous uranium hexafluoride allows the material to be enriched in U-235. After the chemical is converted to an oxide pellet it is packed into a fuel rod and is then ready to use in a reactor. This is also a point where the fissile material
is at risk of being diverted and used in a nuclear weapon.
Step 4 USE IN A REACTOR: The nuclear fuel rods are then transported to either
the 4a nuclear power reactor in Taechon or the 4b research reactor in Yongbyon. The rods are placed in the reactor core and under go the process of slow
fission. During this process the uranium goes though a series of phases as it is bombarded with neutrons causing the atoms to split and so on until the uranium
is transformed into plutonium. This process creates waste including the water from the reactor core nuclear material left over from the chain reaction and equipment used to handle the fissile material.
Step 5 WASTE DISPOSAL: The waste from the reactor is then put into a temporary dumpsite in Yongbyon where the parts of it lose much of their radioactivity. The rest, such as the plutonium, will remain active for thousands of years and is usually sent on to Step 6.
Step 6: REPROCESSING: The used fuel rods may then be sent to pyongsong in the southern part of North Korea where plutonium and other useful elements are extracted from them.
Step 7: RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: The useful elements from the fuel rods are then sent to a lab in Nanam in the eastern part of North Korea for atomic research and possibly for the designing of "bombs". The plutonium can only really be used in implosion type weapons, where as enriched uranium can be used in the much simpler and more reliable gun type. The extracted plutonium is solidified and molded into a grapefruit-sized sphere that could form the core of an implosion device. The sphere must be compressed to a critical mass using high explosives. These high explosives have been tested in North Korea.
Step 8: TESTING: High explosives have been tested near Yongbyon.


BIBLIOGRAPHY
(1) Skold, Thomas. "1999 Map of North Korea's Nuclear program." Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies. 20 Jan. 2004
(2) Skold,T. (1999). 1999 Map of North Korea's Nuclear program. Retrieved Jan. 20, 2004, from Monterey Institute of International Studies: http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/nuc/map.htm
" Yongbyon/Nyongbyon." 20 Jan. 2004

(3)<http://fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/facility/yongbyon.htm> (2000).
" Kusong." 20 Jan. 2004 <http://fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/facility/kusong.htm> (1998). Kusong. Retrieved Jan. 20, 2004.
(4)Wehling, Fred. "The Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Nuclear Weapons." Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies. 20 Jan. 2004 <htt.cns.miis.edu.htm>
(5)" Radioactive Materials." 20 Jan. 2004
" http: Ilwww.accessexcellence.org/AE/AEC/CCradio_table.html"
(6)" Activity Seen at N. Korea Nuclear Site; Spy satellites show trucks where fuel rods are stored ." 20 Jan. 2004 ''http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/(2003).
" North Korea." 2 0 Jan. 2004 (7)<http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/north_korea.jpg> North
Korea.

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Origins of China’s Nuclear Capabilities


China began it’s pursuit of nuclear weapons in the early 50s’ when Beijing signed a secret agreement with the USSR. The terms of that agreement were that China provide uranium ore in exchange for assistance in the nuclear field from the Soviets (3). The Soviet Union continued providing a substantial amount of assistance to China through the 50s’ (1.).

In mid October of 1957, the Soviet Union and China signed a new agreement on technology for national defense. That agreement included provisions for additional Soviet nuclear assistance as well as the furnishing of surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles. The Soviet Union also agreed to provide technical assistance relating to the manufacture of nuclear weapons, and to provide a sample fission bomb (3).

When Soviet-Sino relations began to cool in the late 50s’ and early 60s’, China accused the Soviet Union of having abrogated the terms of the 1957 agreement in 1959, and having refused to provide a sample atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture (1, 3).

Soviet advisers withdrew from China in 1960, effectively terminating Soviet assistance (2). Of the assistance provided before 1960, the most significant to future development of Chinese nuclear weapons was an experimental nuclear reactor, a cyclotron, facilities for processing uranium, and some equipment for a gaseous diffusions plant (3).

The Chinese had to decide which path to choose for a nuclear weapon. They chose to use HEU due to the high radioactivity and toxicity of using plutonium (3). China made remarkable progress in the 60s’ in developing nuclear weapons. In a 2 year, 8 month period China successfully tested its first fission bomb (October 16, 1964), launched its first nuclear armed missile (October 25, 1966), and tested it’s first thermonuclear weapon (June 14, 1967), this is the shortest time period ever between fission and thermonuclear development (3).

Bibliography

1. (n.d.). China. Nuclear Forces. Jan 29, 2004, from http://reference.allrefer.com/country-guide-study/china/china400.html

2. (2000, 11-12 ). China Nuclear Milestone. The Risk Report vol. 6 #6. Jan 29, 2004, from http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/china/nuke-miles.htm

3. 2003, 11 14). Nuclear Weapons. Jan 29, 2004, from http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/nuke

China’s Nuclear Development

1951: Beijing signs secret agreement with Moscow, in which Soviet assistance in the nuclear field was exchanged for uranium ores. (4)

1957: Chinese and USSR sign agreement for sharing of new technology for national defense which included provisions for surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles and additional soviet nuclear assistance. The Soviet Union also agreed to provide technical assistance on the manufacture of nuclear weapons and provide a sample nuclear bomb, as well as providing assistance in the construction of a gaseous diffusion plant for the enrichment of uranium. (4)

1959: China accuses the Soviet Union of abrogating the agreement by having “refused to supply a simple atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture“. (4)

1960: Soviet nuclear advisers and technicians terminate assistance by leaving China. (2)

October 16, 1964: Chinese test first nuclear weapon, a U-235 implosion device with a yield of 25 Kt, at Lop Nor. (4)(1)

October 25, 1966: Tested nuclear armed DF-2 missile which flew over populated areas. (4)(1)

June 14, 1967: Chinese test hydrogen bomb in the shortest span between development of a fission bomb and a thermonuclear bomb, with a yield of 3 Megatons. (4)(1)

1980: Last atmospheric test. (1)

1983: China agrees to provide Algeria with a 15 megawatt research reactor: construction begins three years later and concludes in 1993: United States intelligence learns China gave Pakistan a tested nuclear weapon device. (2)

1984: United States-China nuclear cooperation agreement is signed but is never ratified. (2)

1992: China refuses to join Britain, France, the United States, and Russia in a moratorium on nuclear testing; China joins the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT). (2)

July 29, 1996: China detonates last nuclear test at 0149 GMT. According to the Australia Geological Survey Organization in Canberra, Australia, its yield was 1-5 kilotons. It was China’s 45th nuclear test and 22nd underground one. (3)


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South Korea

Military Nuclear Capabilities -
Up until the early 1970’s, Korea depended solely on the United States for protection from North Korean aggressions. But as the United States began a substantial shift in its foreign policy, Korea started to look at ways of protecting itself, the most notable being plans for a nuclear deterrent.
As early as 1968, the South Koreans in response to the Nixon doctrine, began to devise ways of providing some type of non-conventional defense mechanism to be used against the north. In the latter part of 1970, South Korean President Park Chung-Hee established the Agency for Defense Development and the secret Weapons Exploitation Committee to research and develop some type of special weapons capability. By 1972 the committee had unanimously decided on developing nuclear weapons. Immediately the South Korean government began negotiations with both France and Belgium to procure a fuel reprocessing facility, and a nuclear fuel laboratory. South Korea even attempted to obtain nuclear materials from the United States through various industry and military channels. A mayor proponent of these activities was the concurrent South Korean expanse into civilian nuclear energy technology. When the United States caught wind of these activities, it gave the South Koreans an ultimatum – cease your nuclear weapons program or else will discontinue all assistance to your nuclear energy program.
In early 1975 president President Park bowing to US pressure withdrew from the French-Korean reprocessing deal and pledged to discontinue the nuclear program. Part of the deal with the United States included the immediate cessation of troop withdraws. To further please the Americans, South Korea ratified the NPT on April 23, 1975.
This however apparently did not stop the South Koreans from continuing with a nuclear weapons program. Reports that surfaced in the late 1970’s stated that the South Koreans were actively pursuing nuclear weapons and that their program was nearing 95% completion. After the assignation of President Park in 1979, Chun Doo Hwan’s new government dismissed all the nuclear scientists/researchers and ended the weapons program.
Today, because of South Korea’s strong civilian nuclear energy program, and because of the current North Korean nuclear “crisis”, it wouldn’t be too hard to classify South Korea as a virtual nuclear state.

Civil Nuclear Capabilities –
South Korea’s civil nuclear program began in 1957, when South Korea joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In 1959 the Office of Atomic Energy was created. The first nuclear reactor in South Korea was built in 1959 at the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, and went critical in 1962. In 1973, in response to the oil crisis South Korea began construction of its first nuclear power plant - Kori-1. During the 1980’s eight more nuclear power plants were built and as of 2002 there were 18 operational nuclear power plants in South Korea. Below is a table showing the technical specifications of each current reactor:

Table 1 - Nuclear Power Plants in South Korea (2)
Reactor name Location Type Capacity
(Mwe) Supplier Started operation
Kori-1 Kyungnam PWR 587 USA (W) 1978. 4
Kori-2 Kyungnam PWR 650 USA (W) 1983. 7
Kori-3 Kyungnam PWR 950 USA (W) 1985. 9
Kori-4 Kyungnam PWR 950 USA (W) 1986. 4
Younggwang-1 Chunnam PWR 950 USA (W) 1986. 8
Younggwang-2 Chunnam PWR 950 USA (W) 1987. 6
Younggwang-3 Chunnam PWR 1000 Korea (KHIC) 1995. 3
Younggwang-4 Chunnam PWR 1000 Korea (KHIC) 1996. 3
Younggwang-5 Chunnam PWR 1000 Korea (KHIC) 2002. 5
Younggwang-6 Chunnam PWR 1000 Korea (KHIC) 2002. 9
Uljin-1 Kyungbuk PWR 950 France 1988. 9
Uljin-2 Kyungbuk PWR 950 France 1998. 9
Uljin-3 Kyungbuk PWR 1000 Korea (KHIC) 1998. 9
Uljin-4 Kyungbuk PWR 1000 Korea (KHIC) 1999. 6
Uljin-5 Kyungbuk PWR 1000 Korea (KHIC) (2004. 2)
Uljin-6 Kyungbuk PWR 1000 Korea (KHIC) (2005. 2)
Wolsung-1 Kyungnam CANDU 679 Canada (AECL) 1983. 4
Wolsung-2 Kyungnam CANDU 700 Canada (AECL) 1997. 6
Wolsung-3 Kyungnam CANDU 700 Canada (AECL) 1998. 7
Wolsung-4 Kyungnam CANDU 700 Canada (AECL) 1999. 6 (3)

Bibliography:
1. "South Korea country profile: Past nuclear policies." Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 03 Feb 2004. <http://projects.sipri.se/nuclear/cnsc3kos.htm>.
2. "South Korea country profile - Specific nuclear fuel cycle activities: Power Reactors.." Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 03 Feb 2004. <http://projects.sipri.se/nuclear/cnsc5kos6.htm>.
3. "Maps of Nuclear Power Reactors: SOUTH KOREA." Internation Nuclear Safety Center. 03 Feb 2004. <http://www.insc.anl.gov/pwrmaps/map/south_korea.php>.
4. "South Korea country profile: Nuclear fuel cycle." Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 03 Feb 2004. <http://projects.sipri.se/nuclear/cnsc4kos.htm>.

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Disclaimer:
I would like to point out that because of the sensitive political nature surrounding the status of Taiwan and its government. I will simply refer to The Republic of China as Taiwan. This is intended to emphasize that Taiwan is an inhabited island that is administered by a democratic government that differs from the Peoples Republic of China.

Taiwan

Military Nuclear Technology -
While Taiwan today does not have a nuclear weapons program, at one time it was actively pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. The need for a nuclear weapons program grew from the strained relationship with China. Even today, the Chinese government still lays claim to all Taiwanese territory.
Tensions between China and Taiwan heightened after the success of China’s first atomic device on October the 16th, 1964. Shortly thereafter Taiwan desperately sought ways to defend itself against this impending nuclear threat. In 1966, two Taiwanese atomic scientists took a guided tour of an Israeli nuclear facility. (9) Latter that same year, Taiwan sought to purchase a 50-megawatt reactor for a reported 50 million dollars from Siemens AG of West Germany. (10) These negotiations lasted until the summer of 1967. By the time these plans were presented to the President for final approval, the project had evolved into the "Hsin Chu Program." The Hsin Chu Program included a heavy water reactor, a heavy water manufacturing plant, and a “chemical type” plutonium separation plant with an estimated overall cost of roughly 140 million dollars.
President Chiang Kai-Shek following the recommendations of his most senior science adviser, Dr. Ta-you Wu, canceled the “Hsin Chu Program”. In truth Dr. Ta-you Wu believed strongly against having a nuclear weapons capability at all. He believed that this would jeopardize the protection provided by the United States. So he wrote a paper advising the President to cancel the “Hsin Chu Program”. In his paper he cited the lack of necessary financial resources to undertake such a project, and the lack of trained personal.
On July 26th, 1967 the Scientific Advisory Committee held a meeting to discuss the future direction of Taiwan’s nuclear energy program. Mr. Tang Jun-Po, Director of Preparatory Committee of Chung Shan Institute of Sciences and Technologies, Mr. Chen Wen-Kao of Taiwan Electricity Company (Taipower), and a few others were in attendance. (6) Mr. Chen Wen-Kao presented Taipower’s plans for a light-water reactor to generate electricity. The Chung Shan Institute opposed such plans, they wanted a heavy-water reactor; the reasons for we can only speculate about. The matter would not be settled until 1969 when Prime Minister Yen Chia-Kan ordered a 40-megawatt Canadian heavy-water reactor for the newly formed Institute of Nuclear Energy Research and Taipower bought light-water reactors for electricity production. The Institute of Nuclear Energy Research then replaced the Chung Shan Institute of Sciences and Technologies as Taiwan’s sole institution dedicated to nuclear technology research.
This move was made because the Chung Shan Institute of Sciences and Technologies was part of the Ministry of Defense, which also was working on Taiwan’s rocket program. Dr. Ta-you Wu believed that nuclear research and a rocket program would arouse suspicion if they were both headed by the same organization. Instead he recommended the formation of a legitimate civilian institute to head nuclear research in Taiwan. His recommendations lead to the formation of the Institute of Nuclear Energy Research.
The Institute of Nuclear Energy Research is an organized civilian committee made up of three branches: (8)
- The first branch is headed by the Director, who oversees three Deputy Directors:
1. The first Deputy Director is responsible for the institutes Nuclear Engineering Division, Nuclear Instrumentation Division, and Heath Physics Division
2. The second Deputy Director is responsible for the institutes Nuclear Fuel and Materials Division, Chemical Engineering Division, Engineering Division, and the Physics Division
3. The third Deputy Director is responsible for the institutes Isotope Application Division, the Chemistry Division, and the Chemical Analysis Division.

And the Chief Secretary responsible for: the institutes Accounting Office, the Personal Office, the Planning Office, the Civil Service Ethics Office, the Secretariat, and for the Nuclear Safety Technology Center, the Environmental and Energy Technology Center, and the Radiation Application Technology Center.

- The second branch is the Advisory Committee
- The third branch is the Nuclear Safety Committee.

Located 43 kilometers southwest of Taipei in Lungtan, Taoyuan; the Institute of Nuclear Energy Research is housed inside the same safety perimeter as the Chung Shan Institute of Sciences and Technologies. The Institute of Nuclear Energy Research site housed the Taiwan Research Reactor, a Canadian 40-megawatt heavy-water moderated, research reactor ordered by Prime Minister Yen Chia-Kan. The Taiwan Research Reactor, constructed in 1969 was fully operational by April 1973, and continued operation until 1988. During the first few years the Taiwan Research Reactor performed quite poorly only producing 30 kilograms of weapons grade plutonium by 1978.
At the approximate time of the Taiwan Research Reactors construction, work began on other, more clandestine, facilities at the Institute of Nuclear Energy Research. A uranium fuel production plant, a reprocessing facility, and a plutonium chemistry laboratory were constructed using equipment sourced from France, West Germany, and the United States among others.
Taiwanese intentions were to have a large reprocessing facility supplied by the United States; when this request was denied in 1969, the Taiwanese then turned to other countries for help. The Taiwanese first approached the German firm UHDE-Lurgi in late 1972 to build a 50 tons/year reprocessing plant. This plan was thwarted with pressure from the United States Government on both West Germany and Taiwan. Then, according to a letter discovered by Steven Weisman and Herbert Krosney and dated February 5th, 1973, the Taiwanese began plans to purchase a reprocessing plant that could reprocess 100 metric tons of spent fuel a year from Saint Gobain Techniques Nouvelles. Again this deal never did go through, although the author of the letter reveals that Saint Gobain might have supplied some type of smaller reprocessing facility.
Sometime in 1970 work began on a reprocessing facility at the "Hot Laboratory" adjacent to the research reactor. The facility, said to be completed by 1976, would have produced only 15 grams of plutonium a year, according to the Atomic Energy Council’s secretary general Victor Chang. The laboratory is believed to been a single hot cell, equipped with a remote mechanical manipulators, a fuel dissolver, and a small mixer-settler used in separating fissionable products. The hot labs purpose, according to the Taiwanese, was to process spent fuel from a zero-power reactor which used highly enriched uranium supplied by the United States. Even though the United States denied a request by the Taiwanese to process this fuel in 1975. In addition to this reprocessing lab, another smaller facility was built at the institute with the help of a Norwegian nuclear specialist who was involved with Norway’s reprocessing program. This facility was most likely used to research the various aspects and techniques required to reprocess irradiated material. (7)
Beginning in 1972, Taiwan purchased approximately 100 metric tons of South African uranium, delivered through 1974. The Institute of Nuclear Energy Research’s fuel-fabrication plant began operating sometime after delivery and produced around 20-30 metric tons of fuel per year. Twice the amount needed to run the research reactor.
By the mid-1970’s the Plutonium Fuel Chemistry Laboratory had four “glovebox” type workspaces with interconnecting pipelines used to transport plutonium liquids. One glovebox, equipped with a special neutron-shielding material and a vacuum reduction furnace, was used to produce plutonium metal. Plutonium, in metallic form, is rarely if ever used in any type of civilian nuclear research or energy production programs. (7)
In 1974 Taiwan received a supply of 1,075 grams of separated plutonium from the United States. It began processing this plutonium in 1975 to extract americium and by mid-1976 had processed 500 grams, with 175 grams remaining in the pipeline and glovebox workspaces.
With all this nuclear activity, the CIA concluded in 1974 that Taiwan could be nuclear capable in little more than five years.
The Institute of Nuclear Energy Research, which had been previously administered by the Chung Shan Institute of Sciences and Technologies, became part of the Taiwanese Atomic Energy Council in 1988. Construction of an indigenously designed 20-megawatt light-water research reactor at the Institute of Nuclear Energy Research is currently under place, replacing the old Taiwan Research Reactor. The new reactor named the Taiwan Research Reactor-II is set to be operational by August 2007.

Civilian Nuclear Technology -
Taiwan’s first venture into nuclear technology begun with a single research reactor constructed, under the Atoms for Peace initiative, at the National Tsing Hua University in 1959. Shortly after its construction, the university opened the Department of Atomic Science and began training atomic energy specialists. (2)
Another research reactor was built at the Institute of Nuclear Energy Research in 1968, and went critical in 1971.
Below is a table showing the technical data for each research reactor in Taiwan:

Table 2: Research Reactors in Taiwan (13)
Reactor Name Type Criticality Date Status
THOR 2 MW TRIGA Conv 1961 Operational
THAR 10 KW Argonaut 1974 Decommissioned - 1991
THMER 0 KW Mobile Edu. 1975 Shutdown - 1976
TRR 40 MW Heavy Water 1973 Shutdown - 1988
TRR-II 20MW Pool Expected 2006 Under Construction
WBRL Homog (L) 1983 Decommissioned
ZPRL 30KW Pool 1971 Operational

During the 1970’s Taipower, Taiwan’s state operated power company began the construction of all its currently operating nuclear power plants. The fourth plant was supposed to be constructed sometime during the 1980’s but a series of political set-backs stalled the project. Even as recently as 2001, the government has halted construction.

Table 1: Nuclear Power Plants in Taiwan (13)
Unit Reactor Type Installed
Capacity (MWe) Commercial
Operation Status
Chinshan 1 BWR/4 636 1978 Operating
Chinshan 2 BWR/4 636 1979 Operating
Kuosheng 1 BWR/6 985 1981 Operating
Kuosheng 2 BWR/6 985 1982 Operating
Maanshan 1 PWR 951 951 1984 Operating
Maanshan 2 PWR 951 951 1985 Operating
Yenliao 1 ABWR 1300 2004 Under Construction (30%)
Yenliao 2 ABWR 1300 2005 Under Construction(12)

Bibliography:
1. "Nuclear Weapons - China Nuclear Forces." 14 Nov 2003. Federation of American Scientists. 27 Jan 2004. <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/nuke/index.html>.
2. "Taiwan Nuclear Weapons." 04 April 2000. Federation of American Scientists. 28 Jan 2004. <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/taiwan/nuke/index.html>.
3. "NTI: Country Overviews: Taiwan." Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). 28 Jan 2004. <http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Taiwan/index.html>.
4. "Taiwan: Nuclear profile." Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 30 Jan 2004. <http://projects.sipri.se/nuclear/cnsc2tai.htm>.
5. "China's Nuclear Weapons." 1 May 2001. 30 Jan 2004. <http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/China/ChinaTesting.html>.
6. "A Historical Document." May 1988. INSTITUTE FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. 30 Jan 2004. <http://www.isis-online.org/publications/taiwan/ta-youwu.html>.
7. Albright, David & Gay, Corey. "Taiwan: Nuclear Nightmare Averted." Jan/Feb 1998. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. 30 Jan 2004. <http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/1998/jf98/jf98albright.html>.
8. Institute of Nuclear Energy Research. 01 Feb 2004. <http://www.iner.gov.tw/index_en.html>.
9. "U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv, Airgram 810, 24 March 1966, "More on Nationalist Chinese Atomic Experts Visit to Israel". 03 Feb 2004. <http://www.gwu.edu/%7ensarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB20/21-01.htm>.
10. "U.S. Embassy Bonn, "German Nuclear Reactor for Taiwan" Cable 3000, 25 March 1966." 03 Feb 2004. <http://www.gwu.edu/%7ensarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB20/27-01.htm>.
11. Burr , William. "New Archival Evidence on Taiwanese." 13 Oct 1999. 03 Feb 2004. <http://www.gwu.edu/%7ensarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB20/index.html>.
12. "Maps of Nuclear Power Reactors: TAIWAN." International Nuclear Safety Center. 03 Feb 2004. <http://www.insc.anl.gov/pwrmaps/map/taiwan.php>.
13. "Taiwan country profile: Nuclear facilities profiles." Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 03 Feb 2004. <http://projects.sipri.se/nuclear/cnsc3tai.htm>.

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Japan’s Civil and Military Nuclear Capabilities

To look at the nuclear capabilities of Japan you must look at both the military and civil. While the use of nuclear weapons is banned in Japan the use of nuclear energy as a source of power is utilized through out the country.

The Japanese government set several laws into motion forbidding the production of nuclear weapons as early as 1947. Which in Japan’s constitution “…renounces the right to use force or the threat of force as a means of settling international disputes…” Japan also set into effect the Atomic Energy Basic Law, which states that “the research, development and utilization of atomic energy shall be limited to peaceful purposes...".
Japan also put into effect one more law, the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, which state that Japan shall not: possess nuclear weapons, manufacture nuclear weapons, or permit nuclear weapons on Japanese soil. Japan is also active in nuclear nonproliferation and arms control and was responsible for the ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Japan, although a strong advocate of nuclear disarmament, Japan also signed the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which states that only U.S. troops are admitted on Japanese soil, also an attack on one force will be considered an attack on both ( applies to forces stationed on Japan only) and that the U.S. is prepared to use nuclear weapons. This Treaty was signed in1951 and is still followed. Because of this treaty Japan falls under the protective umbrella of the United States nuclear arsenal. (1)

Japan’s outlook on nuclear energy however is a different story all together. Japan, being a very populated island must import many things used in day-to-day life. One of those is their energy supply; Japan has a program for recycling spent nuclear fuel in the form of metal-oxide. In 2001 Japan had more then 30 metric tons of spent fuel stored at reprocessing plants in Europe along with another 5 to 6 tons stored domestically. Originally, the Japanese government planned to consume the fuel by 2010, but because of technical and safety issues this timetable has been delayed and the Japanese government has yet to come out with another date.(3)

Japanese Nuclear Development


October 1967- Japan starts its first nuclear power development program.
May 1969- Japan has first successful uranium test.
September 1977-Start of spent fuel utilization tests.
March 1978-Start of full operation at the FUGEN plant.
December 1979-Successful extraction of uranium in uranium enriched plant Ningyo-toge
September 1982-Start of fuel reprocessing test.
April 1988-Start of the demonstration of the Ningyo-toge plant.
October 1998-The JNC (Japan Nuclear Cycle) is established.
August 1999- Completion of the Quantitative Assessment Radionuclide Migration Experimental Facility.
March 2003- Termination of the FUGEN plant.(2)

Bibliography

(1) (2003). Japan. NTI, . Retrieved Jan 28, 2004, from www.nti.org(1)

(2). JNC history. Jan 30, 2004, from www.jnc.go.jp/ (2)

(3). Nuclear Reactor. . Jan 28, 2004, from www.insc.org(3)


Japans Current Standing on Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Energy


In the years following the Second World War, Japan has made an extreme effort to maintain peace with other countries. They have limited defensive capabilities because of their post war agreements. Currently Japan holds no nuclear weapons and does not have any desire to acquire them. (1) However, Japan lacks natural resources and is dependent on nuclear energy for much of their domestic needs. They already have fifty one atomic plants and still need more. (5)
Japan has many foreign policies which stress the necessity for continued peace and stability internationally. The official defense policy of Japan is to not act with force unless acted upon. They have the right to defend themselves, but only with the United State’s permission and supervision. While they are limited in their defense capabilities, they still possess enough deterrent forces to help prevent an act of aggression. (1)
Under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Japan agreed to never "use, develop, or allow the transport of nuclear weapons through its territory." (2) They have tried to get other countries to eliminate some or all of their nuclear weapons, material, and capabilities. In 1990 Japan promoted the idea of an Additional Protocol to try and strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The Additional Protocol would inspect suspected nuclear weapons development programs and reinforce IAEA safeguards. Japan and the IAEA hope for universalization of the Protocol. Japan also helped the IAEA with financial support to host two seminars promoting the Protocol. After the meetings, Japan was pleased that 19 countries had signed. The additional protocol could then go into effect in 16 countries. By July 2003, 74 countries had signed the Protocol and it went into force in 35 of those countries. (4)
While Japan has no possession over nuclear weapons, it wouldn’t be impossible for them to develop a nuclear weapon. It was reported that during the 1960's Japan was studying the development of nuclear weapons. Of course they had to do it secretly. In 1974 Japan’s prime minister announced that although Japan had the capability to acquire and possess nuclear weapons they have not made any. It has been alleged that Japan has the ability to create nuclear weapons within a year. They have all the raw materials needed, all the technology, and capital to produce a functional nuclear weapon. Japan could be thought of and is thought of in some cases as a “virtual nuclear state,” because it possesses everything needed to create a nuclear weapon. (2) You also have to consider Japan’s ability to create a ballistic missile. An active commercial space launch program is located in Japan. This program uses solid-fuel rockets which could be easily converted to ballistic missiles. (6)
Japan holds fifty one atomic plants; this is however not enough. Only one-
third of the country's electricity comes from these plants. Japan wants more nuclear plants and the government is deciding whether or not to allow them to build twenty more facilities over the next ten years. Energy experts argue both for and against Japan’s ambitious nuclear expansion. Japan has also been using a lot less electricity because of the economic slowdown over the past of sixteen years. If more atomic plants were built in Japan, it would offer more jobs, which is a major economic benefit.
On the other hand Japan has also seen the costs of accidents. In September 2003 there was an accidental explosion at the Tokaimura plant. Residents within the area were exposed to radiation, and one of the workers was killed. If the government sanctions plans to build more nuclear facilities the risk and benefits will have to be weighed carefully. (5)

Bibliography

1) Contemporary Report, (2000, Oct 17). Japan. . Jan 28, 2004, from http://www.u.arizona.edu/~volgy/japanfp.html

2) Nuclear Weapons Program. . Jan 28, 2004, from http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/japan/nike/index.html

3) Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. . Jan 28, 2004, from http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/index.html

4) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, the Japan\'s Efforts and Contribution on Universalization of the International Atomic Energy Additional Protocol. Jan 28, 2004, from http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/energy/iaea/protocol.html

5) Japan-Nuclear Energy, (2000, Mar 10). Japan - Nuclear Energy. Jan 28, 2004, from http://www.fas.org/news/japan/000310-japan 1.html

5) FAS, Missile Program - Japan. Jan 28, 2004, from http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/japan/missle/index.html

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IAEA SAFEGUARDS POLICIES AND REGULATIONS

The IAEA is responsible for regulating and commissioning nuclear facilities in different countries and supplying cooperative countries with equipment, technology, fuel and man-power as incentives to follow the safeguards and regulations that are laid down by the IAEA and other international organizations such as the United Nations. The IAEA’s responsibilities mostly include enforcing the NPT (the non-proliferation treaty) and its own codes and regulations which may or may not be the same for different countries depending on political history and economic status. These agreements are designed to establish accountability, safety and security standards that all member nations have to follow in order to receive benefits from the IAEA and members of the international community. The IAEA is authorized to apply and enforce these safeguards under article III.A.5 of the U.N... such safeguards include the INFCIRC/153, INFCIRC/66/Rev.2d), INFCIRC/540, the INFCIRC/66-type and the INFCIRC/153-type codes and are enforced with inspections from IAEA personnel.
INFCIRC/153 requires states to accept and follow all IAEA safeguards in regards to any and all source of fissionable material in all peaceful activities. INFCIRC/66/rev2d) includes safeguards applied to some states and is meant to keep certain items accounted for that can be used to process nuclear material for weaponization purposes, such as tubes that could be used in centrifuges and heavy water. The INFCIRC/66-type safe guards are basically to ensure that nuclear and nuclear related material are not used in nuclear devises or explosives besides those specified under IAEA agreements. The INFCIRC/153-type safeguards basically state that all other safeguards must be followed and under these agreements nuclear services and facilities have been offered for use by the five current nuclear-weapons states ( the “nuclear club”). This would include the manufacture and reprocessing of fuel rods and the disposal of waste and any other actions that could be a proliferation risk. This is determined though a case study on where radioactive material can be diverted for nuclear devises or other weapons requiring radioactive material such as “dirty bombs”.
The INFCIRC/540 gives the IAEA more authority to draft new regulations and allows countries to negotiate with the IAEA current specific regulations such as those specified under INFCIRC/66-type regulations. These regulations are enforced with regular inspections by IAEA personnel often without any kind of warning. The authority for such inspections is included in INFCIRC/153 and INFCIRC/66 and failure to allow inspectors into any nuclear facility will negate IAEA cooperation and therefore earn you many enemies and cause you to loose a major source of supplies and technology. This also often results in sanctions from powerful countries and penalties from the United Nations and possible military action. Fear of these reprisals and the benefits of following IAEA agreements usually keep countries from wanting to do anything to violate the IAEA regulations. The goals for these inspections are simple and their primary objective is to see to it that all fissile and nuclear related material is accounted for and that safety and security measures are being met. Things done during an inspection are basically: (1) inspection of the nuclear facility in question and examination of the records of said site and comparison of those to the records provided by the state, (2) surveillance and containment measures, (3) accounting of declared nuclear material and nuclear related material, (4) verifying transfer of nuclear material within and outside the facility, (5) verification of nuclear production as compared with the amount of nuclear fuel recorded.

(1) "THE SAFEGUARDS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (\"THE AGENCY\").." IAEA website

(2) "North Korea rejects IAEA calls for accepting nuclear safeguards." Clari News 23 September 03, special, 1st edition

(3) Pinkston, Daniel A.. "Nclear Crisis on the Korean Peninsula." 5 dec 03. 30 Jan 2004.

(4) Albright, David . "North Korea drops out of IAEA." May 93. the Bulletin of the Atomic scientists. 30 Jan 2004. <www.the bulletin.org/issues/1993/may93reports.html>.